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This thesis explores the relationship between Britain's counter-radicalization programme Prevent and 
the testimony of those convicted of terrorism offences in Northern Ireland.  The research explores the 
striking contradiction whereby Northern Ireland does not implement radicalization pre-emption 
despite its active dissident groups and notorious history of conflict, yet the rest of the UK does. 
Utilizing primary interviews with 17 Prevent officials (including Channel's hard-to-reach ‘de-
radicalization’ mentors) and over 30 Northern Irish former combatants, the thesis performs a 
discourse analysis to expose the two fundamentally different ways of knowing terrorism risk in the 
UK. It undertakes a critical exposition of Prevent's construction and navigation of risk, asking how ‘pre-
crime risk’ is observed and intervened upon only on one side of the border, when a fragile ceasefire 
best describes post-conflict reality on the other. How does the discourse of radicalization subjugate 
the history of political insurgency in Northern Ireland, rendering it invisible, and what reality is 
constructed through these silences? Through substantial empirical investigation, the thesis explores 
how pre-emptive security closes down space for political contestation – ultimately inventing the 
‘(de)radicalizable subject’ though a rationality infused with insecurity. To construct this subject, the 
discourse of ‘risk’ and ‘pre-emption’ has to silence the history of insurgency in Northern Ireland and 
the voices of its perpetrators. These militants staunchly rebut any narrative that they were ‘vulnerable’ 
to radicalization, but rather were heroes who actively chose armed rebellion. This thesis brings the 
disjuncture of UK terrorism knowledge to the forefront, exposing how the discourse of risk, 
vulnerability, and pre-emption necessarily silences militant testimonies – inventing a world without 







What's the motive? Is it ideology? Is it pro-ISIS? No it’s nothing, it’s profoundly human (CM13). 
 
Radicalization is because of external factors on individuals… In Northern Ireland [in] 1969 the… 
most extenuating circumstance is blood on the streets (L27). 
 
The British preemptive counter‐terrorism programme Prevent, and its intervention arm Channel, have 
been consistently lauded for producing “real results in helping divert people away from terrorism and 
violence” (Security Minister Ben Wallace, in HM Government 2017). Looked to by other states as a 
paragon of preemptive risk-management (Thornton & Bouhana 2017), Prevent imposes a duty on 
teachers, nurses, and social workers to look for so-called ‘signs of radicalization’ in their clients. Cases 
presenting these signs are identified and reported to local Prevent teams so that risk-management 
interventions can occur – allegedly – to minimize the chance of any terrorism risk actually 
materializing. This attempt to ‘preempt the next terrorist’ is constructed on a number of suppositions, 
including the calculability of not-yet-materialized risk, the interruptible nature of the potential threat, 
and the notion that danger emanates from the psychological defects of certain individuals (Knudsen 
2018; Younis 2020). Functioning through this rationality, Prevent is embedded within a broader turn 
towards possibilistic risk-thinking, a turn that was apparent during the 20th century but that rose to 
prominence at the turn of the millennium, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (Valverde 
& Mopas 2004; Amoore & de Goede 2008; Aradau & van Munster 2008a,b; Amoore 2013). Prioritizing 
the imagination of possibly-impending catastrophes and preempting their occurrence has become a 
central component of risk-governance, especially in the Global North: Brian Massumi writes, 
“Preemption, it is argued, is the most powerful operative logic of the present” (2015a, 209). The logic 
goes: threats are everywhere and are unending, and they must be managed so that life as we know it 
can continue. As prominent British politician and ideologue Michael Gove remarked in the context of 
COVID-19, “The whole point about life is that you need to manage risk in a way that keeps people as 
safe as possible” (Marr 2020). Risk-thinking is ultimately concerned with making the future amenable 
to intervention and direction (Aradau & van Munster 2008a; Bourne 2014). Yet, as we will see 
throughout the thesis, what becomes visibilized as ‘risk’ is the subject of a privileged gaze (Anderson 
2010a; Martin 2018). In the case of Prevent, a programme that assumes a distinctly psychological 
explanation for the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’, individual-level flashes of violence are the disaster to 
be averted, and the object rendered visible is the fallible individual. 
But what knowledge (and experience) does this gaze exclude? What assumptions constitute 
the preemptive lens and condition how it looks at individuals, to explain ‘why violence erupts’? What 
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becomes seen, and what remains hidden, through the fixation on the risk of terrorism? And in turn, 
what does this mean for the construction of subjectivities in a society dominated by risk-thinking – 
what are the hidden ways in which our conduct is shaped, our bodies governed (Gordon 1991)? In 
order to explore these questions, the thesis will utilize literature on silencing and anticipatory risk-
governance to expose the operative logics of British counter-radicalization. To perform this analysis, 
and to understand the silences upon which ‘terrorism preemption' is built, the research illuminates 
the assumptions the Prevent programme makes about why people engage in violence, before 
contrasting this knowledge with the stories of those convicted of terrorism offences: former 
combatants from ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. Importantly, although Northern Ireland has a long 
history of conflict (which continues today), Prevent is not applied there given the devolution of 
security and policing powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Instead, it is instituted only in 
mainland Britain, with England and Wales adopting Prevent directly from Westminster and Scotland 
interpreting the policy through its devolved parliament in Holyrood. As the thesis unfolds, we see 
chasmic disjunctures characterizing the relationship between these two worlds – of assumptions 
about ‘the terrorist’, and the experience of ‘terrorists’ themselves – despite the worlds being 
physically separated by only twelve miles of water. Why is Prevent not implemented in Northern 
Ireland, a region out of all the UK where it might most naturally appear at home? We find across the 
thesis that the Prevent assemblage relies upon, and re-produces, the silencing of the experiences of 
those who perpetrated the very sort of violence that Prevent supposedly counteracts. 
 
 
Prevent, and the Disruptive Testimony of Northern Irish Ex-militants 
Prevent was established as one of the four strands of the broader counter-terrorism strategy 
(CONTEST) in Britain in 2003, and was rolled out following the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005. Referrals 
to Prevent in mainland Britain are made on the basis of 22 Extreme Risk Guidance (ERG) risk factors, 
or ‘signs of radicalisation’ taken from studies of “extremist-related” convicts (NOMS 2014). These 
factors, which include a ‘need for status’ and ‘them-vs-us thinking’, apparently demonstrate that an 
individual may constitute a risk (see Figure 4, Thematic Chapter 1). In 2015, the Prevent Duty imposed 
a legal responsibility on public sector workers to identify and report these signs, and now an 
“overwhelming majority” of teachers (and many other public servants) accept this responsibility as 
just another facet of their existing safeguarding duties (Busher et al. 2017, 6). My research focuses in 
particular on Channel ‘de-radicalization’ interventions because, as one practitioner said, “The true 
workings of Prevent is Channel” (PPolice9). Channel was piloted in 2007 as the individual-intervention 
arm focussing on the most supposedly-risky referrals made to Prevent, was expanded over the 
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following few years, and was rolled out nationally in 2012. It aims to dematerialize the risk 
(supposedly) pose by referred individuals, through a series of one-on-one interventions with Channel 
mentors that take place often over the course of a few months. I interviewed 17 Prevent-related 
actors, including strategic Prevent officials and Channel ‘de-radicalization’ mentors. These officials 
make judgments about which risk is made ‘seen’, how its subsequent management should be 
implemented, and ultimately decide whether a case continues to pose a threat or should be deemed 
safe enough for the mentoring to conclude. 
Being concerned with rethinking and deconstructing assemblages that prioritize mistrust, 
suspicion, and otherness, I was interested to problematize Prevent by exploring its potential silences 
and discontinuities. In order to analyse the knowledge and privileges upon which Prevent's 
assumptions are built, I contrasted its claims about why violence occurs with the stories of people who 
had been involved in the very violence that it works to interrupt. I interviewed around 30 Northern 
Irish former combatants from ‘the Troubles’ to see how they framed their involvement, and examined 
their testimony in light of how Prevent practitioners narrated the identification and management of 
‘risk’. As ex-militants represent the materialization of risk that Prevent would have wished to divert, 
what is the relationship between their stories and the risk factors that Prevent alleges cause, or are 
associated with, terrorism risk? Are their explanations for violence represented in Prevent’s 
discourse? Does it ‘hear’ those convicted of terrorism offences, or is this testimony rendered invisible? 
What knowledge and experience is excluded through this novel and contemporary framework of risk 
(Rose 2006, 7)? What are the consequences that such an act of forgetting produces? What are the 
effective implications: in other words, how does this performance of knowledge in turn reproduce 
knowledge, and what is this new knowledge? And what are its affective implications: in other words, 
how does it make an impact on our lives? What forms of knowledge and practices (thought, speech, 
behaviour) does it restrict and repress, and what does it encourage and reward? Before delving further 
into the meaning of these questions, I will briefly justify the use of Northern Irish ex-militants. At the 
beginning of the thesis it might seem an unusual comparison, but I will make the case that 
retrospectively, these actors would have been ideal clients of Prevent’s interventions. 
In light of my inability to secure interviews with convicted contemporary Terrorism Act (TACT) 
offenders in Britain (see Methodology chapter), it is apposite to investigate Northern Irish ex-militant 
testimony in relation to the assumptions behind Channel’s ‘counter-terrorism’ interventions, for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it is appropriate given that there has not been any concerted academic 
attempt to compare those who engaged in the Northern Irish conflict with those who are governed 
by Prevent (a programme brought into existence only five years after the Good Friday Agreement). 
No thesis has proposed that some fundamental shift has occurred between the Troubles and the turn 
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of the millennium, regarding how and why people become engaged in militant violence (a discussion 
explored further in the following chapter). So how can the sudden transition from the armed policing 
and political negotiation used by the British state in Northern Ireland, to psychologically profiling 
‘vulnerable’ individuals, be maintained? 
Assessing Prevent in light of the stories of former combatants from the Troubles allows us to 
examine the claims of prominent security officials that violence should be seen as continuous across 
eras, and that violence has always been a psychological problem solvable through safeguarding 
technologies. The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), which oversees the Prevent 
programme, gave evidence in 2012 to the UK House of Commons Home Affairs Committee through 
its Director Charles Farr. When he was asked whether the drivers of radicalisation are different than 
they were before the Good Friday Agreement, he replied, “Not fundamentally, no… There is an 
ideological component, which is important, but there is a lot about personal vulnerabilities that drives 
people into the arms of terrorist organisations” (2012, Q309). Positioning ‘ideology’ and ‘personal 
vulnerability’ as producing violence is characteristic of mainstream radicalization scholarship, and is 
the foundational assumption behind Prevent. This position, which problematizes the individual and 
excludes any explanatory power of structural causes, has been read backwards onto the protagonists 
of the Troubles: the claim is that individual vulnerabilities explain violence, and it was always thus, as 
implied by Farr. The realization of this truth is only just catching up with what was always a reality. 
Where successive British Governments’ renderings of the IRA as degenerate criminals, bandits, and 
evildoers was prominent during the Troubles (Thatcher, quoted in Apple 1981; Mulcahy 1995), Farr 
was making the claim that ex-militants from the Troubles were no different than those who ‘become 
radicalized’ and deploy violence in contemporary Britain. Indeed, this claim is replicated in the Prevent 
Strategy: eight times across the document, it notes that Prevent is designed to combat “all forms of 
terrorism”, and consistently obscures the distinction between the Irish and British contexts: 
 
In Ireland, as elsewhere, ideology is rarely the only factor in the process of radicalisation and 
recruitment. Recruitment is often personality-driven or dependent on family or local 
allegiances. The promise of status, excitement and in some cases financial reward are all 
relevant (HM Government 2011b, 20). 
 
Do these personality-driven risk factors – and the absence of structural factors – make sense in relation 
to how ex-militants portrayed their involvement? We find that this ‘reading back’ of the contemporary 
British precautionary rationale onto the Northern Irish conflict effectively silences the voices of armed 
protagonists, making it important that this thesis reaches out to hear them. 
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Occasionally during interviews, practitioners themselves would also comment on the 
disjuncture in British counter-terrorism, between then and now. For instance, PC6 said the reason that 
a preemptive approach wasn't implemented during the Troubles was because it hadn't been 
considered, rather than preemptive safeguarding interventions not being likely to work: 
 
I think they had such a focus on the military aspect of the war if you like than prevention at 
an early stage. I think safeguarding has become more of a thing than it was back then, if you 
think of all forms of abuse – sexual, anything else – we’re a lot better at dealing with it now 
than we were in the 70s and 80s than we were. So I guess there’s natural learning as far as 
that’s concerned… There probably are still comparisons to be made in terms of how people 
got involved in violence [in Northern Ireland], there’re maybe some good connections that 
can be made because again if you take away the ideology, there’s not too many middle class 
Catholics from Malone Road who joined the IRA if you know what I mean. So they probably 
woulda been well served to look at social and economic factors, people’s vulnerabilities, 
people’s friendship groups and grievances and all those sorts of things… That’s something they 
don’t give themselves enough credit for over here – learning from past experiences and 
recognizing mistakes that’ve been made in the past. 
 
Rather than positing these two objects of concern – violence in Northern Ireland during the Troubles, 
and violence in contemporary Britain – as substantively different, PC6 claims that it was a mistake to 
approach the conflict with a military response. The way to solve the problem of violence has always 
been to consider its potential perpetrators as abused victims and to safeguard them. This reading of 
the present back into the past is evidenced continually throughout the thematic chapters. Prevent 
does not directly apply to Northern Ireland, officially because the areas covered by Prevent are 
devolved matters and are therefore the responsibility of the Northern Irish government in Stormont 
(HM Government 2011b, 106). However, the Prevent Strategy notes that “the issues dealt with under 
this Prevent strategy and the principles it sets out are relevant [and “can be applied”] to the attempts 
to counter the threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism” in Britain (HM Government 2011b, 
14,41). Indeed, PC6 told me that in his local area “we had… an Irish case through Channel.” We will 
unpack the legitimacy of this comparison further during the Methodology chapter. Again, this thesis 
explores the experience of fighters from the conflict in Northern Ireland so that the assumptions made 
about why (their) violence occurs can be more effectively scrutinized.  
I do not intend to make structural claims or assert specific causes of violence in this research. 
In considering Prevent’s counter-radicalization scheme ‘Channel’ against the testimony of ‘the 
terrorist’ themselves, I am most fundamentally interested in how the two worlds of ‘risk-knowledge’ 




The Silenced Knowledge of Preemptive Governance 
Prevent is a programme supposedly designed to interrupt terrorism before it materializes, and is 
lauded as a touchstone of preemptive risk-governance around the Global North (Thornton & 
Bouhana 2017; Skleparis & Knudsen 2020). Yet when we compare its rationale and operations to the 
testimony of those actually convicted of terrorism offences, we witness how Prevent excludes this 
alternative knowledge from its ‘counter-radicalization’ interventions. Prevent relies upon a labyrinth 
of chasmic gaps between its assumptions and the stories of those who would have been its most ideal 
constituents. The Prevent apparatus forecloses relations of space and time – and consequently the 
testimony of former militants – by situating cognitive recalibration as the way towards reduction of 
terrorism risk. Where ex-militants described environmental (spatial) and historical (temporal) 
conditions as instigating their involvement, the ‘dispositif of risk’ closes down this possibility by 
problematizing individual vulnerability (Wimelius et al. 2018; Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier 2019; 
Stephens & Sieckelinck 2020). The meaning behind alternative stories becomes silenced by an 
assemblage that provides psychological interventions rather than political reform. This theme will be 
expanded upon in the following chapter and unfolded across the empirical material, but it is important 
to note here that preemption excludes from reasonable discourse the meaning of material (spatial 
and temporal) relations (Massumi 2015a). It precludes the importance of the co-constitutive affect of 
such relations in the formation of subjectivity, fixing the ideal identity as “already, and forever, 
constituted,” rather than rendering identities as always being (re-) negotiated (Massey 2005, 10; also 
see: Boukalas 2019; Peck 2013). 
Preemptive terrorism governance produces an imaginary of ‘potential terrorism risk’ without 
listening to the stories of those who demonstrated a materialization of this risk. The explicitly 
psychological context within which the Extreme Risk Guidance ‘risk factor’ study was undertaken (see 
Thematic Chapter 1) circulates a self-perpetuating outcome: ignorant and vulnerable but ultimately 
tameable individuals are rendered as the locus of terrorism risk. All that is required is their resilience, 
rather than material reform they allegedly desire. When this terrorism-related risk-consciousness is 
held alongside the very object it is supposedly concerned with (i.e. those convicted of terrorism 
offences), we find that this alternative knowledge disrupts Prevent's gaze. De-historicized and de-
contextualized knowledge is privileged by Prevent. A different story, one that historicizes and 
contextualizes, is told to us by its object of concern. One republican peace activist, R43, gave a talk “in 
a London mosque about Prevent from our perspective here,” and continued, saying, “The whole 
thing’s a load of fricking nonsense!” The preemptive gaze is perennially insecure: risk is everywhere, 
but its carriers unaware; personal resilience is the solution, yet nobody is ever totally secure; suspicion 
is the order of the day. The site of intervention is the cognitive realm, and, by diverting people away 
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from violence through resilience training, we find an assemblage concerned with perpetual spatial and 
temporal continuity. This approach was consistently rejected by ex-militants, who had perpetrated 
violence a few years prior in the same country, and whose motivations are not seen as substantively 
different than contemporary terrorism offenders on the mainland. The disjuncture between the 
preemptive intervention and its (hypothetical) subjects will be the central theme of the research. 
The fixation with anticipation obscures the possibility for political change, and instead sets 
individuals on a course to cope more effectively with their existing surroundings. The future is already 
here, made present and simultaneously averted through interventions (Aradau & van Munster 
2008a,b; Massumi 2015; Boukalas 2019). Alternative realities are only negotiated on a personal level: 
who could pose a threat to the existing order, and how could they be brought on-side and made more 
resilient to their environments? Such a fixation on risk, and ensuring the recurrence of the present, is 
upheld only by ignoring ex-militants’ emphasis on political change and reform of external 
environments. We see throughout the thesis that Prevent would have wished to act on ex-militants 
from the Troubles. However, instead of listening to and including ex-militant testimony in negotiating 
a different future, anticipatory interventions would have wholly ignored their experiences, and would 
have instead cast these actors as simply needing become more resilient within a continuation of their 
surroundings. 
The testimony of ex-militants profoundly unsettles the divergent ways of seeing and knowing 
‘terrorism risk' in mainland Britain and Northern Ireland: “How could we have seen it any other way, 
when all other avenues of protest were barred?… It’s very strange that people over in Britain don’t see 
that” (R30, emphasis added). Despite practitioners occasionally claiming that Prevent would have 
worked during the Troubles, we clearly see the particularism and separation of the Irish and British 
contexts in the implementation of Channel interventions. Rather than listening to those on the outside 
and promoting a radical inclusion of ‘risky others’, which was central to how ex-militants explained 
their movement towards peace, Prevent shuts down the space to trust or learn from those outside its 
risk-conscious rationality. Prevent practitioners consistently drew distinctions between them (risky 
Channel cases unaware of their potential terrorism propensity) and us (enlightened, safe, risk-aware 
activists) (Elshimi 2015). By constructing the prevention of political violence as inseparable from the 
preemptive safeguarding of vulnerable people’s underdeveloped minds, Prevent casts any identity 
that is not aware of its own hypothetical risk as founded on misunderstanding, as illogical, and as 
inherently dangerous. Throughout the thesis we will see that the only acceptable subjectivity enabled 
to exist by counter-radicalization interventions is one which is acutely aware of its potential for 
devastation, of its need to change from vulnerable to resilient, and of its simultaneous, productive 
responsibility to spot risk in others. Ex-militants narrated achieving their continued disengagement 
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from violence through the possession of multiple (conflicting) subjectivities, allow their meaningful 
political contestation. But the propulsion of Prevent is towards restricting subjectivities that are open 
to achieving reforms to the existing neoliberal order. Those who don’t assume proactive risk-
consciousness as the primary lens through which to view the world – and who are identified as 
contravening this mentality – are rendered potentially dangerous. They are offered ‘counter-
radicalization’ interventions until risk-thinking is acquired and success declared. However, this new 
identity is necessarily accompanied by a continued and  active responsibility to look everywhere for 
risk. Citizens under this modality “must prove their [continual] innocence through either consent or 
complicity with the national security state” (Giroux 2004, 20). This sits awkwardly with the testimony 
of those who have engaged in violence. These constituents – those upon whom Prevent would have 
wished to intervene – don’t ‘see’ primarily through a framework of risk, but through trust and 
negotiation with dangerous others. At every turn we see that the significant claims Prevent makes are 
only legitimized when we disregard the stories of its most ideal subjects. 
This is an important avenue of exploration, because the positioning of certain subjectivities as 
legitimate and others as fundamentally risky – to a point of potentially producing catastrophe – has 
significant implications for relations of space and time. How far are we governed by the politics of 
decision (Aradau & van Munster 2007); is there anything else except to choose what to do with the 
space immediately in front of us? Is the only temporality the present moment (Boukalas 2019), or is 
there a past worth learning from, a (different) future worth imagining? How are we affected by the 
gaze of risk-awareness? Looking to silenced experiences matters in light of these questions, because 
such stories help to illuminate the claims made by Prevent about why humans act. In light of these 
stories, the claims of preemption become exposed as fundamentally circular, and making reference 
only to their own quite literal world of imagination, legitimized by a “passion for ignorance” (Zulaika 
2012, 54; also see: Zulaika 2009; Jackson 2012). The power in bringing forth subjugated (ex-militant) 
stories can disrupt  
 
the façade of a foundation for authority, [which is constructed when] politics retroactively 
reorganizes the past and reconstitutes its origins backwards to absorb and conceal the 
traumatic gaps within language, subjectivity and the relationship to the sovereign (Heath-Kelly 
2016c, 151). 
 
Like the apparent irreconcilability between the two quotes at the top of this introduction, the two 
worlds of knowledge from Prevent and its ideal constituents constantly unsettle each other, showing 
us that there exists a different way to interpret than the universal claims made by Prevent, an 
alternative to seeing everything through the eyes of risk, another reality than one which closes down 
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relations of space and time. I now turn to the literature that already exists on this topic and the original 




Prevent was originally designed through the framework of community cohesion; the logic was that 
the integration of excluded communities into mainstream British society would produce relative 
safety from terrorism (DCLG 2007; also see: Thomas 2014a,b; Kundnani 2009). This direction was 
ultimately considered to be counter-productive because it stoked racial divisions, and the cohesion 
agenda of the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) was officially divorced from 
Prevent’s operation in 2011. The DCLG ceded its responsibility for this broader community work to 
the Home Office, which took Prevent away from cohesion and down a more overtly securitized 
trajectory (Thomas 2014a,b). This was around the time of the national rollout of the Channel 
individual-intervention programme (which occurred in 2012), and the mentoring scheme quickly 
became the “jewel in the crown” of Prevent (PC6). Although a central aim of Prevent is still the delivery 
of programmes that target ‘vulnerable communities’, different iterations of Prevent have enabled the 
de-prioritizing of overtly-racialized cohesion approaches, and the escalating prominence of individual 
interventions through population-wide surveillance (Heath-Kelly 2017b). 
The field of radicalization studies that informs Prevent’s operation foregrounds the correlation 
between (individual) vulnerability and the incidence of violence (Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier 
2019). The broader historical development of this field, which emerged from psychological-deviancy 
models of criminality and presumptions that ‘the terrorist’ was concerned with bringing about the 
apocalypse, will be explored more fully in the following chapter. But for now, theories around 
radicalization assert an association between individual ‘deficiencies’ (like mental health issues and 
substance abuse) and national security risk (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich 2013; Corner & Gill 
2015,2017,2019, Corner, Gill, & Mason 2016; Lankford 2016; Bouhana et al. 2018). The individual is 
the prominent object of concern in this literature, a theme manifesting most evidently in research on 
so-called ‘lone wolf’ terrorist actors (Spaaij 2010,2012; Jenkins 2011; Borum, Fein, & Vossekuil 2012; 
Simon 2013; Gill, Horgan, & Deckert 2014; Danzell & Maisonet-Montañez 2016). As well as taking a 
significant lead from anticipatory risk-governance literature (see following chapter), my research 
builds on many critiques of this hegemonic radicalization discourse. 
These critiques, which deconstruct the language and practice of ‘counter-radicalization’ 
policies like Prevent, highlight significant discrepancies and inconsistencies behind key concepts, and 
the circular construction of ‘pre‐crime’ risk (Kundnani 2009; Sedgwick 2010; Jackson 2012; Heath‐Kelly 
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2012,2013a,2017a,b; Baker‐Beall, Heath‐Kelly, & Jarvis 2014; Thomas 2014a,b; Martin 2014,2018; 
Lowe, 2017; Silva 2018; Coolsaet 2019; Younis and Jadhav 2020). This critical scholarship points in 
particular to the subjective way in which basic definitions and aims are instrumentalized: counter-
radicalization practitioners often rely on personally-defined concepts and draw from ‘common-sense’ 
logics (Dresser 2019), rather than reflect critically on the linguistic and conceptual minefield in which 
they work (Elshimi 2017; van de Weert & Eijkman 2018). The imprecision and lack of clarity 
underpinning analytical signifiers like ‘radicalization’, ‘de-radicalization’, and ‘extremism’ has been 
widely documented (Sedgwick 2010; Richards 2011; Elshimi 2017; Lowe 2017). Following this 
research, other scholars have interviewed health workers, educators, and other public sector officials, 
finding that these workers broadly accept and implement the ‘Prevent Duty’ – the responsibility to 
identify and report ‘signs of radicalization’ – through multiple and varied interpretations (Heath-Kelly 
& Strausz 2018; Dresser 2019; Younis and Jadhav 2020). This open space clearly allows for (and even 
encourages) racialized and gendered inscriptions of threat by decision-makers – from teachers making 
the initial referral to Channel officials mentoring cases (Dixit 2014; Elshimi 2017; Wilcox 2017), a theme 
that will be developed throughout the thesis. 
Yet whilst this work has profoundly challenged the premise of radicalization theories, it often 
takes policy documents as its starting point, seeks conceptual clarification, or looks to determine how 
and why initial referrals are made by public sector workers. Research that investigates the preemptive 
interruption of those identified as potential terrorism offenders before they attack is notably sparse. 
One study of community ‘counter-radicalization’ intervention programmes was undertaken by Basia 
Spalek and Lynn Davies in 2012, but there has been no sustained empirical excavation of Prevent’s 
prized jewel, Channel. Moreover, the few instances of research that have examined the 
implementation of Channel ultimately accept the assumptions of the radicalization discourse as 
legitimate. Rather than problematizing the premises or legitimacy of risk-management itself, this 
research points to the ineffective or opaque processes through which interventions take place, and 
seeks to improve individual solutions to ‘the problem of extremism’. For instance, Amy Thornton and 
Noémie Bouhana (2019) interviewed (among others) three Channel mentors and three officials with 
responsibility for Channel in their local authority. They highlighted the lack of detailed information 
about interventions and about how success of the programme is gauged, and demonstrated that there 
exists a lack of consideration for the impact that Channel has on its constituents. The research pointed 
to some profound disjunctures through which the programme functions, such as disparities from 
region to region. However, being written by two behavioural criminologists this article was 
unsurprisingly concerned with improving the effectiveness of preemptive criminal interventions, 
rather than overtly pursuing questions about the legitimacy of preemption itself. 
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Douglas Weeks, a former counter-terrorism practitioner who “offer[s] real world perspectives 
and solutions to real world problems” (DouglasWeeks 2020), interviewed over 20 Channel mentors 
for his research. Across two articles he makes the point that big gaps exist between policy aspirations 
and localized practice, because of the disparate way in which officials interpret the Prevent agenda 
(2017,2018). One chapter explores practitioner narratives of success, highlighting a few key factors in 
the Channel process – like the relationship between mentor and mentee, and the centrality of emotion 
to Channel’s functionality (2017). However, the piece focuses on the recruitment and character 
profiles of mentors, rather than excavating the implications of any findings with regard to the 
processes of ‘counter-radicalization’. His article for Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2018) assesses 
how Channel mentors describe the sorts of intervention they provide and how they establish trust 
with mentees. This paper also bears in mind some experience of ‘the convicted terrorist’ themselves, 
and their reintegration from prison into society. However, rather than to attempting to disturb the 
circularity of preemptive logics, it focuses on how offenders respond to license conditions imposed on 
them after their release. 
The most epistemologically penetrating investigation of the concept of ‘de-radicalization’ is 
Mohammed Elshimi’s book De-Radicalisation in the UK Prevent Strategy (2017). He interviewed over 
two dozen Prevent-related practitioners (including a Channel mentor) and other relevant parties to 
determine how they described this field of work, and found 28 different definitions to refer to ‘de-
radicalization’. However, this piece primarily contributes to the development of a conceptual 
framework for de-radicalization, and so refrained from exploring in depth the methods of intervention 
imposed by Channel: its findings wrestled with the problematic nature of intervening upon others, 
rather than illuminate the processes by which cases are ‘made safe’. 
Whilst this work has been profoundly useful in identifying some of the contradictions 
underpinning Channel and the premise of pre-crime interventions, significant gaps in the field remain. 
When a referral is moved up the Prevent structures towards the most concentrated form of support 
– Channel intervention – what happens to the individual concerned? How are they negotiated over by 
risk-managers, when and why are they seen as posing a terrorism risk, and at what point are they 
marked ‘safe’? Very little is known about the management of and gaze upon the supposedly most 
risky pre-crime cases. Being informed by the critiques mentioned above, and bearing in mind the 
limited work that exists on the highly-guarded Channel programme, the contribution of this research 
is twofold. It firstly seeks to alleviate a significant empirical void: as we have seen, minimal data on 
the Channel programme currently exists, and the research that does examine its risk-management 
processes refrains from asking epistemological questions about the nature of risk (see following 
chapter). In providing exposure and analysis of counter-radicalization processes, this thesis maps an 
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investigation of the Channel ‘counter-radicalization’ scheme onto the broader field of risk-governance. 
It exposes the subjective nature of Prevent’s inner workings, and the banality through which pre-crime 
risk-management operates. In demonstrating that children deemed to be peaceable are being 
provided with counter-terrorism interventions, this research develops the fields of critical security and 
risk-studies through a vast empirical analysis. Secondly, and more fundamentally, the research seeks 
to disturb the circular logics that saturate the preemptive rationality by illuminating a subjugated 
world of knowledge: the experience of the terrorist himself. No research has to date considered the 
premises of counter-radicalization interventions with those it would ultimately have sought to redirect 
and reformulate. This is an important inquiry, because the ascendency of the preemptive rationality 
has considerable consequences for how relations of space and time are understood (Massumi 2015a). 
We find that just as preemptive interventions constrain and restrict possible futures, ex-militants 
articulate the opening up of space as emancipatory. These ex-militants, who would have found 
themselves on the other side of preemption, describe trusting others – despite any dangers posed – 
and radical inclusion as necessary premises of a functioning society. Yet Prevent excludes and silences 
alternative forms of knowing, rendering anything other than an intrinsically suspicious gaze as 
suspicious itself. 
Listening to ‘the terrorist’ allows the potential disruption of fundamental and self-justifying 
claims of Prevent to take place. Attempting to assess the assumptions made by preemptive risk-
governance, my overarching research question is therefore: How does the subjugated knowledge of 
Northern Irish ex-militants disrupt the preemptive dispositif of Prevent and Channel interventions? It is 
crucial to unpack the discourse of ‘counter-radicalization’ bearing in mind the stories of former 
combatants for a number of reasons. Having become widely integrated into society, preemptive logics 
have significant consequences for social and political relations, structuring the way in which we think, 
see, and act (Massumi 2015a). The drive towards anticipation often goes unquestioned, sustained by 
the management of worst-case imaginaries through action in the present to avoid these impending 
disasters (Aradau 2004). How much do these imagined worst-case stories (and their preemptive 
management) embody the stories of the perpetrators of violence themselves (and these actors’ 
disengagement)? What alternative knowledge exists to the way in which the Prevent programme 
‘sees’ potentially violent Others and their possible trajectory towards criminality? The relevance of ex-
militant testimony could not be more central to exposing the concealed assumptions through which 
terrorism-preemption operates. Moreover, as we have seen, no research has yet evaluated Channel’s 
‘de-radicalization’ functionality against the stories of terrorism offenders – either about their 
movement into violence, or their disengagement from violence. Moreover, there exists only limited 
information about the programme in the public domain. The contribution made by engaging with this 
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research question in light of the testimony of two groups of interviewees is therefore both original 
and significant. Moreover, it is timely: in a moment when young people are mobilizing to agitate for a 
sustainable environment, for racial equality, and for other checks on the excesses of decades of 
neoliberal rule (Epstein 2015; Loukakis & Portos 2020), will their activism and protest be seen as a 
potential national security threat, or as a potentially disruptive but valid asset to learn from? 
 
 
Structure of thesis 
The thesis begins by discussing the theoretical work that situates my research, with a particular focus 
on silencing, and the privileges inherent to preemptive governance. The theory chapter explores the 
shift from prevention to preemption, taking into consideration how the conflict in Northern Ireland 
was governed through a criminal justice approach before British counter-terrorism moved towards 
the anticipatory monitoring and management of pre-crime risk. It finishes with a discussion of the 
foreclosure of spatial and temporal relations within preemptive risk-thinking, issues which will be 
referred to during the thematic chapters. This chapter on theory is followed by a chapter on methods. 
The methods chapter explores how and why a discourse analysis is deployed, why I am assessing 
Prevent in light of former militants’ testimonies, and how I selected and recruited interviewees. It 
discusses ethical issues and problems I experienced during fieldwork (especially with Prevent 
practitioners), followed by an explanation of how I thematized and coded interview data in the post-
interview stage. Some reflections on the process of data collection during fieldwork are provided. To 
conclude this chapter, and to tie together the theoretical and methodological sections with the 
empirical material, I included a succinct history of Northern Ireland. This enables the Northern Irish 
interviews to be more easily contextualized. After all, every republican spent time delving into the 
island’s history (some going back hundreds of years), and some loyalists did similarly (and all referred 
to parades and events commemorating historical moments). 
The thesis then moves into an exposition of the empirical material, over the course of four 
thematic chapters. The first two of these examine the claims about why people might be drawn to 
violence. In Motivations and Risk Factors (Thematic Chapter 1) we see how former combatants 
describe why they were motivated to become involved in violence, and how this testimony subverts 
the assumptions made in the implementation of Channel. Negotiating Agency (Thematic Chapter 2) 
examines how ex-militants described their sense of commitment in relation to their violence, again 
assessing this testimony in light of the methodology of pre-crime interventions. The second couple of 
thematic chapters (3 and 4) look away from narratives about the reasons violence erupts (or the 
attempted construction of risk profiles), and consider how interviewees explained their thoughts on 
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‘risk’, and the logical conclusions their perspectives move us towards. How Risk-Knowledge is 
(Un)Known (Thematic Chapter 3) assesses how interviewees described the extent to which risk can be 
‘known’, and their thoughts on the legitimacy of intending to know, see, and categorize risk. The 
Construction of Meaningful Peace / Finding Solutions to Violence (Thematic Chapter 4) – the final 
substantive chapter – then moves on to exploring the logical conclusions that ex-militants and Prevent 
officials separately drew us towards: what do ex-militants see as desirable outcomes of their 
experience and knowledge, and equally what do Prevent practitioners narrate as the ideal outcome 
of their risk-knowledge? 
Motivations and Risk Factors discusses the issue of motivations, and the causes around which 
ex-militants described as encouraging their involvement in political violence. We see how political and 
environmental grievances are central to former combatant testimony: they explicitly and consistently 
focused on the context within which they found themselves. For republicans, this was experiencing 
violence against them perpetrated by the state – such as internment, stop-and-searches, and 
particular moments of violence against their community – with a background of experiencing their 
lives as second-class citizens in Northern Ireland. For loyalists, motivations were described around 
reacting to republican violence exerted against their communities, along with a sense of abandonment 
by the British state in the face of such violence (bearing in mind historic insecurities). Ultimately they 
all described external contexts as primary motivators in instigating their involvement in violence. 
Yet when we look at how Prevent describes the drivers for terrorism, we find an individualized, 
pathologized ontology that excludes from the field of enquiry the environments that ex-militants 
described as fundamentally important to explaining their involvement. Prevent asserts personal ‘risk 
factors’ as the object of concern which – when properly managed – can avert the incidence of political 
violence. This is a deeply decontextualizing and dehistoricizing gaze, and one which silences the stories 
of the very people Prevent wishes to make claims about. As one practitioner remarked about the 
detachment of space and time from human behaviour, “You're always conscious, I think something 
around Prevent is that anyone can go off and commit an atrocity” (PPolice9, emphasis added). ‘Causes’ 
and ‘motivations’ become ‘risk factors’ and ‘signs of radicalization’, hiding the experience and 
knowledge narrated by Prevent's most ideal constituents – and introducing a significant and 
continuing divergence between counter-terrorism policies of the nations of the United Kingdom. 
Negotiating Agency then explores the sense of agency described by ex-militants. How did they 
narrate their commitment and determination, when the field of contemporary terrorism studies is 
saturated with research that assumes the passivity of individuals being radicalized (Gill 2007; Silber & 
Bhatt 2007; McCauley & Moskalenko 2008; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Kruglanski, et al. 2014; Odag, 
Leiser, & Boehnke 2019)? Former combatants spoke about their surroundings leading them to see 
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violence as appropriate. They went as far as to suggest that their involvement in violence was even a 
moral obligation, sometimes telling me that they became involved reluctantly. Occasionally 
recognizing that they had been influenced by others, any admission that they had been ‘radicalized’ 
into violence was articulated simultaneously as a conscious and deliberate choice. All rejected the 
premise that – without reference to broader changes to political environments – they might have been 
talked out of violence. 
However, Prevent narrates a lack of commitment and intent as associated with terrorism risk, 
providing counter-radicalization interventions for people who present narrow-minded religious views 
and an absence of intent to harm others. Moreover, we find the mechanisms of Channel disregarding 
the capacity for agency to be possessed by ‘the potential terrorist’ – deeming them ‘vulnerable’ and 
in need of pastoral support. The notion of protective ‘safeguarding’, a concept that would have made 
no sense had it been posited to those who had engaged in violence themselves, is therefore central 
to Prevent’s operation. Because Prevent takes risky individuals as ultimately misinformed and 
vulnerable, instead of engaging with their ‘grievances’ as legitimate, Channel cases are directed away 
from redress (this point is addressed more fully in Thematic Chapter 4). These individuals – at odds 
with former militant testimony – can hypothetically always be spoken out of violence, because their 
fundamentally vulnerable position requires only additional information and support. 
The third thematic chapter, How Risk-Knowledge is (Un)Known, utilizes Deleuze and Guattari’s 
dualistic notion of nomadology and the state (2010) to understand how risk is (un)known or (not) 
considered by the two sets of interviewees. How do those who engaged in violence during the 
Troubles describe their thoughts on navigating the potential to spot, the ability to see, where risk 
might reside? How do they narrate the potential to interrupt its materialization? Throughout the 
chapter, we see how ex-militants describe a contentment with their histories, framing their 
environments as sufficiently oppressive that there was simply no point in exploring how or why they 
might not have engaged. This approach, however, of reconstructing how alternative realities might 
(have) be(en) achieved, is fundamental to the ordering and striating mechanisms of preemptive 
governance. Prevent presents an anxious determination to know and see all potential futures, to 
reassess associations of risk factors, to monitor and ‘make safe’ all possibilities, in order to harness 
the future (Aradau & van Munster 2008; Massumi 2015). The disinterest in reconstructing alternative 
potential realities that ex-militants displayed, follows through to how they spoke of conflicts in their 
positionality. Searching for peace – in their words – required the deployment of specific instances of 
violence. Equally, though many now work as peace activists, they do not speak of regret of their 
previous violence, maintaining that violence is appropriate in certain contexts. 
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The determination of Prevent to fix down and categorize as ‘risky’/ ‘not-risky’ cannot handle 
such multiple and conflicting subjectivities. Instead it moves to responsibilize its constituents – 
discouraging anything other than actively creative participants in its society. Prevent silences notions 
that meaningful contestation and political reform could be considered productive. The conditions of 
knowledge-production articulated by the two sets of interviewees are so different that radically 
different styles of thought are produced, that have only disjuncture and disconnection between them. 
The Construction of Meaningful Peace / Finding Solutions to Violence (Thematic Chapter 4) 
looks to the solutions ex-militants and risk practitioners pose as reasonable, bearing in mind all the 
data examined so far. We see how political negotiation is posited by ex-militants as the only way to 
bring about meaningful peace. They speak of the necessity of a radical opening of space. We see this 
through their insistence that fostering trusting relationships with people who might even appear 
‘risky’ is desirable,  and society should listen to and learnt from them. Instead of giving any credence 
to this testimony, Prevent shuts down the space for political contestation by narrating only individual 
solutions as emancipatory. Broader contexts become forgotten and are situated as irrelevant 
distractions from the real problem: irrational individuals who are only in need of a more aware and 
secure self. Personal resilience (installed through mentoring interventions), rather than engagement 
with risky others, is how society sustains itself. Excluding political considerations from the 
conversation hides the foundational claims and experiences of those who have committed terrorism 
offences – that material, environmental change produces peace. Indeed, since the political settlement 
of the Good Friday Agreement, reoffending rates of those released under its terms has been strikingly 
low. Yet where ex-militants spoke of working towards the ‘putting away of violence’ through 
negotiation and engaging with others, Prevent sees personal resilience as the only road to avoiding 
violence, seeking a continuation of the good-enough present (Boukalas 2019). We now turn to the 
theoretical framework, to understand how contemporary forms of preemption have become 




Terrorism Knowledge and its Silences 
 
Population is not people. Population is a statistical category (Bigo 2008, 99). 
 
This chapter explores the theoretical literature that contextualizes my research, and investigates the 
literature that maps the historical shifts towards the prominence of preemptive governance (Massumi 
2015a). Relying on the conceptual work of critical scholars like Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, and 
Judith Butler, the thesis highlights the importance of considering subjugated knowledges – within the 
mainstream terrorism-preemption discourse, in this context. The chapter investigates the 
construction and production of contemporary counter-terrorism knowledge, and points to the 
relevance of considering alternative knowledges provided by those who have been convicted of 
‘terrorist’ crimes themselves. It takes the following structure of three substantive sections: it firstly 
examines the importance of studying subjugated knowledges, and looks at how discourses are 
composed and constructed through privileging certain other knowledges. The second section 
illuminates the historical trajectory towards precautionary, anticipatory risk-governance: the 
discussion explicates the movement from a criminal justice (preventative) model of governing political 
violence, to anticipatory (preemptive) interventions in the non-crime space. Finally it turns to the 
silences that uphold preemptive risk-governance, arguing that the meaning behind spatial and 
temporal relations becomes short-circuited by anticipatory risk-management technologies. Following 
the work of critical risk and security scholars such as Claudia Aradau, Rens van Munster, Louise 
Amoore, and Marieke de Goede, this research takes “risk as a dispositif for governing social problems” 
(Aradau & van Munster 2007, 91, emphasis added), where a dispositif refers to a structure of 
hegemonic knowledge informing the conduct and relations within society. Ultimately, this chapter 
examines the ecosystem of power within which Prevent (as a precautionary risk-management 
programme) has been configured – and the silences that legitimize its maintenance. 
 
 
Exploring Subjugated Knowledges 
The research adopts genealogical and archaeological methods to understand the operative 
knowledges sustaining the British Prevent (and Channel) programme. Derived from the work of those 
like Nietzsche, genealogical methodology revolves around exposing the dark spaces and the voids 
within a discourse, which hegemonic knowledge does not make visible (Smithson 1996, 44). This can 
allow a re-historicization and re-contextualization of knowledge, and especially a “reactivat[ion of] 
local knowledges… against the scientific hierarchicalization of knowledge and its intrinsic power-
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effects” (Foucault 2003c, 10). This research does not attempt to theorize about spatiality alone – a 
tendency of critical research (Harootunian 2005) – but also temporal considerations. What is being 
silenced spatially and temporally? As well as highlighting the racialized and gendered spaces managed 
through preemptive counter-terrorism, I seek to understand how temporality itself is (re)organized. 
How do contemporary logics of preemption redraw the present and its relation to the future? 
Emancipatory politics in this context calls for “a restoration of considerations of the crucial 
spatiotemporal relationship that must attend any explanatory program” (Harootunian 2005, 24). 
Tightly associated with the genealogical approach is the archaeological method, intricately 
detailed and analysed by Foucault in various works, culminating in the substantive The Archaeology 
of Knowledge (1972). This methodology is concerned with excavating the components of particular 
discourses, uncovering which truths a discourse is upheld by. It seeks to find those ‘monuments’ 
hidden under the surface, the mechanics or technologies operating within a discourse that shape 
thought and behaviour, in order to understand and theorize about what is not practised. This approach 
is (often) deployed to illuminate whose interests are prioritized, whose freedoms are privileged, 
whose voices are heard – and whose are not. Which particular discourses on terrorism risk 
management have emerged as “dominant and unifying” (Nicolet-Anderson 2012, 163) and are 
operationalized in contemporary British preemptive counter-terrorism, and which certain knowledges 
have been excluded from the implementation of such an assemblage? Understanding the boundaries 
within which thought and action are situated is characteristic of the genealogical approach, and 
comprehending that which holds up these boundaries is the motivation of the archaeological 
approach. Both approaches are central to the aims of this research. 
Foucault (2003d, 20) spoke of the “governmentalization” of the State, where government is 
“a problematizing activity” (Rose & Miller 2010) concerned with the solving of problems: which ills can 
be cured, which deviances can be eradicated? ‘Government’ should be understood as the “conduct of 
conduct”: how is thought and action shaped (Gordon 1991, 2)? Rather than being focussed overtly on 
self-preservation of the sovereign, Foucault posed the concept that ‘government’ is concerned with 
the health of bodies (ultimately the population), where power is directed towards making bodies (the 
population) productive (Foucault 2003a,b,d). This positive, ‘biopolitical’ rationale operates through 
administrating life itself: bodies become the locus of a “power that exerts a positive influence on life, 
that endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and 
comprehensive regulations” (Foucault 1978, 137). It operates to produce security for the citizen, and 
ultimately the sovereign. Regarding the production of subjects, Butler (1997, 84) writes that 
subjectivity not only “acts on… but also activates” a person. Bodies contribute to their own 
subjectification: “individuals are made subjects through their everyday functioning as transistors (and 
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resistors) in the circuits” of knowledge exchange and negotiation (Springer 2015, 82). So both the 
imposition inwards of identity from externalities, and the outward expression of identity from the 
body, formulates subjectification: “both from discourse to subject, and from subject to discourse” 
(Ibid). Society is both the object and subject of its own productive power, and the quest to grow and 
develop supplants (at least conceals) fear of the sovereign. No longer is destructive power directed 
from the sovereign to its citizens as the primary mode of government: “Life is the object of the police… 
That people survive, live, and even do better than just that, is what the police has to ensure” (Foucault 
1979, 250). This principally positive, active, and creative power, as Walters (2004) suggests, produces 
a new subjectivity which experiences its own productive efforts as personal, socio-economic, and 
political growth. We will see the mobilization of productivity and creative growth as a tool of 
preemptive risk-management throughout the thesis. Yet, this positive ‘bio-power’ of life-cultivation is 
still accompanied by more concealed modes of government of negative and oppressive exertions of 
power like the right to take life (Mbembé 2003), which were historically more visible. 
How and by what is government operationalized? Or, how and by what is conduct established, 
shaped, and normalized? And what silences does it consequently produce? One of Foucault’s central 
claims is that every interaction involves the exercise of power and consequentially produces 
knowledge (1980). Examining the ordering and structuring of human existence around the 
problematizing rationality of government to understand what silences are in operation – with my point 
of application being preemptive counterterrorism – is the purpose of my genealogical and 
archaeological work. My research seeks to expose which knowledges sustain the dominant risk-
preemption discourse, which are silenced and excluded, and which mechanisms or technologies are 
mobilized to uphold this hegemony. Ultimately I endeavour to expose the primary claims made about 
terrorism risk-preemption, and upon which knowledge the practice of terrorism preemption rests. 
This can be broken down into numerous questions: what behaviours and patterns of thought are 
inscribed with risk? How are risk-subjectivities (the imposition of ‘riskiness’ onto an otherwise ‘non-
risky’ body) constructed, and what knowledge allows them to be negotiated with in that particular 
way? How is the capacity of those deemed risky to act framed, and what does this say, produce, and 
allow? How is responsibility for terrorism risk-management dispersed and activated, and how does 
resilience produce safety? What does this responsibilization of terrorism risk say about how risk is 
understood? What conduct is allowed and encouraged in the practising of terrorism preemption, and 
what conduct is forbidden, discouraged, suppressed? Questions like these seek to understand the 
hegemonic discourse and how it operates (and the silences it is underpinned by). Therefore my 
Prevent interviews are excavated throughout my thesis with these questions in mind, to understand 
what claims are being made about terrorism risk-preemption. 
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Being concerned with exploring the dominant terrorism preemption discourse, I also look to 
find what is not operationalized or spoken about in how society understands the preemption of 
terrorism risk and its respective responsibilities. These ‘silences’ are central in upholding the 
discourse. My research takes the position that as certain knowledge becomes more known, assumed, 
and practised, alternative knowledges are simultaneously subjugated, hidden, and unknown. 
Hegemonic discourse “covers and silences” all else (Foucault 1972, 25), everything not-said, which can 
be conceived as alternative, subjugated knowledge. The study of silences arose from cross-discipline 
scholarship, popularized by Foucault’s various works, by postcolonial research into Orientalism where 
Others are constructed as inherently dangerous and foreign (Said 1979), and by feminist scholarship 
looking at the subjugated role of women and other groups (Dingli 2015). Subjugated knowledges, 
excluded and hidden through the practising of accepted forms of knowledge, are not neutral absences 
but are disenfranchised through violence and suppression (Galtung 1969; Brownmiller 1975; Enloe 
2004; Parpart & Zalewski 2008), producing a ‘subaltern’ (Gramsci 1971; Spivak 1988). The subaltern is 
excluded knowledge and experience (sometimes personified by whole people or groups), knowledge 
that sits on the periphery or is entirely hidden: it is not practiced, spoken about, or even considered. 
Subjugated knowledge is both the non-practising of objective knowledge, and the exclusion of 
subjective experience (Jackson 2012). Questions to help me find the silences and “reactivate local 
knowledges” pivot around the Northern Irish conflict, in my research. So, in understanding the 
testimony from Northern Irish former combatants, questions to help me look for silences include: 
What experiences or knowledge that ex-militants provided is (made) invisible (through Prevent’s 
operation)? How do ex-militants narrate their environments, personalities, and decisions, and how do 




Within any discourse, inclusions and exclusions are present (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002; Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985). Derrida and Prenowitz (1995, 51) write that the construction of inside/outside signifiers 
is an inherently violent process, because designating identities requires the inscription of the Self as 
set against the Other: “As soon as there is the One, there is murder, wounding, traumatism… The One 
guards against/keeps some of the other.” When a definitive claim is made – for example about who 
‘we’ are, or who the ‘enemy’ is, or what constitutes (un)acceptable risk – unspoken and violent 
assumptions are also being made. The inscription of certain places as risky, and their subsequent 
inclusion or exclusion within hegemonic discourse, is not a neutral phenomenon (Aradau & van 
Munster 2008; Jackson et al. 2011; Martin 2018). The association of certain behaviours, and the 
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indirect association of people or groups demonstrating those behaviours, into more-risky and less-
risky, is a process of visualization that “colonizes the future” by privileging certain outcomes as (less) 
desirable (Aradau & van Munster 2008). The economy of (in)visibilization in the field of preemptive 
counter-terrorism functions not as an impersonal, random process, but through the actions of those 
able to make privileged claims about what constitutes risk, or what does not constitute risk (Jackson 
2012). These (micro)practices are productive in the outworking of hegemonic discourse, what is seen 
or understood as risk, and what is not. What is closed off, and what is opened up, in the making of 
claims about risk in contemporary preemptive counter-terrorism? Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 186) 
write that “discourses, by way of hegemonic closures, fix meanings in particular ways and thus exclude 
all other meaning potentials.” When the economy of (in)visibilization, through interactions and 
exchanges of privileged power, makes claims about what constitutes riskiness, it requires that 
inductive reasoning is deployed to draw together otherwise disparate risk factors in order that 
embodied risky spaces can be identified, or ‘visibilized’ (Amoore 2009). So closures are inherent to 
every discourse: not everything is sayable (Purvis & Hunt 1993; Jackson 2012). But the content of these 
closures is privileged, and is the consequence of a process of privileged discourse-construction, which 
is often hidden, or disguised through claims of rationality (Ouroussoff 1993). 
Uncovering or making visible these privileged claims and the concealed, privileged process of 
knowledge production is a primary aim of critical scholarship and activism (Parpart & Zalewski 2008, 
49). My research is not only interested in which knowledge and experience is subjugated, but also the 
process by which knowledge and experience is subjugated, so that we can understand why certain 
forms of governance are in operation, and what interests they serve. I am interested in uncovering 
the unspoken, the hidden, the excluded. But in order to suggest which interests it serves to cover up 
certain knowledges, my research is also interested in how the unspoken becomes unspoken, how 
particular things in a particular context become hidden, how exclusion functions (Foucault 1980). 
Moreover, as individual subjectification co-constitutes itself, hegemonic knowledge is not only 
structured through privilege but also structures future inquiry as infused with privilege (Ackerly, Stern, 
& True 2006). This double subjugation is driven by the inclusion of insider-status, often of wealth, 
gender, or race – and equally through the exclusion of outsider-status, on the same principles. As 
Parpart and Zalewski (2008, 51) write, “White male privilege is internalized through the habitus and 
reinscribed through constituted practices. Privilege is taken for granted and made invisible, even 
though individual actions regularly reify it.” So, making visible the unseen exertions of power, in the 
context of this research on counter-terrorism, allows the claims themselves and their accompanying, 
reifying micropolitics to become seen. This ultimately allows an understanding of how the 
precautionary risk dispositif informs and constructs social interactions. 
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In the context of preemptive counter-terrorism, privilege is observable when we consider the 
transformation of terrorism scholarship through time. “Authorized ‘experts’” with insider status make 
claims that transform the discursive landscape, and simultaneously forbid from entering and 
transforming the field knowledges “which would challenge the proper objects, boundaries and 
authorized speakers of the field” (Jackson 2012, 16; also see: Miller & Mills 2009). Numerous scholars 
have explicated the history of ‘terrorism knowledge’, observing how the debate was developed as a 
policy-oriented approach to combat individual flashes of civilian-perpetrated violence (Reid 1993; 
Stampnitzky 2013), violence which was then utilized to justify reactionary movements in how ‘threat’ 
was narrated by those in governmental office (Tsui 2016). Any innovative academic roots were soon 
infiltrated by consistent exposure to policy-makers, government funding, and the media (Franks 
2009), and the industry became institutionalized, a self-fulfilling echo chamber where the same 
academics would reproduce knowledge learnt at the previous conference, or otherwise submit to 
journals on terrorism only once and retreating back to their areas of expertise (Jenkins 1983; 
Stampnitzky 2013). Indeed, Gordon (2001) found that terrorism journals had a far greater proportion 
of non-academic authors than journals in other policy areas. Stampnitzky (2013, 45) quotes British 
Army Major-General Richard Clutterbuck as remarking, “My becoming a so-called expert on terrorism 
simply evolved from the fact that I spent such a lot of time talking about it.” 
The field, during the 1970s, became dominated by those not studying ‘terrorism’ from a 
traditional political violence approach, but a far wider academic background – often from non-
mainstream institutions – including psychological, criminological, and sociological approaches, and 
often incited by US Government funding (Stampnitzky 2013, 40-45). Rather than seeking to 
understand the political or economic circumstances that led to eruptions of violence (Ibid, 66-7), it 
became a policy- and security-oriented field, one “very much needed in the West as a cover for its 
own activities and crimes” (Herman & O’Sullivan 1989, 9). This was particularly the case at times 
“when [such investigation appeared] to challenge state power” (Franks 2009, 155). Critique of the 
direction of mainstream scholarship was minimal, and so the field of terrorism studies moved in the 
path of least resistance: Stampnitzky (2013, 46) writes that it was characterized by 
 
Weak and permeable boundaries, a population of ‘experts’ whose backgrounds and sources 
of legitimation are highly heterogeneous, and a lack of agreement not just over how expertise 
should be evaluated but even over how to define the central topic of their concern. 
 
So, government-centric and often circular knowledges were exchanged and promoted through the 
socialization of “embedded expertise” (Burnett & Whyte 2005) between government, industry, and 
academia, which consequently subjugated other knowledges (Jackson 2012; Stampnitzky 2013; Tsui 
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2016). After establishing the composition and (re-)construction of hegemonic risk discourses, the 
remainder of the chapter now focuses on the historical movement towards the contemporary 
dispositif of risk beginning with the creation of Northern Irish counter-terrorism laws and ending with 
theories of ‘radicalization’. It then looks at the consequences this shift has had in relation to the 
production of anticipatory risk-knowledge. 
 
 
From Disciplinary Correction to Precautionary Intervention 
The shift away from a preventative approach and towards a preemptive one is not (just) a historical, 
technical shift to manage the problem of terrorism. I argue that such a shift is demonstrative of an 
inclination towards productive rather than repressive forms of governmentality, which, as we will see 
through the thesis, is a logic that excludes alternative, resistant, not-necessarily-productive 
imaginaries. We will now see how the criminal justice model apparatus to managing terrorism was 




Shortly after Northern Ireland’s inception in 1921, and until 1974, the country was governed by the 
Civil Authorities Act, an act passed by Stormont to combat the ‘terrorist threat’. Through different 
amendments it was retained until the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was passed in 1974 as a 
response to the Birmingham Pub Bombings. Although the legislation changed to confront shifting 
dangers during the course of the 20th century, the various iterations and forms of terrorism law 
operated broadly on the basis of prevention, where the priority was to assess empirical dangers and 
strive – to some degree – to understand their foundations (Massumi 2015, 5). Heath-Kelly (2012, 71) 
writes that this legislation “governed terrorism through a criminal justice model”: monitoring 
suspected criminals and responding to criminal behaviour was the functional methodology. The focus 
of the law was on present or past (chiefly physical) behaviour, and punishing that behaviour through 
highly regulated procedures using the courts (Finn 1990). For example, the PTA proscribed certain 
public and physical expressions of support for outlawed groups (HM Government 1974, c.56, Part 
2(1)a-b). Sometimes this formal process was compromised: the power of exclusion also drawn up by 
the PTA had the material effect of removing subjects, “in the most literal sense, from a territory and 
cast[ing] them elsewhere” (Heath-Kelly 2012, 72) without the involvement of the courts. In fact, many 
of those who were subjected to this power had actually been acquitted by the courts (Walker 1997), 
but were expelled on the suspicion of a PTA official of material involvement in demonstrable 
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criminality (Walker 1986; Hogan & Walker 1989). But regardless of the role of suspicion, the actions 
of government officials in making determinations as to the imprisonment and expulsion of citizens 
were still tied to the presumption of some tangible violation of law, and the potential for proving guilt 
through the courts if evidence was available to prosecute. Whilst the PTA was considered to have 
“seriously undermined democratic freedoms” because of its attempt to deploy counter-terrorism 
legislation against citizens who had not been convicted of acting illegally (Scorer, Spencer, & Hewitt 
1985, 18), the potential for calculating possible criminality was fundamental to its interpretation. Rose 
writes that prevention is summarized as “calculations about probable futures in the present followed 
by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future” (2006, 70). Prevention of 
probabilities, rather than preemption of hypothetical possibilities, ordered counter-terrorism 
thinking. Considerations of spatiality and temporality were therefore important to the functioning of 
counter-terrorism during the conflict in Northern Ireland: the overriding mentality was targeting 
people who had historically demonstrated material danger, or were suspected of having done so. 
The fundamental difference between ‘prevention’ and ‘preemption’ is summarized as follows: 
“Threat looms [and] comes from the future. It doesn’t present itself. Danger presents itself” (Massumi 
2015, 240). Whereas ‘danger’ is calculable, concerned with objective spaces and times, and able to be 
prevented, ‘threat’ or ‘risk’ is the never-here, that which lurks forever around the next corner, and is 
the object of preemption. The paradigm of government during the moment in history of the Northern 
Irish conflict was principally disciplinarian, focussed on punishing evidenced or suspected danger 
(criminal behaviour) – in an effort to prevent it from (re)occurring. For example, upon the introduction 
of the PTA, then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins remarked the exceptional nature of the policy was in 
order “to meet the clear present danger" (HM Government 1998, 2.1, emphasis added). Although 
engagement in the conflict was consistently depoliticized, with South Armagh nicknamed by Northern 
Ireland Secretary at the time Merlyn Rees “bandit country” (quoted in Peterkin 2005), this moment 
was characterized by a focus on engagement in criminality. Margaret Thatcher said on a BBC Radio 
News Report in 1981 that “Crime is crime is crime” (BBC 2005), in a comment that typified the focus 
of that time on demonstrable engagement in criminal behaviour. Counter-terrorism officials at the 
time were concerned with material negotiations, driven by questions like “could you get a peace 
process?” (Sir David Omand, Interviewee 12). 
However, this fixation on engaging with – and ultimately preventing – materially-realized 
danger was occasionally disrupted: Operation Demetrius, the internment campaign of the early 1970s 
in Northern Ireland where nearly 2000 young men were detained for months on end and sometimes 
years without trial, demonstrated that not only danger but also threat (or ‘risk possibility’) informed 
the governing of society during the conflict. Many of these internees fitted the broad socio-economic 
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profile of an IRA volunteer: young, Catholic, males, from particular geographical locations (Hillyard 
1993). Preventative logics (no matter how racialized) did still infuse this policy to some degree: the 
group as a collective had demonstrated some danger, some capacity for engaging in observable 
violence. However, this logic was also saturated with preemption, because it was known that many 
within this profiled group had never engaged in criminality (Spjut 1986), yet they were being subjected 
to counter-terrorism measures. Broadly, therefore, considerations of spatiality and temporality 
(governing the incidence of crime in the past) still remained central to counter-terrorism logics, 
although in their mobilization against broader group profiles they became disconnected strictly from 
the individual. 
Heath-Kelly (2012, 75) writes that during the Northern Irish conflict, “the criminal justice 
model was sometimes abandoned in favour of governmental measures” with regard to the emergence 
of a counterinsurgency ‘hearts and minds’ approach that prioritized winning over the local population 
through economic development. The logic went: to minimize the need for preventative interruption 
of crime, preemption needed to be mobilized too. Instead of being absolutely abandoned though, 
disciplinarian (criminal justice, preventative) measures and biopolitical (productive, risk-obsessed, 
preemptive) governance are only a breath away from each other, constantly reinforcing each other 
(Zedner & Ashworth 2019). If one is less effective, the other becomes operationalized, with the first 
following quickly behind, sometimes at the same time. Reid (2005, 248), following Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1999), writes that the de-territorialization of one mode of governance 
is merely complemented by the re-territorialization of another; the disciplinarian and biopolitical 
function together in “a permanent and agonistic tension that renders it facile to imagine an assertion 
of one without a re-assertion of the other.” So, for instance, to minimize the risk of terrorism offenders 
from reoffending, they are immediately subjected to the material and disciplinary force of living 
behind bars, but are also now mandated onto a ‘Desistance and Disengagement Programme' which 
seeks their personal recalibration (HM Government 2018b, 129-130). 
This section has set out that these two rationalities – probability-based prevention, and 
possibility-centric preemption – operate alongside each other, although during ‘the Troubles’, that of 
prevention was more dominant and observable. The emphasis was still on disciplining the event, the 
crime, the past, rather than constructing the future by preempting threats and attempting to forestall 
their development into realized dangers (Massumi 2015). Although there were elements that 
“prefigured the contemporary regime of preemption” of counter-terrorism (Heath-Kelly 2012, 72), 
little thought was given to psychological preemption and imagining and acting on the worst 
possibilities, during the Northern Irish conflict. Yet towards the end of the 20th and into the 21st 
century, a shift in emphasis from preventive to preemptive governance took place, producing the 
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environment within which ‘Prevent’ (itself a preemptive apparatus) was allowed to be invented. Yet 
the preemptive rationality was connected to, and in part a product of, how the Northern Irish conflict 
and other conflicts at the same time were governed. 
 
Moving to Possibilistic Preemption 
The UK Government’s approach to counter-terrorism gradually transformed towards a preemptive-
centric position – a movement which should be contextualized within the determined march towards 
neoliberalism (Hall 2005). The dominant mode of sovereign-juridical discipline in Northern Ireland had 
involved knowing the space and time of the body intricately through personal interrelation, resulting 
in a negotiation of space and time (through physically imprisoning people, for many years) for 
contravening others’ space (making places unsafe) and time (taking their lives). This mode of 
governance, grounded in spatial and temporal negotiation, was gradually superseded during the latter 
part of the 20th century as the preemptive turn began to take hold (Valverde & Mopas 2004). Instead, 
market-informed governance of ‘the subject’, which revolved around judging the riskiness and 
uncertainty of certain investments (Amoore & de Goede 2008), was utilized to make more effective 
the power “to displace therapy, to cut back state budgets, and to impose new knowledges more 
amenable to performance assessment” (Valverde & Mopas 2004, 238). Where the older logic of 
discipline had required intense personal connection to the subject (physical capture of a suspect and 
collection of material evidence for trial) and the accompanying investments to acquire such totalizing 
knowledge (police work and running informants), the newer neoliberal, managerial agenda allowed 
the state not to seek personal knowledge of its subjects, but instead to make individuals known only 
through the totality of others’ behaviour (Amoore 2013, 29-54). 
Intricate knowledge of the individual’s space and time – their personal histories – is displaced 
by this aggregation, and instead people become “a set of measurable risk factors” (Valverde & Mopas 
2004, 240). Actions are judged not through personal connection to the subject but as “predictable and 
manageable” assets when aggregated (O’Malley, 1996, 190). The role of corrective discipline becomes 
secondary as impersonal management of societally-aggregated risk factors are prioritized to be 
intervened upon. Space and time remain important, although the individual’s connection to them 
becomes disregarded. This is not just the case in the field of security (Haggerty & Ericson 2006); in 
1993, epitomizing this “epochal” turn (Hall 2005), a research paper on data mining revolutionized the 
retail world (Amoore 2013, 40). The paper proposed the accumulation of statistics not on broader 
shopping trends from across a company’s stores but on the very basket of the shopper itself (Agrawal, 
Imieliński, & Swami 1993). Who the actual shopper is – and even entire sales trends themselves – 
becomes less important, and knowledge of the items the shopper buys becomes centralized. So the 
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shopper’s relationship with their own spatiality and temporality becomes subsumed by the contents 
of their basket in that single moment: “what pattern of items has to be sold with sausages in order for 
it to be likely that mustard will also be sold?” (Amoore 2013, 40) Associations like these that had not 
been made before, or ‘risk factors’ that were previously not considered related, were brought 
together and made related.  Shoppers’ habits were preempted by companies experimenting with 
moving items around the shop in order to maximize profit (Ericson & Haggerty 1997, 66). The spatiality 
of the items becomes the functional component in the shop’s negotiation with its shoppers, and the 
present moment in time the only important temporal consideration. Previous patterns of behaviour 
are no longer informative, under this logic; instead, “Everyone’s embodied existence is [now] implicitly 
productive of security data, revealing previously unknown patterns and connections” (Heath-Kelly 
2017a, 32). Aggregating this type of data, and detaching it from the individual themselves, was not 
the previously dominant way of things. To represent this tectonic shift, Deleuze (1992, 5)  wrote that 
"individuals have become 'dividuals', and masses [have become] samples, data, markets, or 'banks’.” 
People are comprised as distinct risk factors that can be divided endlessly, with the behaviours and 
characteristics separated from the person in order for new stories about that person’s potential to be 
imagined. 
Securing society against risks that merely have the potential to materialize has become 
prioritized in a rejection of the “mystery or unknowability of things to come, and an active striving that 
aims to control the future” (Anderson 2010b, 229). Not only space but time faces the demand to be 
governed, to be ordered and striated: 
 
We argue that the ‘war on terror’ is a new form of governmentality that imbricates knowledge 
and decision at the limit of knowledge… What is new is not so much the advent of a risk society 
as the emergence of a ‘precautionary’ element that has given birth to new configurations of 
risk that require that the catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided at all costs. (Aradau 
& van Munster 2007, 91) 
 
Traditional risk-society scholars like Ulrich Beck posited an objective ‘risk society’, taking risks as 
originating from the pace and scale of global modernization, and suggesting that risks are “politically 
reflexive” of the way in which the world was changing (Beck 1992, 21; also see: Lupton 1999). Because 
the world is so precarious, goes the logic, not all risks are able to be managed (Rasmussen 2004), 
requiring an insurantial apparatus to provide at least the veneer of security (Beck 1992). Yet the 
political construction of risk has been theorized extensively (Ewald 1991; O’Malley 1996,2004; Ericson 
and Doyle 2004; Amoore & de Goede 2005; Aradau & van Munster 2007,2012; Salter 2008; Amoore 
2013). For this critical scholarship, anticipatory and preemptive security means the future presents an 
“open set of endless possibilities” (Anderson 2010a, 792); the logic of governing the future through 
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limitlessly imagining the worst possible catastrophes becomes central (Amoore 2013). Emphasizing 
the governance of possibilistic risk imaginaries rather than probabilistic risk predictions relies on “the 
inductive incorporation of suspicion, imagination, and preemption” (Amoore 2013, 10) rather than 
attempting to comprehend calculable risks. 
Borne of the potential catastrophes predicted by German environmental politics in the 1970s, 
the notion that cataclysmic events were on the horizon marked the next half-century of risk thinking 
(Aradau & van Munster 2008). Ewald (1991; also see: Lianos & Douglas 2000) remarked that the 
incidence of danger has not necessarily changed, but that society is now obsessed with understanding, 
quantifying, and attempting to manage risks. Whereas prevention acts on historical data to prevent a 
course of probabilistic future events, preemption is the attempt to interrupt a course of possibilistic 
future events, without any reliance on past data (Amoore 2013). This logic disrupts conventional 
interpretations of the limits of probability-based insurance that sought to categorize risks through 
projecting past events into the future. Many areas considered by traditional risk-society scholars (Beck 
1999) as so catastrophic that they are “uninsurable, are [actually] insured” (Ericson & Doyle 2004, 
137), precisely because the power of imagination has displaced the power of history-informed future-
projections. 
The power of this ‘dispositif’ or ecosystem of risk is substantiated by the performativity of risk 
imaginaries: society is constructed and reconstructed through the risks imagined and acted upon, 
which in turn shapes the functioning of society. Moreover, what constitutes risk can be altered at will. 
Though speaking of (objective) risks, Beck could be writing about the responses to and the 
(re)constructions of supposed risk, remarking that they are a: 
 
‘Bottomless barrel of demands', unsatisfiable, infinite… Risks can be more than just called 
forth (by advertising and the like), prolonged in conformity to sales needs, and in short: 
manipulated… With risks, one could say… the economy becomes self-referential, independent 
of its context of satisfying human needs (1992, 56). 
 
This shift in emphasis from a probability-based to a possibility-based modality has been gradual: for 
instance, Northern Ireland was governed both by disciplining past contraventions through the 
regimented procedures of the courts, and also by preempting violations – such as the indiscriminate 
internment of whole sectors of the population with the patent innocence of many internees often 
being overlooked (Spjut 1986, 731). 
Whilst episodes underpinned to some extent by the preemptive rationality took place 
throughout the 20th century (like internment), the preemptive logic became embedded in the 1990s 
(Amoore 2013). Hazardous but highly improbable outcomes were asserted as certainties – or at least 
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deemed necessary to act upon. A transformation in academic terrorism studies was taking place, 
around the concept of ‘new terrorism’, that juxtaposed the supposedly excessively destructive and 
often religious violence as distinct from that of more conventional, strategic political violence 
(Hoffman, Arquilla & Lesser 1995; Laqueur 1999; Tucker 2001; Benjamin & Simon 2002; Neumann 
2009). Though this field faced sustained criticism (Duyvesteyn 2004; Crenshaw 2000,2008; Field 2009; 
Lynch & Ryder 2012; Stohl 2012), its premises of the catastrophic nature of ‘new’ terrorism filtered 
through to policy-makers: Sir David Omand, a key official behind the UK's counter-terrorism strategy 
(CONTEST), wrote, “We must take seriously the possibility that at some point a suicidal terrorist may 
come to see widespread urban fire, destruction, and killing as a cleansing power” (2010, 105). An 
accident or disaster occurs, whereupon it is administrated by existing emergency response 
procedures: evacuating, rebuilding, rehousing. Catastrophes like megalomaniacal terrorism, however, 
pose a disruptive threat to order itself – they are situated between “the accident (which can be insured 
and does not disrupt historical continuity) and apocalypse (the ultimate discontinuity)” (Aradau & van 
Munster 2012, 101). 
Preparedness is the necessary response to the potential catastrophe, where the worst 
possible event is expected to occur (Lakoff 2007, 247). The state of active anticipation is therefore a 
requirement of the risk dispositif, a modality that sees everything through “an all-risks approach” 
(Omand 2010, 11). Given that ‘what might happen next’ holds only unpredictability (as historical 
trends become irrelevant), when considered through a framework of risk-management the 
securitization of the future is necessarily a cyclical endeavour that promises “the repetition of the 
game, the tantalizing wait for the promised next terrorist attack” (Heath-Kelly 2016b, 171). There will 
always remain another threat around the corner, there will always be something vulnerable to make 
more secure, some further perceived risk against valued life. The endeavour to tame the future – in 
every moment an entity comprised of horrifying risks – is the endeavour to govern and subjugate time 
itself, to govern the ungovernable (Aradau & van Munster 2007, 107). Yet attempts to stop risk 
materializing into danger are inherently ridden with failure (Aradau & van Munster 2007), because 
“insecurity [only] proves itself” (Ericson 2008, 76). Measuring counterfactuals is impossible, and there 
will always be violations of safety. However, rather than provoking any critical self-analysis, the very 
failure of the preemptive endeavour only advances the drive for more effective predictive technology, 
ever-more fervid grasping for any information about other possible risks (Heath-Kelly 2012). 
Whenever the next traumatic event occurs, there will always be a risk of a more devastating 
catastrophe (Anderson 2010a). Alongside the calculability of risks being unimportant to this 
rationality, the administration of the dispositif of risk demands more and more of those in charge of 
monitoring the future: there are always more ‘risks’ to be managed or re-calculated. The management 
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of risk never proves itself, and risk-managers are judged not just by their knowledge or lack of 
knowledge, but by what they should have suspected (Ewald 2002, 289). Although an unappeasable 
project, the process of possibilistic risk insurance – once the risk dispositif takes hold – must continue 
in order to “tame the infinities of risk” (Aradau & van Munster 2008, 28). 
Critical risk-society scholars posit that this shift in knowledge establishes a necessary 
“monitoring of the future” (Aradau & van Munster 2008) to productively harness its direction, rather 
than merely to protect against it, as traditional risk-society scholars would theorize. The stark 
difference between this preemptive logic and earlier preventative logics is demonstrated through the 
comparison of exclusion being used in the past as a disciplinary action against probable threats (Heath-
Kelly 2012), where similar deportation measures today are now “intended to act as a deterrent” (HM 
Government 2011a, 47), only as signals to produce conformity and subjection. This break in 
connection with the individual, and consequently with their relations with space and time, is 
fundamental to the theoretical work of subjugated knowledge and silences that underwrites this 
research. However, before the disconnection with the individual is explored further, we look to how 
preemption is mobilized. 
 
Mobilizing Preemption: Disembodying the Being, Making ‘Risk’ Visible 
The considerable epistemological shift from prevention to preemption is mobilized through the 
abstraction of risk (Rabinow 1996; Rose & Novas 2004; Lemke 2004; Rose 2006; Clarke et al. 2010; 
Esposito 2011), whereby, ultimately, the embodied person is fractured and deconstructed. In Birth of 
the Clinic (2003d), Foucault identified the ‘medical gaze’ as a technology that observed the person, 
looking at the body-as-a-complete-entity. However, the dispositif of risk – being obsessed with 
preempting that which never arrives – displaces and deconstructs the embodied being. The medical 
gaze is supplanted by an observation instead of singular, extracted risk factors which only affect or are 
attached to the body. 
With the transition from probability governance to possibility governance, experts who 
perform interventions – “therapists, psychologists, [and] counsellors, [who constitute] the new 
priesthood” (Elshimi 2015, 122) – see associations of risk factors rather than a whole person. Rose 
asserts that, 
 
The ‘style of thought’ of contemporary biomedicine [or ‘risk-thinking’] considers life at the 
molecular level as a group of intelligible vital mechanisms which can be identified, isolated, 
manipulated, mobilized and recombined in intervention practices which are not constrained 




So rather than the whole entity of the molecule- or characteristic-carrier being liable to intervention, 
the individual molecule, the specific characteristic itself which could hypothetically host risk is set 
before the surgical tools (Braun 2007; also see: Rabinow 1996; Rose 2006). The intricate operation on 
these susceptibilities, on the characteristics that could carry risk, seeks to create an ever-stronger urge 
to produce life: through the operation, growth is rewarded and unproductiveness is brought back onto 
the path towards betterment. The subject of observation moves from the person to abstracted risk 
factors, “From a targeted [person-centric] practice to a whole-of-society [risk factor-centric] practice” 
(Heath-Kelly 2017a, 34) which is mobilized through “big data logics of inductive profiling” rather than 
probability judgments (Heath-Kelly 2017b, 314). Each specific instance of potential risk is meticulously 
analysed; these practices of targeted surveillance and monitoring signify a clutching for the “dream 
[of a] ‘smart’, specific, side-effects-free, information-driven utopia of governance” (Valverde & Mopas 
2004, 239). Clarke et al. (2010, 78) argue that Western society has moved “from normalization to 
customization”, whereby disciplinary drives to ‘normalize’ everybody to some natural order has been 
superseded by an obsessive individualizing (yet also highly impersonal) rationality, so that there are 
as few opportunities as possible for risk to materialize. Improved, healthier, customized cells are less 
likely to catch the flu. The ‘actual’ level of danger posed by people becomes more immaterial – 
remember though, disciplinary measures are on hand if required. Indeed, Parpart and Zalewski (2008) 
write, “In the technologized age of bio-political war, bodies are absent.” Instead, all cells within an 
organism pose hypothetical risk, all characteristics within a body could contribute to the person’s 
radicalization. The body is a mere vessel possessing potential risk factors. Heath-Kelly (2017a) speaks 
of the autoimmune response triggered by this logic that requires detection of infiltrative-risk – 
exemplified by the discourse adopted after 7/7 around the “homegrown nature” of the threat 
(Mythen, Walklate, & Khan 2009; Sedgwick 2010; Heath-Kelly 2017a). Whilst cells within an organism 
or people within a society could be perfectly healthy, they are made the object of suspicion, because 
locating risk is the dominant requirement: “Counter-radicalization then targets healthy cells (parts of 
the national body) and attacks them, in its desperate search for the radical” (Heath-Kelly 2017a, 35). 
Concerned with promoting life, this modality requires that everything is understood as a potential risk. 
Yet whilst everybody is a security threat, they are also a security asset – not only in the sense 
of spotting other sites of risk, but in their own reformulations and potential for growth and production 
(Lianos & Douglas 2000). Rose (2006, 253) writes that it has become hard, almost impossible, to 
differentiate between that which seeks to intervene upon a possible risk, and that which enhances 
life. Where each possible element of life is a potential risk factor (and also a point of possible 
productivity), everything legitimately becomes made amenable to intervention to minimize its 
riskiness from materializing, and instead its productiveness encouraged. Because totalizing knowledge 
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cannot be achieved by state institutions alone, the whole of society is recruited to “manage their own 
[innumerable] risks” (Valverde & Mopas 2004; also see Ericson 2008; Amoore & de Geode 2008). The 
burgeoning of ‘community policing’ is symptomatic of the all-inclusivity of the dispositif of risk 
(O'Malley 1999). It is a method of security which prioritizes the information flow (or ‘communication 
about risks’) between communities and the police. It responsibilizes communities for counter-risk 
efforts, encouraging them to own their participation in security measures (Ragazzi 2015). Heath-Kelly 
(2017a, 32) writes that “we are thus constituted through an autoimmune gaze whereby the system 
cannot differentiate between healthy and radical cells, and turns on those cells previously afforded 
protection.” Where people previously engaged in trusting social relations, now the community 
becomes the police. In accepting this responsibility, they must monitor their surroundings – and even 
themselves – which were previously safe. A neighbour is treated simultaneously as “friend and foe” 
(Walker 2008), as a possibly constructive social entity who looks out for risks but also one possessing 
the potential to unleash the latent danger within them. Stepping away from habeas corpus, this model 
is one where everything and everybody is suspicious (Ericson 2008).  Therefore, whilst being ‘risky’, a 
person can be also deemed ‘at-risk’ (Heath-Kelly 2012). This allows people to be acted upon not just 
as a threat but as a citizen requiring protection and redirection through (preemptive) intervention 
(rather than post-event discipline) on the basis of whatever the newly produced non-risky identity 
requires. Importantly those deemed non-risky remain only ever mostly in the non-risky space; they – 
along with society at large – in each moment are liable to their subjectivity being swiftly re-narrated 
as risky (Walker 2008). Everything is, after all, just a signifier: it’s not personal. This constant oscillation 
disrupts the potential for stable configurations of identity; behaviours and their carriers are judged 
and re-judged on a momentary basis in the frantic effort to move them away from posing a risk to 
society (Ragazzi 2015). 
Because risks are everywhere, the response of preparedness and resilience is an urgent 
priority. The risk of disease will never fully subside or disappear, so preparedness is merely a state of 
resilience against their development rather than a total escape (Rose 2006). Resilience is central to 
the immunitary logic: to be inoculated against risks, a person must assimilate some of that which 
threatens them (Esposito 2011; Massumi 2015). Through a considerably depersonalized illustration 
(and one which would sound odd if ‘the person’ or ‘the body’ was more important than her constituent 
characteristics), Omand explains the basis of social protection against the ubiquitous riskiness we are 
surrounded by: 
 
Resilience is a term… meaning the capacity of a material to withstand an impact and bounce 
back again into shape quickly… [And the main aim of resilience is] increasing the self-reliance 
of communities (2010, 60,13; also see: Davoudi et al. 2012). 
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Resilience, itself a product of the obsession with risk, sustains the legitimacy of the risk dispositif, by 
situating social problems at the feet of the vulnerable subject who is as-yet insufficiently responsible 
or resilient (Chandler 2016, 123), and by simultaneously calling on them to withstand these injustices 
(Mavelli 2017). Performing its own response to the impending catastrophe contributes to the 
continuation of the logic: once they are self-reliant, as in the words of Omand, they require less 
intervention in the future. Cynically, this methodology could even be considered a dynamically 
entrepreneurial one. Julian Reid writes of the co-constitutive nature of resilience and productivity, 
arguing that resilience when at its most powerful can breed innovation and growth. It could be 
interpreted through the reasoning held within the following passage, that risk-thinking – coupled with 
a necessary demand for resilience – actually thrives on inequality and suffering: 
 
For abused children, especially, recovery and development is said to require the work of 
imagination, as hurt creates the images of a better future and the pleasure of such images 
becomes linked with painful realities, enabling them to withstand the present. It is even 
possible, some psychologists of resilience maintain, that the torment of the present heightens 
the need to imagine a future and thus increases the very powers and potentials of imagination 
itself (2019, 29, emphasis added). 
 
So, alongside the responsibility to spot risks in others, the second but equal duty of the risk dispositif 
is to develop resilience against injustices, which can produce growth and development. Whilst some 
elements of this contemporary paradigm are a continuation of earlier forms of governance, “a 
threshold has been crossed” with the shift towards risk-based resilience against oneself (Rose 2006, 
8). 
How are the abstracted ‘risk factors’ spotted and identified, so that customizable 
interventions can take place? Governmentality functions through inscription (Latour 1986); indeed, 
Rose and Miller (2010, 185) write that “by means of inscription, reality is made stable.” Before the 
inscription of certain places as sites of risk, these spaces were floating, untethered, posing danger. The 
alleviation of the uncontrolled nature of these spaces through inscription, and the pinpointing of their 
threat, enables them to be governed. It should be noted that even the inscription of risk itself is a 
process of interventive governance, by situating the risk-carrier somewhere on the overall spectrum 
of risk. Yet it allows for further, more active intervention and management of risk, to recalibrate it 
back towards productivity. When what constitutes riskiness is determined and the sites of that 
riskiness identified, interventions to manage that risk can then take place. 
Visibilization, or the “defining and classifying” of risk factors, allows the practicable 
operationalization of risk possibilities, enabling intervention on ‘risky’ sites to minimize the threat 
(Aradau & van Munster 2008a, 198; for more on visuality studies see: Bleiker 2001; Boggs & Pollard 
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2006; Amoore & Hall 2009; Hansen 2011; Delmont 2013; Dixit 2014). Sorting and categorization is 
central to the dispositif of risk: 
 
Preparedness exercises—whether they consider a terrorist attack or some other issue—
generally start with clear delimitations of space (and time) that reframe the unknown, 
uncertain, and unknowable future into the ‘thinkable’ materialities of space (Aradau & van 
Munster 2012, 102). 
 
The filtering and categorization of such spaces according to the imagined ‘propensity to pose risk’ 
(their potential to reveal some destructive capacity) is essential in order for risky subjectivities to be 
reconstructed and remade. As soon as something is made thinkable through its categorization, it 
becomes governable. The visibilization of specific subjectivities through narratives of threat, and their 
consequent quantification, makes actionable the previously unknown risk (Aradau & van Munster 
2005; Joseph 2018; Martin 2018). Risk subjectivities are discovered, wrought from risk-management 
negotiations, and are a result of seeing more accurately than before (Martin 2018). Equally, less risky 
subjectivities are a result of risk-management negotiations that lead to a realization that the risk has 
diminished (invisibilizing it). These negotiations, between counter-terrorism officials in this particular 
research context do not take place on the basis of perfect information, and so ‘danger’ materializes in 
unexpected places. Yet this failure of imagination to visualize where risk had been only produces a 
stronger desire to see more, to improve systems or thought-processes (Aradau & van Munster 2005, 
33). As much information as can be gathered on everybody and everything is therefore an essential 
component of governmentality in the dispositif of risk (Miller & Sabir 2012; Heath-Kelly 2017a), so 
that the negotiations over the visualization of risk can fail in newer, unorthodox ways. 
It has been necessary to articulate the conditions within which anticipatory risk-governance is 
mobilized, its assumptions, and functionality, in order that alternative stories (of ex-militants) can be 
illuminated in contrast to it more effectively. Where risk-thinking is obsessed with abstracting and 
impersonalizing associations of potential risk factors through risk-manager negotiations, we will see 
through the thesis that ex-militants consistently drew their testimony to very human experiences that 
required the whole of their beings, speaking about having wrestled relationally, emotionally, even 
morally with the prospect of deploying violence. I now explore the exclusion of spatiality and 








If risk governance works through inscription, what knowledges are rendered silent by this regime of 
(in)visibility? This final section looks into how spatial and temporal silences occur as a result of 
contemporary terrorism preemption, because of certain knowledges being included or excluded. 
 
Making Explanatory Inquiry Taboo 
In the run-up to the end of the 20th century and by the turn of the millennium, as the shift towards 
preemption accelerated, various streams of academic study had attempted to explain the incidence 
of non-state political violence. Social movement theory had assumed a structural approach, framing 
violence as a result of escalation and de-escalation between groups in society including state forces 
(Wiktorowicz 2004; della Porta & Diani 2006; Alimi, Demetriou & Bosi 2015). This was complemented 
by a similarly-minded school that looked to social, economic, and political root causes of violence 
(Crenshaw 1981). Researchers in this field frequently carried out primary interviews with the subjects, 
but were comfortable representing “the terrorists’” stories “in their own words” (Post, Sprinzak, & 
Denny 2002). Studies from the ‘root causes’ perspective occasionally delved into exploring individual-
psychological explanations (Rabbie 1991; Crenshaw 2000). In occasionally problematizing the mental 
(in)stability of ‘the terrorist’, this school was drawing on a historic field of study that saw ‘terrorist 
violence’ as a result of psychological deviancy, which situated them alongside “persistent criminals 
[and] child abusers” and other socially problematic individuals (Forth, Cooke, & Hare 1998, 128-129). 
As Schmid and Jongman point out (1988, 91), 
 
The chief assumption underlying many psychological ‘theories’… is that the terrorist is in one 
way or the other not normal and that the insights from psychology and psychiatry are 
adequate keys to understanding [their violence]. 
 
The psycho-pathologization of ‘terrorism’ became consolidated towards the end of the ‘70s 
(Stampnitzky 2013), leading the way for the discourse around mental illnesses at the exclusion of 
grievances about social or political externalities to emerge as mainstream (Rabbie 1991; Victoroff 
2005; Post 2009). In the meantime, the ‘new terrorism’ debate rose to prominence: it makes the claim 
that violence occurs because barbaric, megalomaniacal, and irrational people are bent on apocalyptic 
destruction (Neumann 2009; Kilcullen 2009). In this vein Tony Blair wrote about the demonic 
foundations of extremism that compelled people to “kill, terrorise and torture without compunction 
or conscience” (2010, 362). Theories around ‘radicalization’, which appeared in the aftermath of 
various spectacular attacks, like 9/11 in the US or 7/7 in the UK, assumed the remnants of various 
individualized-psychology and risk-fixated schools of thought (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich 2013; 
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Kruglanski et al. 2014; Corner & Gill 2015,2017,2019; Corner, Gill & Mason 2016; Lankford 2017; 
Bouhana et al. 2018). Social movement theory was abandoned as structural explanations (and any 
focus at all on state-violence) were dismissed. Instead, the individual-psychological element of ‘root 
causes’ research (itself founded on older deviancy logics) was adopted by researchers in this field, 
along with the potentially catastrophic dangers identified by the new terrorism thesis. 
The re-narration of violence as inherently unable to be negotiated with, and its association 
with apocalyptical danger (Omand 2010, 105), makes violence incomprehensible by rendering inquiry 
taboo (Zulaika & Douglass 1996; Jackson 2012; Stampnitzky 2013). Whilst security risks have not been 
demonstrated to be empirically and fundamentally different than before (Crenshaw 2000,2008; 
Duyvesteyn 2004; Field 2009; Lynch & Ryder 2012; Stohl 2012), and whilst violence has been shown 
to be utilized against political oppression (Pape 2005), researchers became unwilling in the face of 
such hegemony to be seen attempting to understand the incomprehensible, the unjustifiable, or the 
evil (Stampnitzky 2013, 191). The policy-oriented approach to achieve, improve, and revise security 
measures became dominant at the expense of a more critical interrogation (Stampnitzky 2013). The 
question of why disappeared. Importantly, the object of study in ‘new terrorism’ scholarship was 
entirely non-state violence, and was completely detached from social movement theory or the root 
causes debates, both of which had emphasized the spatiotemporal relationality of different forms of 
violence (Jackson 2012). The development in the field towards the irrationality and non-
understandable nature of violence made these forms of knowledge (and related academic pursuit) 
unknown: why should ‘causes’ of violence be interrogated if they are merely the product of mental 
health defects and irrationality, and if these people are so determined just to create chaos? Moreover, 
Stampnitzky argues that because risk potentially contaminates, to understand the motivations of 
those perpetrating violence is to spread the disease, in a quest to avoid inquiry she names ‘anti-
knowledge’ (2013, 189). The motivations themselves, and the endeavour to understand them in 
relation to spatiality and temporality, become subjected to and concealed by the power of hegemonic 
discourse. Researchers are therefore unable to voice the stories of – or even speak to – those who 
have committed violence: it becomes an irrational pursuit. Their testimony, and even the premise that 
they might be able to contribute to political discourse, is excluded. It is crucial to listen to the stories 
of ex-militants in light of this pre-emptive paradigm, because Prevent makes universalized claims 
about the journey into violence without taking into consideration those who have actually 
demonstrated some ‘materialized risk’. In other words, it constructs a world of imagination without 





Preemption Forecloses Temporal Relations 
Because theories of ‘radicalization’ are mobilized through imaginaries of mental health concerns being 
associated with impending catastrophe, the preemptive paradigm establishes intervention as 
necessary before risk materializes. Not looking at ‘the potential terrorist’ as evil or fanatical as we have 
seen, but instead as merely irrational and requiring re-direction away from their (potentially 
devastating) riskiness, means that the only important consideration is for risks to be spotted and 
recalibrated (Boukalas 2019). The temporal consequences accompanying this modality are significant. 
Prioritizing suspicion and fearful imaginations more than historical trends to conceptualize the 
future – and where anything can constitute a risk (Ewald 1991; Salter 2008) – ensures the “status quo 
as something worth preserving, as a value in itself” (Aradau & van Munster 2008a) to stave off these 
imaginary disasters. In pursuing the aim of preserving the continuity of the present forwards into the 
future, Ewald (2002, 284; also see: Donzelot 1988) writes that the “precautionary principle is 
counterrevolutionary. It aims to restrict innovation to a framework of unbroken progress.” The 
ubiquity of risks and the exigency of intervening upon them means that the future fades into an 
“extended present” (Adam 2003, 73): the important variable is everything, but now. Market-based 
governance, the thrust of neoliberalism, in ushering out the use of broad historical trends to predict 
an individual’s behaviour ushers in the deployment of the aggregation of others’ behaviour in this 
particular moment in time. As Aradau and van Munster (2007, 95) write, “The identification and 
management of risk is a way of organizing reality, disciplining the future, taming chance and 
rationalizing individual conduct.” 
Preemptive governance has a material effect on the construction of risk. Massumi (2005) 
speaks about ‘quasicauses’, which he says are conjectural future events that cannot be specified or 
known until they are no longer in the future but occur in the present. Anticipating deviant behaviour, 
through devices like reminding civilians to ‘remain vigilant’, for example, disturbs linear temporality 
by “disclos[ing] and [making] present” the future (Anderson 2010, 793). Spatiality, albeit detached 
from the individual, still matters, but temporal considerations revolve around the only- and ever-
present (Boukalas 2019), where the present folds into itself, justifying itself. If individual, isolated 
spaces can just be reorganized, re-ordered, and re-arranged to manage risk more effectively, 
considering temporal explanations for reality becomes unimportant – even a distraction. The 
importance of the past and future fades, as the market strives to eliminate 
 
the radical, the nonliberal. In preventing the formation of non-liberal subjectivities, [market-
based governance] aims to cancel the potentiality of a political future and freeze society into 
an eternal liberal present. [It] aims to end social change. It declares that the social order is 
perfected, that history has ended (Boukalas 2019, 472). 
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Working through the translation of the qualitative judgment of officials into statistics in order to make 
new possible imaginations actionable (Gigerenzer 1989), the logic produces an indifference as to 
whether future realities come to pass or not (Massumi 2010); indeed, failure just accelerates newer, 
more creative reorganizations of risk profiles (Aradau & van Munster 2008). ‘False positives’ are mere 
learning opportunities for the dispositif of risk, new knowledges to be built into new understandings 
of risk (Heath-Kelly 2012). The principle of the connectedness of time is thus rendered obsolete (Bibler 
Countin 2008), undoing it to a point where the past is no longer considered the cause of the present 
or the future. Instead, the future causes present and future experience and action: what shoppers 
might buy is the operative logic in organizing aisles, how citizens might act violently in the future 
determines counter-terrorism policy today, which in turn shapes the future. 
 
Preemption Forecloses Spatial Relations 
Equally, the consideration that risk emanates from vulnerable and irrational individuals who could 
perpetrate mass violence (and the exclusion of any alternative forms of knowledge) means that the 
intervening gaze is unconcerned with understanding “space as a product of interrelations” (Massey 
2005, 10). The logic of preparedness through preempting the highly improbable event takes hold, and 
interventions are logical because these risks can be mitigated by making the vulnerable resilient, and 
by enlightening the irrational. This rationality promotes the politics of decision, which, instead of 
asking causal questions, is concerned with “‘what [now] to do?’ and ‘what decisions to take?’” (Aradau 
& van Munster 2012, 105; also see: Aradau & van Munster 2007). As temporality folds into itself, 
spatial concerns become the preeminent explanation and justification (Aradau & van Munster 2012), 
except these spatial explanations are abstracted and decontextualized, as we have seen. 
An assemblage that looks to the management of abstracted risk signifiers through preemptive 
intervention targets a person’s “desires, aspirations, interests, and beliefs” (Dean 1999, 11) in order 
to minimize the alleged risk. The connections between people fragment where ‘risk factors’ exist as 
primary compositions of social relations, face-to-face interaction becomes less important, and 
exchanges of knowledge about “abstract factors deemed liable to produce risk” become centralized 
(Castel 2001). The behaviour of shoppers and citizens is abstracted away from the person; the 
important component of politics is the organization and re-organization of risk (or profit) components. 
Where everything is a possible risk and the person is hidden below the compulsion to spot risk factors 
in every abstracted space, interactions become impersonal and instead infused with mistrust and 
suspicion. Aradau and van Munster (2012, 105) remark poignantly that 
 
The withdrawal of time cuts individuals from the social and political conditions in which events 
happen and locates them within an empty-container space. The social is excavated from 
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counter-terrorism as the future is rendered as an abstract container-space. Social relations 
are only constituted in the anticipation of, response to, and recovery from the next terrorist 
attack. 
 
Personal relations stop being personal relations and become risk-knowledge, and everything signifies 
an indication of less- or more-risk, in what Ericson and Haggerty (2006, 63) call a “disarticulation of 
subjectivity”. Security official and founder of the Prevent programme Sir David Omand hints at this 
when he writes that 
 
The duty is to contribute to public security, defined as a state of mind that gives confidence 
that the risks ahead are being managed to a point where everyday life – and investment in 
the future – can continue (2010, 11, emphasis added). 
 
The actual management of risks is relatively unimportant, a tertiary issue; instead, the very perception 
of risk-management – the signifier – is the cornerstone of risk-governance. A state of mind, rather 
than the management of physical danger, equates to security. 
Because subjects have been deconstructed into disparate risk factors, “concerns about the 
meaning or motives behind offending” are largely irrelevant (Smith 2006, 93). The relationship 
between cause and effect are being consequently dismantled, because, as Amoore (2013, 59) 
elucidates, “Contemporary risk calculus does not seek a causal relationship between items of data, 
but works instead on and through the relation itself… If *** and ***, in association with ***, then 
***.” Correlation replaces causality: in solitude, the risks are deemed of no consequence, but their 
relations to each other define the alleged risk a particular space (body/ person/ group) poses. Rather 
than actual intentions or motives, “what can be imagined and inferred about who we might be” is 
more actionable (Amoore 2013, 61). For example, in sentencing a lady for terrorism offences for the 
possession of a prohibited magazine, the judge mentioned she posed no threat, nor had intent, nor 
was a terrorist (Qureshi 2015). However, under the new dispositif of risk, the criminal justice system 
is disinterested in a person’s intentions; the risk factors are more important than the human. 





Where negotiations over space and time (crime and imprisonment) are substituted for innovative 
(re)learning and reformulations of the individual (preemption), causal relations disappear. Hegemonic 
narratives that deem risks as emerging from a lack of information and insufficient resilience compound 
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the expulsion of certain pursuits of knowledge around terrorism – knowledges which would otherwise 
listen to and represent ‘the terrorist’, or situate the state or external conditions as potential 
contributors to violence. The abstraction of risk factors from the embodied person, the treatment of 
susceptibilities to ‘radicalization’ rather than the conditions that enable it becomes the aim and 
purpose of interventions (Rose 2006). ‘Pastoral care’ is mobilized through the façade of genuine 
connection as interactions of risk profiles become devoid of spatial and temporal considerations. As 
we can see, the meaning of human stories becomes lost when the only spatiality is the singular risk-
trait and when the only possible temporality is the present moment. The potential for stories with a 
cause-and-effect relationship becomes displaced by the horrifying affront that the flash of potential 
violence  presents, whilst historical explanations are subjugated beneath the consideration of “what 
now to do?” (Aradau & van Munster 2007). The consequence is, as Knudsen (2018, 8)  writes, a reality 
“narrow and frozen in time.” As will become continually clear, the purpose of this thesis is to broaden 
and unfreeze the preemptive-present, by deploying the disruptive testimony of ex-militants, which 
has been subjugated by this risk-obsessed paradigm. Prevent is sustained by the subjugated 
knowledge of terrorism offenders’ stories: explanations by actors from Northern Ireland for their 
violence, explanations that were situated within historical and spatial contexts, are roundly ignored 
by Prevent. Ignoring these context-laden histories enables the regime of ‘counter-radicalization’ truth 
to be maintained. Precisely how these exclusions legitimize the privileged and universalizing claims of 
Prevent will be unpacked, as we move through the thesis. I now turn to the methodology, where I 





Undertaking the Research 
 
My research explores the subjugation of decades of significant counter-terrorism knowledge acquired 
by the British state during the latest conflict in Northern Ireland. The Belfast Agreement drew ‘the 
Troubles’ to a close in 1998, and Prevent came into existence just five years later - apparently taking 
into account few of the political or structural lessons from the Northern Irish conflict. Instead, as we 
have just seen, political violence is seen as an individual-phenomenon to be preempted through 
anticipatory assemblages. My research is ultimately concerned with how dominant terrorism 
knowledge is (re-)created and (re-) constituted through the rationalities driving ‘counter-
radicalization’. This can only take place when we look to its concurrent silences, what is not included 
in mainstream discourse. This thesis therefore deploys a discourse analysis methodology that 
examines two regimes of truth, in order to understand hegemonic risk-logics in light of the experiences 
of those whose ‘hypothetical risk’ actually materialized. This chapter explores the premise of the 
discourse analysis approach used here, followed by a practical explanation of my fieldwork, a 
discussion of issues of coding and organization of data, and some reflections. It finishes with a brief 
history of Northern Ireland so that interviews with ex-militants can be contextualized. 
 
 
Discourse Analysis Methodology 
Being interested in “following lines of fragility in the present” in order that how the present is 
constructed might be better understood (Foucault 1988, 37), my research looks at two realms of 
knowledge: the implementation of Prevent, and ex-militant experience. A discourse analysis is 
therefore utilized, because such an approach  can help to uncover the hidden ways in which a world 
(that accepts ‘counter-radicalization’ as legitimate for instance) is composed and ordered (McGregor 
2010, 2). Generally concerned with exploring language, discourse analysis methodology is deployed 
to explore relationships between different objects of knowledge and practice (Wodak & Mayer 2009, 
37), and often to challenge hegemonic forms of truth (McGregor 2010; Mogashoa 2014). My research, 
which applies a critical assessment of terrorism preemption, takes the two discourses of the 
testimonies of Prevent practitioners and the testimonies of ex-militants, setting them against each 
other to explore their interrelation, as the dominant and subjugated components within a pair. Taking 
a discourse analysis approach allows me to study the conditions that make possible the appearance of 
‘counter-radicalization’ as legitimate (Hodges, Kuper & Reeves 2008) – paying special attention to that 
which must be silenced, in order for the radicalization regime of truth to become, and remain, 
sensible. Silences, which are “the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, [are] an integral 
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part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses” (Foucault 1978, 27). The purpose of this 
research is to identify which knowledge and silences underpin the discourse of ‘counter-
radicalization’, to illuminate how pre-criminal interventions are justified and maintained. 
Deconstructing the potency of self-justifying preemptive logics by highlighting these hidden spaces in 
the discourse ultimately allows a different future to be imagined than the one constructed by risk-
management systems. Opening up space for ‘ontopower’ – the operative force of the preemptive logic 
– to be contested is a central aim of this research, and uncovering some of the discourse’s silences is 
a foundational process through which to achieve this aim. 
This methodology, it must be stressed, is not one directly comparing Northern Irish with 
Prevent-era counter-terrorism efforts, nor is it one juxtaposing the testimony of politically-violent 
individuals in both periods. Importantly, my research does not theorize about structural causes of 
violence, either to inform or challenge risk-management assemblages. The comparison between 
Northern Ireland and Prevent was utilized primarily because the redrawing of terrorism risk-
management techniques to recruit mainstream society (such as schools, social work, hospitals) is a 
fundamentally distinct approach than that which governed the Northern Irish conflict. If risk-managers 
don’t see a distinction between eras of ‘terrorism’, why is a fundamentally different mode of 
governance deployed to manage violence? I spoke with former combatants because these individuals 
had obviously committed the very acts that the programme supposedly seeks to stop. I was interested 
instead in how far their experiences and explanations for violence informed contemporary counter-
terrorism. 
Ideally, I would have been granted access to the very small number of people in Britain who 
have been convicted of terrorism offences since Prevent was conceived, but access would have been 
denied. Gaining research access to terrorist offenders is notoriously difficult, with interview capability 
generally only available to officials like the police and mental health teams (see: Al-Attar 2018). The 
next best approach was to look to a context within the UK where political violence has been recently 
utilized and access to ex-militants remains far freer. During the latest Northern Irish conflict, estimates 
of people imprisoned for terrorist offences are around 25,000-30,000 (Mullin 2000). With a population 
around 1.7 million, 1 in 60 people in Northern Ireland were therefore convicted for terrorist offences 
during the conflict. (R23, a prominent member of the republican former combatant community, noted 
that this figure probably equated to half of the number actually involved.) As one of the “most 
researched and understood” conflicts in the world, Northern Ireland presents a “benign atmosphere 
to research terrorism as it is a relatively open society… and the communities have experience of 
dealing with researchers” (Ferguson & Burgess 2009, 22). Scores of researchers have managed to 
conduct interviews with ex-militants (Munck, 1992; Bruce, 1992; McAuley, Tonge & Shirlow 2009; 
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Edwards 2009,2017; Sanders 2011; Ferguson, Burgess & Hollywood 2015; Ferguson 2016a,b; Clubb 
2016). Many ex-militants work as tour guides, using their previous experience of conflict to inform 
others about their reasons for joining groups and how to build towards peace. Organizations like the 
republican Cóiste, and the loyalist Ex-Prisoners Interpretative Care (EPIC), encourage work between 
former militants and academic institutions to help secure peace in post-conflict regions, incorporating 
personal histories of violence into their work (McEvoy & White 2012, 47). Other former combatants 
engage in other forms of community outreach with organizations like Community Foundation for 
Northern Ireland (amongst a vast number of other local institutions). I then interviewed Prevent 
officials, to see how far the Prevent methodology would have suited another context within the UK 
just five years prior to when Prevent was imagined into existence. After all, as I have mentioned, the 
remit of Prevent ideally stretches across the Irish Sea to Northern Ireland, because the policy attempts 
to combat “all forms of terrorism”, including that relating to Northern Ireland (HM Government 
2011b, 20). The reason given by practitioners and the Prevent Strategy for its non-implementation in 
Northern Ireland is that the policy is constrained by devolution: policing and other levers utilized by 
Prevent are devolved affairs (PC6; HM Government 2011b). Moreover, as explained in the 
introduction, there is “not fundamentally” seen to be a difference between the violence of 
contemporary, mainland terrorism offenders, and offenders – past and present – in Northern Ireland 
(Farr, quoted in House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2012, Q309). Every offender is ultimately 
seen as having vulnerabilities that drew them into violence (ibid.). Prevent is therefore applicable to 
every past and potential-future terrorism offender in the UK, rendering legitimate the comparison 
between Prevent’s counter-radicalization interventions and terrorism offenders from the Troubles. 
A comparison purely of those convicted of terrorist offences in both eras would be less useful 
in identifying and highlighting the silences - and hegemonic knowledge - central to the discourse of 
terrorism preemption. Looking at a small sample of individuals to explore ‘why they became involved 
in violence’ across both timelines would show some different contributing factors that might have 
caused involvement, but such research would not demonstrate upon what knowledge ‘counter-
radicalization’ practices were built, what alternative knowledges were subjugated, and how 
anticipatory risk-governance moves to construct the contemporary subject. Likewise, an examination 
only of counter-terrorism officials from both eras would provide an insight into the metamorphosing 
of risk-management strategies. Whilst this would be interesting, such an approach would not 
demonstrate the extent of silenced knowledge about the subjects being acted upon in preemptive 
governance. How do those who have engaged in violence understand their reality, and are these 
realities sensed or perceived by counter-terrorism officials? If these stories do not inform counter-
terrorism praxis, then what other knowledge is being utilized? What does this say about how power 
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operates and the relationship between subjugated and hegemonic discourse? Is there only one (state-
sanctioned) story about why people engage in violence, or are the stories of those who perpetrate it 
worth listening to as well? Exploring these crucial questions required that I speak with both counter-
terrorism officials and those counter-terrorism would act upon. 
My research ultimately looks at the direct testimony of those who have previously engaged in 
– or prepared for – physical acts of violence, in order to understand how they narrated their 
experiences  and what sort of factors they describe as contributing to their involvement in activity that 
Prevent alleges to interrupt. These accounts of involvement are juxtaposed with how the Prevent 
dispositif presents the trajectory towards political violence, to expose what hegemonic knowledge 
says of risk, danger, and threat, and to expose what is not being spoken about. These disjunctures are 
then analysed to understand upon what rationalities counter-radicalization is constructed. After all, in 
developing a strategy in the same country to curtail individual-level violence, why would officials not 
consult those who had engaged in the very activity that the strategy was supposedly established to 
tackle? As will be evident throughout the thesis, we find significant disjunctures between violence-
perpetrators and violence-‘preventers’. The way that former combatants recounted their histories, 
and how Prevent officials narrated their work, seems to have very little – to nothing – in common. The 
approach of comparing ex-militant testimony with that of counter-terrorism practitioners allows the 
thesis to explore the relationship between hegemonic and subjugated knowledge, particularly as the 
respective eras of terrorism knowledge were disconnected by only five years (and for the justification 
given in the introduction). 
My PhD was not always a discourse analysis: my original PhD project proposed to test the 
impact of various preemptive programmes in operation in Germany, Denmark, and Canada, in order 
to provide a ‘best practice’ de-radicalization model for the UK. However, after immersing myself in 
post-structuralist literature, attending various academic conferences, and discussing my thoughts with 
colleagues, I altered my original project and assumed a discourse analysis methodology, looking at the 
knowledge produced by such regimes and the rationality that upholds them. There were a few times 
during interviews where I slipped back into my (rather foundationalist) mindset. My first interview 
with a Channel mentor for instance, which occurred before my Northern Ireland fieldwork, had me 
convinced that his work existed in a structural and political vacuum. Talking with my supervisor 
afterwards and reflecting on the broader political implications again reminded me that actually, I 
should consider the political consequences of intervening in the non-crime space, and that I should 
not take policy – and the things policy doesn’t take into account – as somehow apolitical. For this 
reason, and the vast chasm between Prevent practice and Northern Irish testimony, my project moved 
quickly from a comparative study of international radicalization prevention programmes to one 
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focusing on what political rationalities were operating in one nation’s counter-terrorism alone. In 
total, I accumulated over 300,000 spoken words (around 500 pages) of testimony from Prevent and 
Northern Irish individuals,  so the choice to focus solely on the UK has been very productive. 
 
 
Method of sampling 
Northern Ireland 
31 of my 35 Northern Irish interviewees were formerly members of proscribed groups, and all but one 
had carried out acts of violence or preparation for violence during the conflict for which they had been 
imprisoned. I will include the single exception (a former Official IRA member imprisoned for 
membership rather than violent activities) in the umbrella category ‘former combatants’. All were 
released prior to or as a result of the Belfast (“Good Friday”) Agreement and had not been re-
imprisoned, with the exception of one former INLA member, who was imprisoned after 1998 for 
various related offences I was not aware of before meeting him. Incidentally, those released through 
the Belfast Agreement are ‘remembered’ by the UK state: ex-prisoners remain on license, and any 
further crimes would place them back inside prison. Crimes unsolved from the previous conflict that 
later came to light would put them in jail for two years; many commented for this reason that they 
would not talk about specifics and, had they, I would have steered the conversation away. 
Of the 30 former combatants, 25 semi-structured interviews were accompanied by 10 political 
walking – and driven – tours in Belfast and (London)Derry. 11 interviewees were from various loyalist 
groups (often members of several groups during the conflict), 15 were former IRA members, and 4 
were former INLA members. All were male, except for one female IRA member. The vast majority of 
interviews were carried out in Belfast where access is particularly easy. I also carried out a loyalist 
interview in Lisburn and another in Portadown, a republican interview in Armagh, two republican 
interviews in (London)Derry, a republican interview in Drogheda (Republic of Ireland), and two 
interviews over the phone after returning to England (including the female former combatant). I 
attempted to obtain at least one loyalist tour or interview in (London)Derry, but despite exploring 
several avenues (such as unionist lodges and loyalist museums) this venture was not successful. 
I attempted to obtain more female interviews but, according to a senior academic working in 
this field, there were essentially no loyalist women involved. When I asked the curator of a loyalist 
museum (Interviewee 41) if he could put me in touch with any formerly-active loyalists and especially 
females, he replied that such access would be difficult, because most loyalists have “moved on with 
their lives, they don’t want to be associated with [the conflict, and] they… want to forget about the 
conflict and their actions, they don’t wanna know.” 
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The final five interviews were made up of two driven tours by a non-combatant republican in 
(London)Derry (R36); a semi-structured interview with a high-profile barrister during the conflict who 
had tried “a couple of hundred” terrorist cases in the crown court and “a lot more in the petty 
sessions” (B42); two semi-structured interviews with republican peace activists who were at the time 
of the conflict “active republican[s] with many friends and colleagues involved” (R47; also R43); and a 
semi-structured interview with a loyalist museum curator who was well-connected in the community 
and knew a large number of former combatants (L31). Whilst in Northern Ireland I spent some time 
walking around the main sites of conflict, and visiting related museums such as the Museum of Free 
Derry in (London)Derry, the Irish Republican History Museum in Belfast, and the Museum of Orange 
Heritage, also in Belfast. Often, those in charge of the museums (especially on the republican side) 
have personal connections with the history, part of the unique selling point of these places. 
 
Prevent 
I also interviewed 17 actors associated with Prevent in Britain. Given how little the ‘de-radicalization’ 
process – broadly understood as moving cases from ‘posing risk’ to ‘no longer posing risk’ – has been 
researched and how central it is to my work, I focused on acquiring interviews with Channel mentors. 
The Channel programme provides interventions which seek to relocate the most supposedly-risk 
Prevent cases from ‘risky/at-risk’ to ‘sufficiently non-risky/not-at-risk’, through one-on-one mentoring 
sessions. Individuals are offered Channel mentorship if they make their way up the Prevent referral 
chain (see Figure 1). The most serious cases are discussed at Channel panels (a board meeting 
comprised of local safeguarding leads), and the most serious of these are offered Channel mentorship. 
I interviewed other senior and strategic figures from within Prevent. Interviewees were otherwise 
selected because of their seniority within the structure, the variation of their work (to provide a 
holistic view), and because of access provided. I stopped collecting Prevent officials’ testimony 
partially because I had collected sufficient data, and partially because I believe my access was curtailed 











Figure 1: The referral process towards Channel intervention (HM Government 2018b, 38) 
 
 
These 17 interviewees included the architect of CONTEST (and therefore Prevent) Sir David 
Omand, six official Channel ‘de-radicalization’ mentors (comprised of one right-wing specialist, one 
mental health specialist formerly a Regional Prevent Coordinator within the NHS, and four Islamic 
theology specialists), and three national leads on Prevent. I also interviewed two local Prevent officers 
(both of whom deliver official WRAP training, one of whom was formerly a Prevent Police officer), one 
former Prevent Police officer, and one local authority official with responsibility for Prevent in the 
capacity of youth work. On top of these official positions, I interviewed one of the original community 
consultees of the earliest version of Prevent (when it was being rolled out in 2005 as ‘Preventing 
Extremism Together’), a director of a well-known company providing training to public and private 
institutions (including schools) funded in part by Prevent, one director of a company offering 
awareness-raising of Prevent in schools, and one individual who worked in counter-
extremism/radicalization think-tanks that received Prevent funding. I also sat in on official Prevent 
WRAP training (performed by PC5), on Prevent/radicalization awareness training performed by the 
company of PCC2, and on Prevent/radicalization awareness training performed by the company of 
PCC14. All my interviews were carried out between September 2017 and September 2018, including 
a trip to Belfast for 5 weeks from November 2017, and for another week in early 2018 to interview 






The ethical considerations of interviewing former combatants and ‘de-radicalization’ practitioners was 
important. There is a vast literature within the confines of ethnographical research on the role of 
positionality and self-representation (see for instance: Bok, 1979).  This was important to my 
methodology; in any study the position of the researcher is fundamental, but my immersive 
ethnographical approach meant I spent around 60-70 hours in the company of former combatants 
(including being driven around Belfast for three hours, unplanned, by a former IRA fighter). I also had 
to represent myself in Prevent-related interviews in a way in which was honest about my research but 
that also provided me the best possibility for further interviews. The ethics of both elements of my 
research will now be explored. 
 
Northern Ireland Interviews 
My fieldwork in Northern Ireland took place in the aftermath of the Boston College Tapes (BCT) 
incident. The BCT project was an oral history of former militants’ personal involvement in the conflict 
that often touched upon unsolved criminality, and which project leaders (at Boston College) had been 
under the potentially-misled impression would be protected from legal ramifications. The PSNI 
subsequently requested and obtained a number of the interviews which included damaging testimony 
concerning Gerry Adams, and was therefore a high profile affair (BBC 2017). I was acutely conscious 
of my responsibility to ensure interviewees were aware that their interviews should not touch upon 
unsolved crimes, as these may not be outside the interest of the PSNI, which is actively seeking to deal 
with these legacy cases (HM Government 2018a). 
Aside from needing to protect my sources, myself, and Warwick University from legal 
implications, participating in fieldwork with former combatants can be ethically discomforting - are 
they representing their histories accurately? Does asking open questions allow significant 
misrepresentations of why they became involved at the time? How far should I trust their post-event 
memories? Did this devalue my fieldwork to any extent? Questions like these plague research of 
former combatants, such as that described by Jessee (2011) in the context of Rwanda and the Former 
Yugoslavia. For her, asking open questions and letting those who had committed atrocities speak 
freely could lead them to whitewash their gruesome histories. Whilst my research did not cross into 
specifics of crimes committed, and whilst I asked a number of questions to direct conversations, there 
were occasions when the interviewees took the lead. This raised a fundamental question: how far did 
the ex-militants’ representations of their involvement hold true to their decision-making and 
environments at the time? I could only situate the prominence of romanticized and filtered lenses by 
considering my findings alongside other research from within the ‘terrorism’ literature; the testimony 
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I gathered differs little from research carried out from conflicts around the world and specific research 
into the Northern Irish conflict (Bruce 1992; McAuley, Tonge & Shirlow 2009; Edwards 2009,2017; 
Sanders 2011; Ferguson, Burgess & Hollywood 2015; Ferguson 2016a,b; Clubb 2016). This limitation, 
of processing post-event (and often very emotionally intense) memory, is further controlled by 
considering ‘conditions of victory’. Perceived conditions of victory varied amongst my interviewees - 
which can contribute to varied post-event narrative recreation: Heath-Kelly writes that “hegemonic 
[and victorious] narratives constitute ‘the’ past as singular, erasing the inconvenient details” (2016a, 
295, emphasis added). My sample contained, on both sides of the conflict, those who felt they had 
achieved their aims, and those who felt depressed by the undesirable and unfinished state of affairs. 
Yet despite these different views of relative victory and defeat, themes that arose in all my interviews 
(like that of the wider and aforementioned research) were largely consistent. 
Another ethical concern I had to consider was that I was actively contributing to and 
reproducing an obsession with conflict, violence and death: revisiting ‘the Troubles’ through tours 
(and the maintenance of conflict-related public artwork and museums) is sometimes seen as 
perpetuating community divisions and as upholding the memory of violence (McDowell 2008). So 
called “dark tourism” (Lennon & Foley 2000) is claimed to perpetuate a fixation with atrocity and 
death. The point is a contentious one. Removal of conflict-related art has been attempted, successfully 
in the city centre as an element of regeneration projects (Wiedenhoft-Murphy 2010, 546), but 
unsuccessfully elsewhere (West Belfast for example) because of some communities’ desire to 
remember their history. My contribution was not just through my academic interest or physical 
presence in these areas, but it was sometimes monetary: whilst I did not pay for one-on-one 
interviews, I paid for tours of conflict sites. The tours and the stories they provided me are not central 
to my research, but they helped to situate me in the time and space of the conflict, enabling me to 
understand more fully the context in which the violence occurred. The ethics of paying research 
participants is worth considering, because it produces more complicated layers of relation between 
researcher and researched. However, this effect is considered more significant when higher sums are 
provided (Bentley and Thacker 2004). The charges, set mostly between £10-£20, that I was paying for 
tour guides’ time in a way they charge tourists every Saturday, can only have contributed minimally 
to this effect. Moreover, Draper et al. (2009, 236) write that provided transparency is assured, 
“Reimbursement appears, then, to be an accepted and acceptable practice to cover the costs incurred 
by a practitioner or practice for taking part in a research study.” The prices were set by the tour 
operators except on two occasions – a car tour in (London)Derry when the guide told me the price 
over the phone, and one tour down the Shankill when I was told by the guide prior to the tour. Head 
(2009, 339) writes that “potential research participants on low incomes might feel coerced to 
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participate if the level of ‘reward’ is too high to refuse”. Given that a number of former combatants 
complained of employment difficulties, this motivation should be weighed. However, the testimony 
from tours (of both the broader context and the guides’ personal histories) is included, but provides 
more flavour than meat to the thesis – and, importantly, it is corroborated by the many interviews 
that I secured without payment, and wider academic literature. 
A further concern to consider was that walking tours have been contested for being so 
dynamically immersive. The requirement of physical exertion in order to engage with the topic and 
the ex-prisoner tour guide, writes Skinner (2016), ensures an experience distinct from more passive 
tourism (like bus or taxi tours). Walking several miles - often in the cold and rain - in order to gather 
around an ex-prisoner to hear him (all men from my experience) retelling his personal history, requires 
the committed engagement of one’s entire being. Furthermore, Skinner reminds us of the politics of 
movement: marching has been consistently utilized by the weak as a means of protest, and by armies 
as an integral element of war. Walking up the Falls and back down the Shankill is therefore far more 
than just actively listening to an individual’s history - it situates the tourist, as a “habituating spatio-
temporal practice”, within the conflict (2016, 26). However, historical atrocities have long resulted in 
the production and reproduction of memory of loss, grief and disaster, particularly in Europe and 
North America. The fixation on extreme violence perpetrated by, but primarily against, both states 
and individuals is often commercialized through museums. For instance, the Churchill War Rooms in 
London and the 9/11 Memorial Museum in New York situate visitors in a particular space and time by 
reconstructing the respective scenes (through videos and sound clips, wall art and statistics, and 
artefacts ‘from the moment’). Like the political walking tours, visitors to such museums buy in to the 
experience through their physical immersion within this reconstruction. So where ‘dark tourism’ is 
posited as distasteful or problematic, remembering exceptional death and tragedy is a mainstream 
activity. 
Whilst the immersion of the Northern Irish conflict walking tours can be seen as problematic 
for their preservation of divisions through exclusive narratives, and for ensuring that the memory of 
violence and conflict remains present, the director of loyalist ex-prisoner support group EPIC remarked 
that one of the organization’s primary purposes was to de-glamorize conflict through outreach (Tom 
Roberts, in Carruthers 2018). Cóiste also engages in similar work, performing youth outreach and 
assemblies in schools (see Thematic Chapter 4). In addition, although both sides use the tourism space 
to promote their own “deliberately exclusive” perspective of the conflict (McDowell 2008, 407), 
listening to their stories provides a window into a time and space that otherwise would be unheard. 
This is particularly important where such violence is represented in very binary ways through public 
media. Taking both sides’ narratives can be useful to identify some of the broader trends that appear 
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important in the establishment and continuation of a conflict. Another not unimportant element 
upholding the legitimacy of this form of tourism is that it has encouraged people to visit what is often 
felt a neglected part of the city. Patri (2009) suggests this ‘area of expertise’ was developed by 
proactive former combatants to ensure West Belfast does not become forgotten. 
The ethics process at Warwick University was fairly stringent, with the funding committee 
requiring that I undertake an extra and complete risk assessment form in order to travel to another 
part of the UK, to talk with people who had passed through the judicial system, who had faced the 
consequences of their crimes, and who were by now generally between 50 and 80 years of age. I was 
instructed to meet in public places and situate myself next to an open door, presumably in case the 
interviewees sprung at me and attacked. Had I insisted on doing so, it would have been impractical, 
quite rude, and bizarre for the interviewees who often engage in public outreach on a daily basis. In a 
few instances I met in cafés or on the streets for walking tours, but otherwise I interviewed them at 
their place of work, in their homes, or in cars (mine and theirs). In reality there was no reasonable risk 
to my person: these former combatants were being monitored as part of the terms of their release 
under the GFA, and if they were suspected of re-joining a group by the Sentence Review 
Commissioners or the Secretary of State would be re-imprisoned. However, “Only 16 out of 449 
prisoners freed between 1998 and 2007 had their licence revoked” (Democratic Progress Institute 
2013, 14-15). This is a significantly lower race of recidivism than for ‘traditional’ crime. 
 
Prevent Interviews 
My Prevent interviews also brought up ethical dilemmas, most notably how I framed my research to 
potential interviewees. Prevent is a field often divided between practice and research; practitioners 
cannot see the legitimacy in theoretical critique, and researchers cannot abide what the programme 
is said to produce (often racism and divisions). The European Commission notes that social scientists 
“should not normally deceive their subjects without good reason” (Iphofen 2013, 11). Ortmann and 
Hertwig (1998, 806) write, “Not telling participants the purpose of an experiment is not necessarily 
deception; telling participants things that are not true necessarily is.“ Entering such a contested field 
where access is curtailed for very critical researchers meant that, in order to secure interviews with 
the most central actors, I had to frame my research in ways that did not convey that I would be 
especially critical. (In fact, when undertaking these interviews, I was generally more interested in 
improving Prevent than wholeheartedly deconstructing it – the extent of my criticality came later.) 
This restriction extends to those who are perceived merely as potentially critical: a more senior 
academic in the field told me that his religion (Islam) meant that I’d experienced far more access to 
Prevent officials than he. Although interviewees were hard to locate and contact, as a white and male 
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PhD student, access seemed far more readily available to me than other researchers in a less privileged 
position. Other researchers - even those with doctoral qualifications – corroborated this, with their 
names or faces appearing to fit a ‘critical’ profile. 
Although I did not engage in deception, there were occasions when it appeared more 
conducive to frame my research in certain ways. The Commission’s study points out that considering 
the ethics of ‘deception’ is not useful in determining appropriate data collection methods, because 
framing issues differently is a cornerstone of how society functions. Instead, the questions should be: 
“Would the form of deception proposed here harm the research participants, the researchers and/or 
society in general in any way?” (Iphofen 2013, 35) So, although I question it now, at the time cost-
benefit calculations were more central to my approach than moral questions about the truth I was 
producing. An example of this calculation was when I was seeking an interview with a national 
government Prevent lead. In order to secure access I was required to fill out some detailed forms 
asking how an interview would benefit both parties. I framed my research in the following way, 
realizing at that point that effectiveness of preemption is inherently unmeasurable: 
 
The research is being undertaken to understand how Prevent operates on the ground, how 
operatives (rather than merely legislative documents) understand the movement towards 
violence, as well as to understand measurements of effectiveness. 
 
Similarly, despite being aware that one cannot measure preemption, I asked other Prevent actors for 
interviews on the premise that I was researching the impact and success of a preemptive programme. 
Yet this was necessary for them to accept the interview request. Had I framed my research as a post-
structural discourse analysis between Prevent officials and Northern Irish former combatants, it would 
likely have resulted in all of my leads going dead because my position would not have been 
understood. 
Once an interview was underway, I faced another conundrum. How do I portray myself 
(academically, personally, even physically)? For Liong (2015), this dilemma was at the heart of his 
research. Interviewing often patriarchal men in Hong Kong about fatherhood, he fundamentally 
disagreed with many of their interpretations about masculinity. He was concerned that his silence 
would be interpreted as ideological alignment, yet he felt he could not confront his subjects as a data-
collector. My research followed his ethnography: what would result from not speaking my 
disagreements with the work of Prevent officials? Did I have any responsibility to present myself as 
critical if I later wanted to ask them to connect me to other practitioners? Was being overly personable 
problematic? This felt less important in earlier interviews, because I was still figuring out the workings 
of Prevent, and was still vacillating between post-structuralism and foundationalism! 
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Incidentally, it was from one of these earlier interviews - where I had been quite personable 
with PC6 and showing my genuine interest in his work - that a conflict arose. After developing a more 
critical mind, I wrote a blog piece that challenged some fundamentals of Prevent, using some 
provocative wording (Pettinger 2018). I was due to observe some high-level Prevent training of other 
Prevent practitioners that this particular practitioner was offering. Two days before the training was 
going to occur he called me having somehow found my blog, upset that I had published it. He asked 
me not to attend the training, and threatened to withdraw his participation from my research. After 
speaking with my supervisor about the significant empirical contribution that interview had provided 
my research, I replied. I used empathy to express my distress at his reaction, as it had never been my 
intention to deceive him, and I underlined that I had gradually become critical of Prevent as a 
consequence of the empirical research. To try and heal the rift, I offered to write a co-authored blog 
with the practitioner to ‘correct’ the impression that only critical opinions exist about Prevent. He 
declined to write a co-authored piece, for reasons of time. Thankfully, he also relented on his request 
to remove his interview from the research. However, as a well-connected practitioner – with access 
to national Prevent leads – he had discovered my critical opinions and remained displeased. This had 
the likely consequence of stopping any further access: Prevent practitioners are reported to speak 
candidly with each other. I was in the process of securing an interview with another Channel mentor, 
but this lead went dead after my dispute with the Prevent Coordinator. I then decided I would not 
seek more Prevent interviews. 
 
Confidentiality and Protection of Interviewees 
I made numerous provisions to protect my interviewees. Data collection threw up a number of issues 
that the pre-fieldwork paperwork had prepared me for, most notably issues around confidentiality. I 
had primed a consent form and participation information form for my interviewees, outlining my 
responsibilities and what they should expect from the experience. For Northern Irish former militants 
this included my commitment to anonymize their names (and any details that could be traced back to 
them), whereas for Prevent interviewees this anonymization was optional. I later decided to 
anonymize all of them despite a couple of interviewees being happy to be identified. I chose to do this 
because I became aware that the field is plagued with personal attacks on practitioners (occasionally 
provoked), often on social media. Prevent officials have written about some of the problems with 
being associated with Prevent (Arbuthnot 2015). One Prevent Coordinator mentioned during an 
interview that anonymization was important to some officials because they didn’t want to have a 
target painted on their back and because some of the criticism was wholly distasteful and very 
personal. There were a few instances where individuals (both Northern Irish- and Prevent-related) 
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made remarks that could be traced back to them, if somebody knew them already. I made sure to take 
these out of the transcripts. With regard to data storage, I made sure to store the audio recordings on 
the secure Warwick servers, keeping them only as long as I needed to refer to them for transcription 
and coding, which was completed within months of the interviews. I will retain the transcripts of the 
interviews for the mandated 10 year period of storage. 
 
Recruitment of Research Subjects 
Whilst I sent out ‘cold’ correspondence to potential interviewees with success, snowballing is the main 
method by which I recruited research subjects, both in Northern Ireland and from within Prevent. 
Snowballing, which is the process by which the researcher is “passed [informally] from respondent to 
respondent” through interpersonal links, is standard across both fields (Dolnik 2013, 34). 
 
Prevent 
For my first interview, my supervisor put me in touch with a Channel mentor she had spoken with. 
After this I attended a couple of Prevent-related events organized by various local authorities, which 
a couple of senior Prevent officials attended. I approached them for interview, and a number of leads 
later came from these interactions. In the meantime I was writing handwritten letters to people I 
suspected to be Channel mentors. Mentors’ involvement in Prevent is sufficiently obfuscated by a void 
of information in the public domain, so I felt like an investigative journalist piecing together passing 
comments in local newspapers and figuring out where they could live or work. Often a mentor will be 
the director of a company offering Home Office approved ‘safeguarding interventions’, having a 
website that is indistinguishable from non-terrorism-related safeguarding companies. Trying to figure 
out if a company was related to Prevent and Channel was considerably time-consuming, and I am sure 
I have left in my wake a number of somewhat confused social workers. This showed me to an extent 
how the topic of preemptive counter-terrorism has become bureaucratized; processes and positions 
supposedly related to national security are hidden behind everyday words, and incorporated as ‘just 
another duty’ of existing institutions. 
Handwritten letters secured me three interviews with Channel mentors. In a few cases I could 
only find a postal address where I thought a mentor might reside, and, instead of an impersonal typed 
script, I thought that - as I know them to be extremely busy individuals - a letter written by hand would 
catch their attention because it’s unusual, and conveys depth and thought. Otherwise attending 
events where I knew certain key figures would be, and sending cold emails to official addresses (and 
snowballing on the back of these contacts), secured me the remainder of my Prevent-related 
interviews. The more interviews I undertook, the more interviewees repeated each other, offering 
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little added value. As I undertook more interviews (especially those after my Northern Ireland 
fieldwork), I realized how far their understanding of the trajectory towards violence and of risk differed 
from my Northern Irish interviewees. 
 
Northern Ireland 
Ex-prisoner organizations in Northern Ireland are easily located but outside these commonly used 
pathways into the former combatant community, there are few obvious routes. One researcher, 
attempting to locate ex-militants in Northern Ireland, mentioned to me that his home institution’s 
ethics committee did not allow snowballing, and as a result his research sample consisted of four IRA 
interviews. One professor who had carried out interviews with ex-militants in Northern Ireland 
encouraged me to adopt snowballing as the best approach. John Horgan (2018) remarked that 
“Snowball sampling is very often the best we can get, there’s nothing wrong with that.” Another 
academic, who carried out an oral history of female Northern Irish former combatants, told me he 
sought to acquire participants through: 
 
• Ex-prisoner support groups, although the groups’ political ideologies complicated the 
objectivity of the research 
• Individual approach, which led to numerous single-contacts followed by more single-
contacts 
• Newspaper adverts, although this was not very successful, with little take-up 
 
He saw approaching groups and individuals (and asking them for further contacts) as entirely 
necessary - whilst not methodologically ideal this is the best possible method to recruit participants. 
I carried out a similar double-pronged approach. I contacted the two main ex-prisoner support 
groups in Belfast: Cóiste (republican) and EPIC (loyalist) and secured a number of interviews through 
those groups. I tried to use other ex-prisoner support organizations (particularly republican as there 
seemed to be far more of these around), but despite being located in towns and villages outside of 
Belfast, and with various names, they consistently pointed me back to what I eventually realized were 
the parent organizations in Belfast of Cóiste and EPIC. I was told this was because the parent groups 
had more experience dealing with researchers and could therefore offer more potential interviewee 
opportunities. In dealing only with these two main groups the potential sample size and range was 
limited, because I was exposed to ‘approved’ speakers. To offset some of this more restricted range 
of interviewees I made more sure to reach out to more ex-militants from outside of these 
organizations through alternative approaches. Both organizations offered me around 5-6 interviews, 
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and I undertook walking tours with them both on top. On my first trip I did not manage to locate any 
former INLA members, and I returned to Belfast speak with four of them through an organization on 
the Falls Road. 
I found a non-affiliated republican ex-prisoner support group in Armagh that helped me speak 
with one former combatant, and then a Sinn Fein activist and tour guide in (London)Derry allowed me 
to speak with two former combatants in the city. From the loyalist community, individuals were often 
a member of the UDA (when membership was permitted) and a proscribed group that engaged in 
violent activity. Although there were innumerable proscribed groups to which loyalists belonged (see 
Figure 1), most were members of the UFF, UVF and LVF, which was represented in my sample. 
Otherwise I relied on finding individuals on Facebook, looking for names in local newspapers 
and trying to find contact details, and engaging in any other journalistic activity I could to locate 
possible participants. This was somewhat successful, like the academic mentioned above, and I found 
about ten individuals through this approach. 
One influential figure in the loyalist community (Interviewee 41) tried to explain the 
establishment of and relationships between the most prominent loyalist groups whilst I wrote it down, 
remarking at the end that he was confused about the uncountable number of splits and factions that 
arose during the conflict. The picture in Figure 2 shows various loyalist organizations, with a mixture 
of proscribed violent groups and the political wings. There were many, many more. Whilst a few 
different republican groups existed, the OIRA, PIRA and INLA were the main recognized umbrella 
































Snowballing is obviously a useful technique to recruit research participants, allowing access 
into populations who would otherwise be hard to locate (Atkinson & Flint 2001). Moreover, it can be 
considered an especially appropriate method when researching sensitive topics (Biernacki & Waldorf, 
1981), when informal approaches could be received less invasively than cold contacts. Waters (2015, 
377) speaks to this, suggesting that there is a critical point of sensitivity, after which “snowball 
sampling’s effectiveness begins to break down”. Despite their involvement being a somewhat 
sensitive issue (republican groups in particular get short shrift in the British media), I was able to 
recruit scores of former combatant participants, and would have been able to speak with hundreds 
more, because it is decades after they were involved in violence, they have served their time in prison 
for their crimes, and their communities are aware of their involvement (often having supported it). 
However, Prevent interviews were harder to obtain because there is such a toxic environment for 
practitioners – many have been abused (at least in their eyes) on social media for their work. It is a 
present reality for them; they face combative individuals and communities who want nothing to do 
with their agenda, and their work is so sensitive that trying to break into a new area for them even 
takes the form of undercover operations. Aside from the practical utility of snowballing, the practice, 
as Browne (2005) points out, reminds us that we are immersed in our research. Our involvement as 
researchers affects what we see: we produce knowledge whilst studying it; we are complicit in the 
construction of truth. She points to snowballing as a good example of this – we researchers make 
personal contacts as a result of our politeness and body language, we ask questions that encourage 
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certain responses, and we subjectively follow up avenues that seem interesting. We are situated 
within our research. 
 
 
Organisation of Data 
I transcribed Northern Irish interviews within days of the interview, and the discussions with Prevent 
officials within weeks. To allow the hegemonic discourse to be held alongside its corresponding 
silences, I then undertook a thematic analysis of the interviews. Thematic analysis is a process to find 
“a pattern [that] describes and organizes the possible observations [from a dataset] or at a maximum 
interprets aspects of the phenomenon” (Boyatzis 1998, 161). These patterns, or themes, are found 
through ‘thematic coding’: commonly performed on qualitative data, especially transcripts like my 
interview data, such a procedure works whereby “several passages are identified and… linked with a 
name for that idea – the code. [This allows for the] indexing or categorizing [of] the text in order to 
establish a framework of thematic ideas about it” (Gibbs 2007, 38). The interplay between inductive 
(data-driven) and deductive (researcher-driven) thematic coding and analysis is inherent to all 
scientific enquiry. As Strauss and Corbin (1998, 136) write, research is based on observations of data 
but simultaneously also on “our reading of that data, along with our assumptions about the nature of 
life, the literature we carry in our heads, and discussions we have with colleagues.” I would not be 
able to see my data from a position of neutrality. A hybrid approach, that utilizes both inductive and 
deductive thematic coding, was therefore explicitly deployed. In other words, I was directed by the 
data and my positionality (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane 2006). In both sets of interviews, I looked for 
recurring and overarching themes on issues and disjunctures that seemed important to me. Five broad 
themes stood out as particularly relevant: 
 




5. Solutions / methods of risk-management 
 
These were selected because there seemed to be significant discrepancies between ex-militant 
testimony and the narratives of Prevent officials on each of these issues. For example, the theme of 
‘Agency’ arose because I saw ex-militants narrating themselves as conscious and determined actors, 
whereas Prevent officials were describing its cases as vulnerable and in need of emotional and social 
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support. These broad themes emerged from moments where I felt especially surprised at the 
disconnection between the testimony of the two sets of interviewees. Three of them (motivations, 
agency, and solutions) became the main focus of an empirical chapter, whilst two (banality and 
temporality) were recurring themes across the whole thesis. 
As I drew out these main themes, I began a comprehensive process of ‘axial coding’. Axial 
coding is “the process of relating subcategories to a category” (Klenke 2008, 94), and again, these 
subcategories were drawn from a combination of inductive and deductive analyses. Staying with the 
overarching theme of ‘Agency’, I found Prevent practitioners emphasizing ‘mental health’ to explain 
their work in managing terrorism risk. Channel cases were articulated as unable to support themselves 
or remain as safe citizens because of mental health considerations that made them irrational. ‘Mental 
health' became one (important) subcategory, because practitioners deployed it to signify a lack of 
agency – yet this stood in contrast to how Northern Irish ex-militants described their involvement: 
through self-determination and conscious commitment. I therefore used ‘clear thinking & logic’ as the 
equivalent subcategory from Northern Irish interviews, and highlighted the transcript when I came 
across ex-militants talking about how they weighed family life and moral concerns around violence, 
against becoming involved, for example. Some other subcategory pairs included ‘banality’ (in Prevent 
interviews) against ‘exceptional’ (ex-militant), and ‘ignorance of environments’ (Prevent) with ‘talking 
about environments’ (ex-militant). Again and again the subcategories reminded me of the disparity 
between the outlook of Prevent officials and their hypothetically-ideal constituents who had 
committed terrorism crimes. I was largely unable to carry over any subcategories from Prevent to ex-
militant interviews. The reorganization of subcategories (‘banality’ to ‘exceptional’, for instance) was 
not the beginning of my understanding of how far the two groups were not speaking the same 
language nor had the same epistemological framework, but it epitomized how the world was 




Reflections on Data Collection 
Northern Irish interviewees ranged from key strategists of proscribed groups, to local and regional 
commanders, renowned ‘hard men’, a hunger striker, those who had planned bomb attacks on 
economic targets, some who were caught preparing for violence, others who had killed army or police 
officers, others who had killed civilians for being from another community, many who had been on 
long-term no-wash protests whilst in prison, those who had written books about their experiences, 
some who were involved from the onset of the conflict in 1969, one who saw his unarmed cousin as 
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he lay paralysed on the floor shot dead in cold blood by a British soldier, one of the most considered 
people I have ever met, one who talked of his utter hatred of violence, one who spoke of himself as 
not being violent, and several (loyalists) who were involved in post-conflict feuds. They were often 
kind and conscientious, there were a few curious characters, all were fairly philosophical and 
reflective. Many on the republican side were disillusioned with the dominant narratives of ‘terrorism’ 
yet were hopeful about what they saw as the forthcoming inevitable reunification of the island of 
Ireland. Several on the loyalist side were frustrated about their lack of economic prospects: former 
combatants are the only people group in Northern Ireland permitted to be discriminated against in 
employment law, and so they rely upon support organizations. Meeting former combatants was like 
meeting anybody else - you would not be able to tell their history from looking at them or talking with 
them, except if you were to pry about their past. A few more exceptional moments from my Northern 
Irish fieldwork are worth noting: 
 
1. My first experience of former combatants was a (group) tour up the Falls with a republican, 
and back down the Shankill with a loyalist, passed over at halfway. It was immediately 
apparent how totally disparate ideas of existence and reality were in operation. The 
republican tour was operating on a very considered, thought-provoking level that suggested 
language as essential to understanding the conflict, and which delved into hundreds of years 
of history. The loyalist tour, on the other hand, heavily featured emotive terminology like 
‘terrorism’ that appeared to discount some level of nuance, and which focused on the conflict 
purely as a moment in time. We were taken to a Protestant memorial on Shankill Road, where 
the guide pointed out a particularly striking mural (Figure 3, below). It showed me that wholly 
different realities were being lived, how fundamentally misunderstood the conflict is, and how 
hegemonic narratives around ‘terrorism’ are upheld and outworked. The disparity of these 
two representations of the conflict was by no means universal across my interviews, but it 















2. In one of my first republican interviews, I tried to figure out the point at which he saw violence 
as becoming acceptable – and why he got involved in armed struggle at that particular 
moment in time. He misunderstood me, became very irritated, to the point of being angry, 
and asked me if I was moralizing to him. His view that his decisions, his violence, his life, were 
justifiable and justified, was particularly important to him – far more than I had anticipated. 
How did this change his posture, how did it affect his portrayal of his involvement? Regardless, 
it showed me that this is his reality – he was and is committed – substantiating the consistent 
claim that all interviewees gave: that they could not have been persuaded out of violence. 
 
3. I interviewed a republican who had been present during what had been a relatively peaceful 
march that ultimately turned into Bloody Sunday. We were standing in the street where 
several of the deaths occurred. He talked about his experiences of that day, and he began 
crying as he spoke about the horrors of what he witnessed. Not knowing how else to show my 
empathy to a stranger recollecting his cousin being shot dead by British soldiers, I attempted 
to show how moved I was – and I was moved – by nodding, shaking my head in disbelief, and 
giving him time to process his emotions. I stood silently, looking upwards into the rain, and 
sighed. Though nearly 50 years later, the past is still very present for this elderly gentleman. I 
was struck by encountering this conflict at a very human level, realizing how far it involves 
very real and emotive human stories, and is not just based on the deployment of historical 
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narratives. What does justice look like, for this man, for his family, and for those that 
witnessed the traumatic violence day in, day out, throughout the conflict? When does this 
trauma, inflicted by the state, end? How could anyone conceive of a state-based programme 
that sought to persuade a person with this sort of experience away from seeking justice, even 
if it looks like retribution? 
 
4. I was trying to ask questions as though I was a Prevent practitioner in one interview of an 
active republican (and who was one of the Hooded Men). I queried, “How could the state have 
stopped people from joining paramilitaries?” and then, “How could they have stopped the 
loyalist groups from expanding?” He responded that the British had encouraged rather than 
discouraged violence, and so my questions are nonsense because they're so ignorant. He was 
angry and visibly upset with my approach. I saw, again, how real state violence is for those it 
hurts, and the consequences it has for them in impassioning them against the state. I 
conceded my Prevent hat and offer: “It was kind of more a hypothetical” and explained that 
I’m looking into Prevent. He seemed happy to continue. We spoke about Prevent, and he was 
aghast! It reminded me how stark the disconnection is between Prevent and Northern Irish 
experience, and the importance to interviewees of their relationships with space and time 
compared to Prevent’s fixation with reorganizing associations of ‘risk factors’. 
 
5. I was trying to find the way back to my car one evening, parked somewhere on Shankill Road, 
when I came across a pub with its lights on. As I walked in, everybody’s heads turned. I 
approached a group of men standing by the bar to ask for their help. One walked me outside 
and began to explain where I needed to go. He was exceptionally friendly, almost delighted, 
despite appearing sober. After a three-or-four-sentence exchange, he shook my hand with 
remarkable vigour and a beaming smile. He watched me walk off for a few seconds too long. 
I couldn’t help thinking his response was because of my British accent and his possible 
tribalistic environment, which, according to a few interviewees, is more entrenched in 
Northern Ireland than even during the conflict. Indeed, the peace walls (see Thematic Chapter 
4) were only a few metres away. How is an environment that produces this behaviour not 
covered by the Prevent Strategy, when mainland Britain – which does not have peace walls or 
such explicitly divided communities – is? I was struck by this apparent arbitrariness, but 





I also had a number of remarkable moments during my Prevent interviews: 
 
1. I asked, in my first interview with a Channel mentor (with a fairly imposing figure), whether 
Prevent has a possible end-date. He leant forward into the voice recorder that was sitting on 
my knee, and almost shouted “NO”. We were sitting within two feet of each other. He then 
elaborated, seeming to calm himself down whilst doing so (I didn’t move or show any sign that 
it had been weird). He appeared fervently passionate about his work, and I saw an inability in 
him to understand how any fundamental criticism of the programme could be legitimate. Over 
the course of the Prevent interviews, I became more aware that practitioners are happy to 
self-criticize some details of Prevent to ‘improve practice’, but are largely unable to step back 
and consider the validity of the scheme itself even when asked. 
 
2. The same mentor had a few tears speaking about his work, as did another mentor. Three of 
my six Channel mentor interviewees had formerly been self-proclaimed ‘radicals’; these were 
both. The other Channel mentor who was a ‘former radical’ did not cry, although he was 
clearly emotionally engaged in his work. Whilst the mentors were demonstrating their 
emotional investment in their work, they are arguably more able to cry from a place of 
privilege: their reality is “visible, acknowledged, and legitimized because of [their] tears” 
(Accapadi 2007,2010), diminishing the space for criticism. In moments of practitioner tears, I 
felt the space for genuine critique closing down, and instead empathize with them: the tears 
are working – intentionally or otherwise! 
 
3. I organized an interview with someone I had been led to believe was a Channel mentor, and 
he had agreed to this interview about his work with Channel. I was in his office, about five 
minutes through the interview, but he was speaking in such vague terms and so much about 
mental health – and not about ‘radicalization’ or even any consideration of ‘risk’ or ‘threat’ – 
that I began to wonder whether he was genuinely a mentor on the Channel programme. Am 
I in the right place, am I speaking to the right person? It was almost surreal – I have to make 
sure, how is this possible?! So I asked him a very specific question about what he thinks are 
the most common signs of radicalization. Annoyed, he jabbed back, “Do you want me just to 
repeat it again?” as though it should have been clear to me that he had already talked about 
this. The distance in this moment, between conceptions of Northern Irish ‘risk’ (considered 
around physical engagement and violence), and preemptive counter-radicalization (that 
hardly touches upon physical danger and is eminently psychological) was utterly astonishing. 
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Although I was generally pleased with how I conducted myself during fieldwork (and pleased with the 
results of the fieldwork), I wish that I had asked more effective follow-up questions. I feel like I missed 
opportunities to probe deeper and expose more of the ways in which preemptive governance and its 
‘ideal subjects’ fundamentally differ. Looking back, I regret not pushing conversations on Prevent 
more with ex-militants: I didn’t engage with the majority through an explicit discussion of Prevent’s 
operation. It would have been interesting to see what they made of its assumptions in light of their 
experience and perspective (peace worker or otherwise). I drew conclusions from hundreds of 
thousands of words of their testimony, but it would have been fascinating to have had more explicit 
discussions than I did. Equally, were I to repeat the research, given my lack of exposure to the field 
and limited critical perspective at the time, I would have engaged more critically with Prevent officials. 
I would have queried the boundaries within which Prevent operates, and sought to complicate its 
‘British exceptionalism’ by asking “What makes ‘radicalization’ in Britain so different from 
‘radicalization’ in other countries?” I would have problematized the distinction between Britain and 
Northern Ireland especially – remembering how security officials (and Prevent documentation) 
retrospectively narrated the similarities between the two contexts. I might have asked officials what 
Prevent might have done with the suffragettes, and whether they thought the suffragettes’ approach 
was justified by the (relative) successes of the movement. I might have asked them plainly whether 
they understood why people used violence in some contexts, from human to human – asking them to 
remove their Prevent ‘hat’ for a moment. This might have unsettled the circularity that Prevent relies 
upon, and opened up space for alternative ways of seeing. However, generally, I was pleased with the 
comprehensive amount and quality of the data that I collected. 
Finally, how else could I have devised this project – what else could I have done with similar 
data, and why didn’t I? This research could have easily been a ‘counter-radicalization programme 
improvement’ project, which either looked at various ‘risk-management’ programmes to determine 
somehow what constituted best-practice, or at the effectiveness of the UK model in order to refine it. 
This could have drawn from critical theory to some extent, but any such project would have had to 
accept the preemptive paradigm as worth perpetuating, and therefore “[relinquish] its claim to 
exercise criticism” (Horkheimer 1972b, 178). Many studies into the ‘radicalization’ model take its 
central premise of preemption as justified, and only criticise counter-radicalization programmes from 
this internal logic. For example the work of Thornton and Bouhana (2017) studies the ‘effectiveness’ 
of Channel interventions, and, whilst critiquing the implementation of Channel, does not critically 
engage with the concept of measuring preemption. However, the more I read, discussed, and wrote, 
the more I came to see attempts at preemption itself as propagating violence, and producing 
problematic forms of knowledge founded on privilege that foster suspicion rather than trust, and 
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parochialism rather than critical thinking. Equally I could have contributed to ‘radicalization’ 
scholarship in an attempt to inform preemptive counter-terrorism efforts, by investigating individuals 
who had completed their Channel ‘journey’. Incidentally, at time of writing, a colleague in the field 
has launched a project doing just this with UK Home Office support. But again, this would have rested 
on circular notions that those identified as potential risks posed some objective danger, and that it 
was able to be spotted before its materialization. A third approach I might have taken is to undertake 
an investigation into the ‘root causes’ of terrorism, in order to generalize about why humans become 
involved in violence. This approach, which often takes the line that “terrorists are not insane or 
irrational actors” (Bjørgo 2005, 257), might have assumed a somewhat critical angle in comparison to 
mainstream – or at least government-promulgated – terrorism knowledge, by discussing the state as 
contributing to the ‘incidence of risk’. This was the approach taken by Robert Pape’s (2005) analysis 
of suicide terrorism that problematized foreign military intervention as the leading cause. However, 
utilizing these results to generalize about broader populations is also short-sighted, given that these 
studies only examine very few ‘terrorists’ in depth. For example, Sageman’s (2004) landmark study of 
just 172 ‘jihadis’, is celebrated for its comparatively large sample. I do not intend to produce a ‘root 
causes’ explanation for violence. I have become more interested in looking to subjugated experience, 
so that the privileged knowledge that anticipatory risk-governance is mobilized through can be 
disturbed. 
Applying the methodology of discourse analysis to radically different protagonists within the 
world of political violence, I have been able to ask: how are the claims made within British 
radicalisation prevention made knowable and credible? And when we hold Prevent’s most ideal 
constituents in its gaze, do their voices disrupt the claims it makes? Is the logic of Prevent (as a 
touchstone of anticipatory terrorism-governance) universal as it claims in its coverage of “all forms of 
extremism”, or does it rely on the subjugation of ex-militant voices to remain ‘sensible’ and qualified 
as knowledge? My research finds that when anticipatory risk-governance is challenged by alternative 
(and subjugated) knowledges, it stands on little more than its own self-justification – yet this 
knowledge meets little resistance as counter-radicalisation expands into ever more spheres of public 
policy (Busher et al. 2017). 
 
 
Northern Ireland History 
Having discussed my methodology and ethical considerations, and before we move into the 
substantive empirical material, the history of Northern Ireland must be introduced in order that 
interviews with ex-militants can be contextualized. Remembering what we have already heard about 
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Prevent, it might feel jarring to read a section of historical prose. However, this history is fundamental 
to understanding the ‘discourse’ of former combatant testimony: in almost every single interview, 
there was some focus on the decades or centuries before the (latest) conflict erupted, even if they 
used it ‘merely’ to explain why the circumstances might have been the way they found them by the 
late 1960s. When reading through the following discussion, if it does feel strange in relation to thinking 
about the implementation of Prevent, a useful question to bear in mind might be, “Does Prevent 
consider anything like such a history, in order to explain why its cases might present ‘signs of risk’?” 
Even considering ‘history’ as strange in relation to Prevent's operation shows us how entrenched (and 
concealed) its de-contextualized and de-historicized gaze is. 
Issues of identity are paramount to understanding how the two sides narrated their 
movement towards (and ultimate involvement in) what the British state would consider ‘terrorism’. 
So, this final sub-section of the Methodology Chapter explores the context within which the conflict 
took place, and how these identities were (re)negotiated and (re)conceptualized. Although republican 
former combatants framed their motivation for involvement through injustices they saw in Northern 
Irish society during the mid-20th century, they consistently referred back to centuries of Irish history 
to explain how this structural discrimination was able to occur. The sentiment of second-class citizenry 
they described as fundamental to their citizenship was only able to be understood – in their eyes – by 
referring back to the involvement of the British on the island of Ireland. On the other hand, loyalists 
involved in the conflict spoke of their fear that their survival – both their individual lives and their 
identification as part of the United Kingdom – was under threat, from physical violence and the idea 
of nationalism that arose from a country with a significant minority of dissatisfied citizens (Catholics). 
In order to conceptualize why republicans’ second class citizenry was narrated as so crucial to the 
conflict, and to understand the loyalist perspective of feeling attacked and under siege that resulted 
in their involvement, we must look back into history.  
The history of Northern Ireland is complex, and fiercely contested – even down to language 
used: I was reprimanded at various points for calling the conflict ‘the Troubles’, or even referring to 
‘paramilitaries’. For the sake of ease, I will deploy terminology (throughout the thesis) in a similar 
fashion to that which I found when in Northern Ireland. ‘Unionists' are those who support a continued 
union with mainland Britain. ‘Loyalists' are those who engaged in (often violent) activism to safeguard 
this relationship. ‘Nationalists’ are, on the other hand, those who support reunification of the island 
of Ireland, and ‘Republicans’ are those who engaged in (often violent) activism to bring this about. 
These terms can in practice be interchangeable, and their links with violence have broken down in the 
aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement. 
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In attempting to represent an Irish history (and later during the empirical material), I 
emphasize at this point that the story I construct will not embody the fullest account of history 
possible. Ankersmit writes that one cannot ‘know’ an experience of history by reading informed 
historical narratives from the belvedere (1983, 204). Instead of historic expositions re-assembling a 
series of tangible events, what is important is that we ‘smell’ or ‘hear’ the effects from different 
perspectives. Kellner makes the point that history comprises a multiplicity of perspectives and 
experiences, and that for this reason “there is no view of the past” (1987, 21). But certain moments 
and historical arcs are able to be ‘smelled’ and ‘heard’ through representations of narratives. This 
section will look at three parts of Irish history which were of central import to understanding 
interviews. It will explore the beginning of English invasion and colonization of the island of Ireland 
until its partition in 1921; the years between 1921 and the late-1960s when Northern Irish society was 
becoming politicized; and finally the moments that are understood to mark the beginning of the 
conflict. 
The Normans invaded Dublin in the 12th century from England with imperialist and politico-
religious motivations, wanting to subjugate the ‘barbarous’ indigenous population and bring the Irish 
church under closer papal control (Gillingham 2008). However, the invasion was contained to the 
south-east of the island and administrative power was retained by the Irish. Whilst there was initially 
antagonism between the indigenous people and the invaders from England, by the 17th century these 
original English imperialists had become "more Irish than the Irish themselves" (Hambro 2015), 
maintaining a Roman Catholic faith, having intermarried, and having learnt the native Gaelic language. 
But beginning in the 16th century and accelerated in the 17th century, the English crown enacted a 
policy of plantation, where settlers from around Britain established themselves on Irish land, often 
supplanting Irish chiefs (and the old English). This anglicized the island: settlers brought their own 
language, a new religion, and alternative political affiliations (Robinson 2000), encouraging the greater 
exposure of Ireland to English influence. A series of rebellions by the Irish began in the 1530s to oppose 
English rule and the policy of plantation, culminating in the Nine Years’ War (or ‘Tyrone’s Rebellion’) 
at the end of the 1500s. It was decisively won by the English. Soon thereafter, in 1607, a swathe of 
Gaelic lords – who had until then protected their Irish dependants from English plantation – fled 
abroad, marking “the end of an age” for Irish Gaelic history (Canny 1971, 380). After this defining 
moment, plantation from England and Scotland commenced on an industrial scale (O’Daly 1995). 
Meanwhile, penal laws that suppressed native Catholic expression were introduced.  Although the 
lasting legacy of the penal laws was arguably more representational than material (Cullen 1986) – the 
conquest of Catholic possessions and land occurring through military defeat – Gaelic identity was 
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suppressed by the banning of Catholic worship and rituals, and by prohibitions on Catholics from 
voting, serving in the army, or holding public office. 
As this was occurring, constant uprisings against the ‘Protestant Ascendancy’ by the native 
Irish (and the old English) engrained a ‘siege mentality’ in the new Protestant settlers. The Siege of 
Derry, and the penal laws in the context of the Cromwellian invasion, are two historic events that can 
help contextualize the respective starting points of loyalist and republican testimony. The city walls of 
(London)Derry were constructed in the early 1600s to offer Protestant plantees protection from 
angered native Irish who were often supplanted. From 1685 until 1688, Catholic King James II had 
ruled England, Ireland, and Scotland, but he was deposed and replaced by his son-in-law William of 
Orange, who was a Protestant. James fled to Ireland to plan a (re-)conquest of Britain. In 1689, he laid 
siege to Derry – the north-eastern-most city in Ireland – for over 100 days, but the Protestant-ruled 
city refused to surrender, resisting the siege until relief was brought. Though loyalist interviewees 
never harkened back to the Siege of Derry to situate their stories in a broader history, acknowledging 
or celebrating moments like these are fundamental to unionist identity in Northern Ireland. The 
Apprentice Boys of Derry (a Protestant fraternal order) commemorates this victory many times every 
year, recalling their shared history as a besieged people (see Figure 5 in Thematic Chapter 3). The 
concept of ‘siege mentality’ was prevalent in many loyalist interviews, in their tales of how 
republicanism posed a threat to unionist survival on the island of Ireland. 
Similarly, to help understand republican interviews more comprehensively, we can look to a 
crushing of the Catholic population in the 17th century. A native Irish rebellion in 1641 against the 
terms of plantation ended with the death of thousands of Protestant settlers. Oliver Cromwell arrived 
in Ireland to quell the uprising, in a conquest between 1649 and 1652 that was said to have resulted 
in atrocities including massacres of the indigenous population (although the extent of these crimes is 
contested: Faul 2004). New planters played a particularly bloodthirsty role in this Cromwellian military 
campaign, that may have killed a fifth of the entire population of the island through “slaughter, 
starvation, and disease” (Canny 2003 571; also see: Morgan 2011). In the aftermath of this episode, 
penal laws were re-applied to Catholics more harshly to ensure another uprising would not occur. This 
far history of Catholic, Gaelic, or native Irish oppression and subjugation was often referred to by 
republicans to help them explain the conditions in which they found themselves during the time that 
the conflict erupted. Commemorative parades, bonfires, and ceremonies in recognition of the 
victories or atrocities are a common occurrence in Northern Ireland: these aren’t ‘just historical facts’ 




Towards the end of the 19th century, the independence movement had taken hold, and 
various political parties in Ireland and mainland Britain began to moot the idea of ‘home rule’, which 
would bring about the transferral of governmental authority over Ireland from Westminster back to 
Dublin. Two attempts to legislate on this matter in the UK Parliament in 1886 and 1893 failed, and the 
implementation of the third (successful) attempt in 1912 was interrupted by the outbreak of war in 
1914. The home rule movement was largely perceived by the Protestant population on the island of 
Ireland as an abandonment by Britain, and a threat to their place in Irish society – even to their survival 
(Collombier-Lakeman 2016). Paramilitary groups arose in the early 1910s to contest the issue, and 
contend for the continued relationship between Britain and Ireland. The (loyalist) Ulster Volunteers 
was formed to safeguard the links between London and Dublin. Whilst it was disbanded shortly after 
the country’s partition a decade later, its name lived on later in the Troubles through the Ulster 
Volunteer Force. The (republican) Irish Volunteers meanwhile was created to contend for 
independence in opposition to the Ulster Volunteers, and would later inspire the formation of the 
original (or ‘Old’) Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1919, which in turn would develop into the IRA known 
from the Troubles. 
By 1916 the independence movement had taken hold in certain quarters of Irish society, and 
an insurrection against British rule occurred on Easter Monday in that year. The Irish Volunteers, 
among others, took key strategic buildings such as communications posts around Dublin, declaring 
Ireland independence. This ‘Easter Rising’ in Dublin was fiercely put down by the British Government, 
and a number of key republican figures were executed. The heavy-handedness of the British served 
to strengthen republican sentiment across Ireland, and in 1918 the separatist Sinn Fein won a large 
majority of Irish seats in the UK General Election. An Irish parliament was established in January 1919 
(and by definition independence from Britain declared), so the British Government declared war in 
Ireland, fighting against the guerrilla forces of the IRA to take back control. This War of Independence, 
which raged until just before the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1921, is occasionally referred to as the 
‘Black and Tan War’, because reinforcements from Britain (wearing improvised black and tan attire) 
committed continual reprisal attacks against civilians during the course of the conflict. One of these 
incidents in 1920, ‘Bloody Sunday’, followed the IRA killing a number of undercover British officers 
working in Dublin. Later that day, police and the Black and Tans arrived at a Gaelic football match and 
shot and killed a number of spectators. December 1921 saw the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, 
granting republicans their wish by establishing the Irish Free State a year later as a separate country 
(repealing its commonwealth status and renaming itself the Republic of Ireland only in 1949). 
However, the six counties in the north east of the island – populated more densely by Protestants – 
were named ‘Northern Ireland’, and opted out of the Free State because the Protestants wanted 
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closer union with Britain. The splitting of Ireland effectively into two countries was known as the 
‘partition’. 
In the decades following partition, McGladdery (2002, 88) writes, “The policies of successive 
Unionist governments… were characterised by 'not-an-inch' politics, designed to secure their position 
as a majority in the Northern Ireland state.” Proportional representation was repealed in 1929, with 
unionists controlling the Northern Irish parliament Stormont uninterrupted in the aftermath of 
partition for the next half century. No Catholics held a position in cabinet during that time. There were 
widespread allegations of gerrymandering, and councils controlled by Irish nationalists fell from 
twenty-five to two by 1925 (Buckland 1981, 40-43). The civil service was dominated by Protestants, as 
was the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the Northern Irish police force. The Special Powers Act of 
1922 enabled the Ulster Special Constabulary, or the ‘B-Specials’, to operate as a separate and often 
ruthless force in addition to the police (Buckland 1981). The B-Specials were "the rock on which any 
mass movement by the IRA in the North inevitably foundered" (Coogan 2000, 37), and so drew 
significant support from Protestants across the North (Schulze & Smith 2000). However their ferocity 
was a significant point of contention for Catholics, whose demands during the Civil Rights Movement 
in the 1960s included the disbanding of the unit (Hezlet 1997). The IRA, from Northern Ireland’s 
partition until the beginning of the Troubles, prosecuted a continual series of uprisings protesting 
against the partition of the island. Various campaigns of violence were perpetrated in mainland 
Britain, in the Irish Free State, and in the six counties that comprised Northern Ireland itself. The IRA 
carried out the Sabotage Plan between 1939-40 (that sought to disrupt English economic and military 
structures), the Northern Campaign of 1942-44 (that sought to attack security forces across Northern 
Ireland), and the Border Campaign of 1956-62 (that sought to assault structures on the border). 
Though this historical context was only occasionally referred to, or mentioned in passing, the arc of 
these events provided the backdrop within which the turbulent 1960s took place. 
Although much happened in the short-term that can situate the re-emergence of paramilitary 
groups from both sides, the 1960s were characterized by piecemeal reforms that were seen as 
insufficient to ensure equality for Catholics (O’Dochartaigh 2017), the campaign for greater civil rights, 
and moments of violence between groups. The civil rights movement had taken inspiration from the 
campaign in the United States, and in the Northern Irish context revolved around issues including 
equal votes, employment, and the disbanding of the B-Specials. These issues discriminated particularly 
against Catholics, although they affected many in society – for instance until the late 1960s those who 
didn’t own a home couldn't vote in local elections, and local councils decided on issues like housing 
(Coogan 1997, 33-35). With many more Catholics not owning their own homes in the North, this was 
a particular bone of contention for them. However, when protests to agitate for equality occurred, 
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they occasionally faced police brutality and attacks by loyalist groups. In January 1969 a civil rights 
march from Belfast to (London)Derry came under an “extremely vicious attack” at Burntollet Bridge 
by loyalists and off-duty B-Specials (Beiner 2018, 498). Occasionally civil rights protests would result 
in violence against the RUC, and, although some Protestants (and other interested groups) were 
involved in protests to agitate alongside Catholics, many Protestants saw the civil rights movement as 
at least infiltrated by a hardcore republican contingent. Protesting was eventually banned, leaving 
little room to contest unequal conditions (Power 1972). This obviously affected Protestants’ ability to 
protest (about the violence that took place during civil rights movement protests, and later about IRA 
violence) too, although there had been less of a systematic movement to agitate for their sense of 
security than for issues that affected Catholics, and so Catholics saw it as a suppressive move. 
There are numerous other significant events that situate the beginning of ‘the Troubles’, like 
the Battle of the Bogside in (London)Derry, the August 1969 violence between republicans, loyalists, 
and the RUC in Belfast, and the burning of Bombay Street. But it is sufficient to say that a turbulent 
society was the context when the widespread re-emergence of paramilitary groups across Northern 
Ireland occurred. It could not be more pertinent to remark that, as former loyalist fighter Jim McKinley 
(2016) says, “All can assume the status of victim – Catholics victims of four centuries of social 
exclusion, Protestants of thirty years of terrorism – and both claim the other as perpetrator.” 
Regardless, hopefully this discussion has illuminated the conditions within which the conflict emerged, 
and that it contextualized sentiment that was narrated in interviews – of Protestants feeling under 
attack and abandoned by mainland Britain, and Catholics feeling excluded as second-class citizens. 
Hopefully it has also been somewhat unsettling and strange that I should be expounding a Northern 
Irish history when thinking about Prevent. Yet this history contributes to explaining a campaign of 
‘terrorist’ or political violence (which is still ongoing, on a small scale), and Prevent is supposedly a 
counter-terrorism duty that interrupts the trajectory towards “not fundamentally [different]” violence 
that was seen during the Troubles (Farr, quoted in House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2012, 
Q309). 
So far we have established the premise of the research – exploring the shift in emphasis from 
preventive to preemptive logics, and the methodological approach of a discourse analysis which will 
enable exploration of the relationship between silenced and hegemonic knowledge about terrorism, 
and between Prevent practitioners and Northern Irish ex-militants. The following thematic chapters 






Motivations and Risk Factors (Thematic Chapter 1) 
 
Introduction 
One of the most striking disparities between Prevent’s implementation and the experience of 
Northern Irish former combatants was around the (presumed) motivations for and ‘drivers’ of 
violence. Before we move into the substantive discussion, it is worth setting out the most fundamental 
point of this chapter: those who had been imprisoned for a multitude of terrorism offences spoke 
overwhelmingly about their political, economic and social environment as the reasons behind 
involvement, and personality as entirely secondary. Yet Prevent flips this narrative, almost entirely 
excluding consideration of broader environment, instead taking individuals and the ‘risk factors’ they 
present and examining them microscopically as sites of risk. The first part of this chapter explores 
former combatants’ framing for their involvement in activity Prevent would attempt to preempt. The 
second half of the chapter then examines how Prevent understands ‘the trajectory towards violence’ 
through the eyes of supposed risk factors. We see how the discourse of Prevent ignores the stories of 
those convicted of terrorism offences, by looking not at causes of violence but instead associations of 
risk factors that can be imagined on a whim. Through a rabid fixation on interrupting the potential for 
violence, we see how preemptive risk-management silences any attempt to explain why ex-militants 
became involved. One of the main tasks outlined by Edward Said to enable the present to be pulled 
out of its hiding place as the present as detached from other moments and situated again within a 
more meaningful context, is the “opening [of] the [present] culture to experiences of the Other which 
have remained ‘outside’… the norms manufactured by "insiders” (1982, 25). By illuminating 
alternative stories and experiences to those privileged by the hegemonic ‘radicalization’ narrative, we 
remake the present as a connected moment-in-time, rather than one outside-of-it. 
 
 
Northern Irish Ex-militant Motivations 
General Environment and “Circumstances” 
So how do interviewees narrate the motivations for engaging in violence? How do Northern Irish ex-
militants tell the stories of why they became involved, and are these stories represented by the 
descriptions that Prevent practitioners provide of ‘counter-radicalization’ interventions? What 
silences exist between the two explanations for violence, and what implications might any gaps have? 
I spent dozens of hours in the company of ex-militants, listening to them speak about their 
experiences of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Whilst details differed between the numerous 
accounts of why they engaged in violence, there were many themes that were repeated in interview 
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after interview. The underlying political, economic and social conditions existing in Northern Ireland 
(discussed in the Methodology Chapter) was one of the most central of these. External environments 
of violence that left them frustrated, hopeless, and wanting to enact change were articulated as a 
foundational motivation for engagement by both republicans and loyalists. Republican violence was 
often framed within the confines of the historical backdrop – especially the feeling of being second-
class citizens. Sometimes the structure of society was mentioned vaguely, as in the case of republican 
R37, who remarked that “there was something wrong with the system”. Yet utterances like these were 
always made within some context of specific problems, some explicit ‘grievance’. On this occasion, 
the ex-militant had noted that he was struck, aged 15, by the headquarters of Northern Ireland’s 
second university not being established in “the natural place” of Catholic-majority (London)Derry from 
where he came, but instead in Coleraine, a far smaller – and largely Protestant – town. Similarly, when 
asked why he decided to engage in violence, another republican (R23) responded imprecisely that he 
was left with a moral sense that “this isn’t right. It’s quite ridiculous that you could not change the 
structure of the state.” Yet this imprecise and unquantifiable moral judgement was immediately 
substantiated by a condemnation of the gerrymandering that existed in the 1960s. In every interview 
where general structural frustrations were indicated, they were always accompanied by significant 
detail. 
Where republicans often situated individual incidents within a general environment of 
oppression as essential to understanding their involvement in violence, loyalists focussed on the more 
immediate environment as central to their violence. This testimony was generally no less focussed on 
external circumstances. L27, who is intimately involved in the loyalist community, summarized the 
importance of the political environment as motivating violence quite succinctly: 
 
Why is there no violence today? People’s attitudes haven’t changed dramatically that much, 
they still really dislike one another. Why has that changed? The external factors have been 
turned down, almost turned off. 
 
Again, like all other accounts, this interview was submerged in detail about what the external factors 
were (discussed later in this chapter). One interviewee (L41) considered himself as having been 
‘radicalized’ by others, and was still angry about having been ‘misled’ into violence – in particular by 
Iain Paisley. Yet even here, he spoke at length about negative experiences of his local environment, 
which led him to seek out the Protestant minister at his church: “I was going hoping to hear him make 
calls for the government to take on the IRA.” For this ex-militant, the IRA was acting with impunity and 
the state was not offering sufficient protection. And in all other interviews, the physical environment 
was far more central to the testimonies than the rhetoric of some radicalizing figure or introspection 
80 
 
about their personalities (let alone consideration of exploitation or vulnerability, which Prevent takes 
as foundational: see Thematic Chapter 2). Any generic comments about circumstances being 
important were consistently immersed within a personal story that outlined specific points of injustice 
or anger, and were narrated around a political process that produced specific changes in external 
circumstances. Oftentimes it was smaller policies or specific incidents rather than obvious oppression 
(such as ‘foreign occupation’ or concerns about the reunification of Ireland) that ex-militants narrated 
as the most important element in their movement towards violence. Small injustices being recounted 
as motivating movement into violence should not be underplayed: these individuals’ stories were held 
together by the more localized details. Yet they were always situated within a broader context of 
feeling insecure, feeling unprotected by the state, feeling like second-class citizenry (corroborated by 
work such as Ferguson & Cairns 1996). 
The comments of all former combatants in this way stand in stark contrast with Prevent’s 
understanding of threat and risk. External circumstances are interesting if not important to Prevent, 
but only insofar as they provide a starting point for individual intervention. External circumstances are 
not the focus of the preemptive paradigm – instead, it is the individual who is the matter of concern. 
Practitioners occasionally spoke of the importance of the underlying environment (CM11): 
 
Whilst I've embraced the idea [of] vulnerability, I'm coming from a health model perspective 
[but] there has to be a realization… from a communities perspective… of the diversity of many 
of our communities [and] understanding [of] the cultural factors, and understanding the 
influences. 
 
Whilst this practitioner understands that considering a wider context is important, alongside his 
psychological interpretation he suggests a culture of violence explanation for ‘risk’  – incidentally, the 
thrust of Labour’s initial Prevent project. This situates the problem at the community or cultural level 
(Said 1978; Hillyard 1993; Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; Ragazzi 2016), demarcating the violence into 
specific Others, rather than considering that anything outside the Other – such as government policy, 
or the socio-economic-political setting within which the violence took place – could contribute to the 
violence (Springer 2015, 61-80). Yet these external influences were pivotal to all of the Northern Irish 
interviews (and traditional terrorism studies literature: Crenshaw 1981; Shirlow 2003; Bjorgo 2005), 
from those who regret their involvement to the many who were proud of it, to those who see violence 
as no longer moral to the many who still see it as legitimate, to those who support the Good Friday 
Agreement, and to those who consider it folly. 
There exists, therefore, a significant discrepancy between practitioners trying to manage risk 
through a focus on the individual (or by extension their distinct and Othered ‘community’), and the 
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testimony of ex-militants who posited that environments were significant contributing factors to their 
violence – violence that Prevent alleges to interrupt. Individual practitioners would obviously not be 
able to change the culture of a school, or a local area, or change government policy. But the 
individualized and Orientalist rationale behind the implementation of Prevent does not just stop at 
point of implementation, but carries through and feeds back into future implementation, re-
instantiating future practice as individualized, focussing on the Other, and as essentialist (positing that 
objective risk exists within this specific Other). Indeed, one senior official (PC6) noted that the 
Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) form, which is the paperwork that follows a Prevent case 
from initial referral through to completion of their Channel journey, “can give you a good sense as to 
whether risk is being reduced [in the individual] over time or [if it is] increasing or staying the same.”  
The VAF form therefore operates as a technology which ensures the continued application of the 
individualized, pathologized ontology of Prevent, reifying and reasserting the individual as the locus 
of political violence. We will return to the technologies by which Channel cases are managed further 
on in the chapter, when we explore Prevent’s ‘risk-management’ strategies in more detail. But for 
now, the point to be made is that specific and other individuals (or entire communities) are 
problematized, rather than considering that anything intrinsic about society might have contributed 
to the supposed incidence of risk. Therefore the logic goes: why shouldn’t practitioners naturally focus 
on those individuals (and communities), if they are the problem? The culture of violence rationality, in 
seeing the problem as emanating from particular others, disregards the potential for factors other 
than a fallible individual to produce risk. The logic fulfils itself, ensuring that officials always have 
anecdotes to substantiate their work. 
 
Violence as a Close Experience, Producing Insecurity or Sense of Injustice 
Many interviewees from the Northern Irish conflict witnessed particularly tragic incidents of injustice, 
or exceptional flashes of violence, which they narrated as contributing to their involvement in 
producing violence in turn. Like a few other republicans, R37, whose account is especially moving 
because of his proximity to various episodes of bloodshed, spoke at length about Bloody Sunday as 
we walked through (London)Derry. Bringing me near to where his grandparents’ house in ‘the Bogside’ 
had stood, he pointed around, remembering: 
 
There was a shot fired through their window. Now neither my grandfather nor my 
grandmother heard the commotion cos they were both in their bed sleeping. The bullet 
actually crashed through the wardrobe mirror in their bedroom. My [young and unarmed] 
cousin [name redacted] was shot dead outside their garden. He was obviously trying to make 
his way through the house. [He] was shot from across there. He fell here. He was shot in the 
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back, he was paralysed from the bullet, he couldn’t move. The soldier walked over and fired 
a coupla shots into his body to be killed. 
 
Noting the injustice of his friends having been interned without charge and abused the previous year 
(like many others did, including R34), R37 concluded that “the brutality on [Bloody Sunday] forced me 
to make a decision about what I was personally gonna do about it. So I decided that I would become 
an active republican.” All who were asked asserted the ‘radicalizing’ effect of infamous flashpoints like 
Bloody Sunday (even if they weren’t there personally). L46 said that for him personally, 
 
1972 was a particular watershed in the events around what’s been classed Bloody Friday. So 
a lot of young men in their teens at that time woulda said and have done, that this was 
particularly motivational… That’s almost the straw that broke the camel’s back. 27 
indiscriminate bombs [by republicans in Belfast] on the one day. And then young men seeking 
to have some sort of response to it. 
 
Because there were so many during the conflict, often these tragic cases of suffering were witnessed 
first-hand. Many interviewees had been present for marches that were beaten off the streets 
(including R34,R37), a few had friends or were involved themselves in or felt the shock of incidents 
like Bloody Sunday or Bloody Friday1 (L46,R23,R37), or felt the injustices of other flashes of violence, 
often around specific areas of Belfast (L21,L41,L40,R32,R20). All spoke of the intense emotional, 
relational, or ontological impact these events had on them. 
Other more personal incidents of violence stood out as I listened to interviewees recount their 
stories. In particular, one loyalist’s experience struck me: 
 
There was an incident when I was about 15 on the Shankill Road, where a furniture showroom 
was attacked on a Saturday afternoon by the provisional IRA. They threw a bomb and killed 
people including two babies. I was actually playing football not far away from it. (L40) 
 
And R34 spoke of his own horrendous experience as encouraging his involvement: 
 
You seen all the things that were happening across the country on the TV, but then it started 
happening in south Armagh. Like my own home was raided first time in 1973, I was taken into 
the barracks [by] Special Branch men- Before you got involved, or after? Before. And they 
 
1 Bloody Sunday was an event during the Troubles in (London)Derry in 1972, where the British Army shot dead 
13 unarmed civilians (including children), a 14th dying from their injuries later. It was widely reported to be a 
reason many people involved themselves in armed republican groups. Bloody Friday took place later that year 
in Belfast, and saw a series of bombs by the IRA largely targeting infrastructure. The bombs killed five civilians, 
two British soldiers, a police officer, and a member of the Ulster Defence Association. 
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started putting me in stress positions and stuff up against the wall [and beat me for not 
knowing information they wanted]. 
 
Closeness to flashes of violence, in a context of feeling physically insecure or threatened by violence, 
was the most common reason which ex-militants presented as motivating their involvement. Accounts 
of their areas being attacked (L41,R20), bombs going off near where they were (L21,L40,L46), or 
having friends or family killed or terrorized by police, army, or ‘the other side’ (L44,L45,R34), were 
almost ubiquitous amongst interviewees. And all of these accounts were accompanied by 
interviewees recalling feelings of insecurity or anger, or a sense of a lack of equity. 
Many spoke about the violence-saturated environment as contributing to their involvement 
through attrition. Echoing the words of many others, R25 reflected, 
 
Being a teenager your life’s focus should be on other things. But for me my whole life seemed 
to be about [the] political scene around me, and the political scene around me seemed to be 
pretty much, it was very much militarized… My life was very much what I had witnessed what 
I was taking to be a norm, but looking back, that childhood wasn’t a norm at all. 
 
Similarly, recounting the motivation for his involvement, L49 – notorious in the loyalist community 
(and the UK establishment) for his impassioned commitment – said: 
 
No incident was graver than the other, although sometimes a mass murder was involved [in 
my journey]. They all stuck out in my mind, there wasn’t one incident where I said “we gotta 
do something,” I mean this was happening on a daily basis, it wasn’t like “let’s wait until 
there’s a big incident” it wasn’t like that. 
 
One of the more astonishing tales was told by (R47), who spoke about the army taking over his school 
playing fields, the IRA firing mortars at them, and British soldiers running, bloodied, up the English 
corridor during a lesson: “And [our teacher] continued to try and teach us English. I remember sitting 
as a kid thinking, ‘Is he real?!’… It was mayhem! It was militaristic.” 
Violence was not always physically nearby; a number of interviewees reported being 
influenced towards engagement by watching reports on TV or having conversations with family, which 
brought geographically-distant violence (along with a distinct sense of insecurity) close to home. R25 
spoke about the importance of TV in enabling a widespread awareness of the violence and injustices 
that were occurring in Northern Ireland at the time. Indeed, a loyalist who grew up in a quiet village, 




[The IRA had] killed a preacher. I remember my granny, sitting there, she was in her 70s, she 
says, “Good Lord if they kill a minister, they’ll kill us all!” and I never forgot that… That’s what 
I grew up thinking (L35). 
 
He spoke about how he then began to see the world differently, becoming involved in local politics 
“as an act of defiance”, ultimately to a point of joining the UDA and LVF, engaging in sectarian killings. 
As with all others, and despite his geographical distance from violence, his involvement was framed 
as dependent upon external circumstances, that had exacerbated or created some level of insecurity. 
These accounts of violence personally experienced or closely felt, were moving for me as a researcher, 
sat in the same room opposite the person who was sometimes very clearly reliving the memory. 
Occasionally during interviews with Prevent practitioners, they displayed empathy for this sort 
of experience. During an interview with PPolice9 I was moved by his identification with others’ 
grievances. Talking about violence experienced by Muslims in Britain, he contended: 
 
I think with Channel cases it was [an experience of] racism was a starting point for a lot of 
them. So first racism then politics after… Islamic extremism [will] be here for a while [because 
of] I think grievance really. There’s a lot of grievance in the communities, in individuals, if you 
look at Palestine, Israel, if you look at how Muslims are being treated in Myanmar. If you get 
young hotheads, that wanna do something that don’t take their time, they’re prone to take 
violent acts… Trump is adding to it. Until you alleviate the grievance you will have these young 
people fiery enough to wanna do something about it… Our mixed messages don’t help here 
in Britain. We condemn Iraq and Syria, but then we supply arms to Saudi Arabia. We condemn 
beheadings but then the Saudis do amputations and selling arms. The last 20 years our 
involvement in certain conflicts in the Middle East has caused chaos… It’ll be 30-40 years till 
it’s resolved at any point, but until you alleviate grievance in any community or any individual 
you're gonna have individuals who decide to take it upon themselves and commit violent acts. 
 
I considered this former Prevent police officer’s account the closest that any Prevent official came to 
describing motivations in a way reminiscent of the Northern Irish former combatants: he considered 
that violence and injustice – even in a different locale – can cause outrage and reactive violence on 
behalf of others. He may have been able to speak this candidly because he was no longer an active 
official, or he may always have spoken this candidly as a police officer. But many Channel mentors 
have a background in psychology, and strategic actors have a responsibility to represent the 
government, and so these sorts of views were rarely narrated. One relatively critical Channel mentor 
(CM8) spoke in a similar vein but came to different conclusions. He speaks from the point of view of 




“And here are my brothers and here is my struggle, and my struggle is with the children dying 
in Yemen or Syria or Iraq or elsewhere, as either directly in the case of Iraq or indirectly in the 
case of Yemen, cos it’s British arms and British weapons being deployed by the Saudis… The 
Muslim world and white Europe as it were continues to be at conflict. And if I have to pick a 
side it’s not gonna be this side, just cos I was born here I'm forever hated.” So that is in a sense 
a lot of what we have to deal with. 
 
So here CM8 speaks in a similarly candid way to PPolice9, yet this narrative is centred on the subjective 
perception of the individual rather than any objective concerns the mentor held himself (although at 
different points he was critical of public discourse and the British government), concluding that “we 
have to deal with” these perceptions. This account should obviously be expected, given that the 
mentor is recruited to recalibrate individuals rather than solve political injustices. But the 
consequence of this work is clear: objective grievances, meticulously detailed by Northern Irish former 
combatants, are ultimately of little concern to the functionality of Prevent. And again, this is not just 
important in the context of how Prevent is operationalized, but it reproduces the neoliberal discourse 
of individualization and responsibilization, reconstructing risk as distinct and separate from ‘us’, a 
point that will be referred to throughout the thesis. Experiences of insecurity have no place in 
Prevent’s risk-calculations, despite the obvious human acknowledgement from a few practitioners 
that such experiences matter. The obsession with ‘seeing’ through risk-consciousness, a gaze which 
inspires programmes like Prevent, shuts down the space to grant structural factors as having 
explanatory power – a matter more deeply excavated in the final chapter. In a society that is 
preoccupied with neoliberal aspirations (Hall 2005), the subjugation of structural explanations is 
doubly-compounded: the unit of concern is the individual, and only the individual. 
 
Governmental Oppression, Fear of Constitutional Revolution, and State Failure 
The entire sentiment from ex-militant interviewees can be summarized in the notion that state failure 
contributed significantly to people becoming involved in violence. Republican feelings of oppression by 
the government, and loyalist fears of constitutional revolution threatening their very survival, played 
an important role in the recounting of former combatants’ stories. 
For republicans, this state failure was framed as leaving them feeling like second-class 
citizenry, feeling unprotected by – even attacked by – the police and army, and not having a 
democratic voice. These factors, described over and over again, often produced “a real hatred for the 
state [because] of course [the responsibility for this environment] went straight to 10 Downing Street” 
(R34). For many republicans (especially on tours) the story began with the English invading the island 
of Ireland (R20,R22,R48). This was the starting point for R48: “The English invaded Ireland. You know 
so that’s why the violence started! The English invaded the Irish country, so why would they not [resist 
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through violence]? Why would there not be rebellion?” He explained the consequences of the English 
invasion – the loss of land to English and Scottish plantation settlers, the loss of the Irish language, 
and in his eyes the establishment of a Protestant state in 1921. For him this final point was evidenced 
by a consistently and overwhelmingly Protestant government through gerrymandering, with jobs and 
housing being given to Protestants rather than Catholics, and being policed by a largely Protestant 
police force: “Do you know there's a million things.” A leading republican figure (R23) framed his 
motivations: “The Brits in Ireland and the Brits out of Ireland would’ve been the two primary factors.” 
Others spoke of feeling monitored (R22,R32), and for R28 the fact that “there were something like 11 
military installations” overlooking his area in the Short Strand left him understanding “very quickly… 
that the life we were living was under British military occupation.” Yet I was surprised by how 
infrequently these sweeping statements about colonialism were made as motivators for initial 
involvement in violence, particularly at the beginning of my fieldwork, given that my reading prior to 
travelling to Northern Ireland had me believing that republicans were engaged in an overtly ideological 
anticolonial struggle from the start (many loyalist interviewees presumed this too). Interestingly 
several of the republican interviewees mentioned their gratefulness for the British army’s arrival in 
1969 when it seemed civil war might have been likely, and indeed, soldiers were warmly welcomed 
with cups of tea by the Catholic residents because they were seen to be peacemakers. For the most 
part, republican former combatants emphasized the smaller injustices than any broader sense of 
anticolonial oppression as motivating their initial engagement. Several mentioned that there were 
very few ideological republicans before the conflict emerged in the late 1960s. It appeared like 
republicanism became a useful explanatory frame for them to explain their position as second-class 
citizens, only once they had been politicized or educated (often whilst in prison, where classes on the 
history of Ireland took place). 
For loyalists, there was a deep sense of fear of being dragged unwillingly into a united Ireland 
and becoming an unwanted and threatened minority in a Catholic-majority country. An interesting 
comment was made by L26: 
 
[We] would be the minority in a majority Roman Catholic theocracy Marxist socialist ideology 
and [we] would not survive. Our people cannot survive in a 32 county united Ireland Republic. 
And [IRA violence was] the proof of it for me personally. 
 
So the threat of becoming a minority, with republican violence substantiating these concerns, roused 




First and foremost Ulster is British, we wanted to maintain our identity and Britishness, but 
more importantly what the IRA was doing to try and achieve their goal of a united Ireland, i.e. 
they were killing our people, killing our security forces, blowing up towns and villages to pieces 
on a daily basis. 
 
For both of these men, as for other loyalists, republican violence was the manifestation of their fears 
around a united Ireland. Protestant, unionist survival was ultimately at stake (L40,L41). Where state-
supported and -sponsored violence encouraged republicans’ involvement, loyalists spoke with equal 
strength of feeling unprotected by the state as republican violence became a norm, and their identity 
became threatened by unrepentant Irish nationalism, their unionist government unable or somehow 
unwilling to intervene. Many loyalists mentioned the inability of the security forces to protect them 
or their families against the IRA (and other republican paramilitary groups). The overriding 
representation was that “The police and the army aren’t able to [provide protection], so I had to do it 
myself” (L31). Similarly, L26 noted that, 
 
[Our] philosophy was that if IRA terrorists were going to terrorize our people, the only way we 
were going to get it to stop was by terrorizing the terrorists by the most macabre means we 
could find possible… [Because the army and police] couldn’t fire a shot at an IRA terrorist until 
he fired a shot at [them]. Which didn’t really make sense… And so therefore there was a 
certain sort of we were selling our souls. What we would normally, morally have been revulsed 
by, we were rejecting that, in order to stand up for the country we loved. 
 
L35 remarked, “Political failure creates a void that’s often filled with violence, not just in this country 
but across the world, throughout history.” When I asked one of the Hooded Men (R43) who faced 
British government-sanctioned torture (BBC 2014) how the state could have stopped people joining 
paramilitaries, he replied, “Behaved in a civilized manner. Stop murdering and torturing their citizens. 
Would have been a good start… How would people not react in a negative way?” These tales of 
suffering, which ultimately produced the distinct sense that “societal breakdown” (L27) had occurred, 
could go on and on. 
As discussed, there were moments during my Prevent interviews (especially with the more 
critical officials) where the origin of risk was considered to emanate from society or the external 
environment. CM8 spent some time explaining that Muslims in the West suffer from a sense of fear, 
and suspicion, and Otherness, which has settled on them because of recurrent experience of being 
made to feel separate. He explained, 
 
[Muslims in the Caribbean don’t have] this big chip on their shoulder cos they’ve never been 
made to feel like they're outsiders. Society there’s made up of people very comfortable in 
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their own skin. That’s not the same for a lot of Muslims in the West right now: England, France, 
[the] USA for sure. And right-wing movements and politicians and politics of xenophobia, your 
Katie Hopkins – all of this adds to, “You don’t belong, and you're a threat [with] these evil 
things you and your people keep doing.” And no one else has to answer for things of people 
they share similar ethnic grouping with. We don’t have to talk about, “Why did the guy who 
drove his car into people at the mosque?” The average white person isn’t made to answer for 
that. And there are church-going Christians who feel they don’t have to answer, but Muslims 
still do. And I think all of these things mean young people are in a place of great discomfort 
and conflict. So for Muslims there can be a sense that ‘No the monster that you're painting is 
much more a reflection of you, therefore I have to resist you, and you're never gonna accept 
me anyway.’ 
 
This sits in contrast with the earlier account from CM11, who posited a culture of violence (with his 
psychological) interpretation of risk which situates the problem coming from an external and 
governable Other – a perspective which constructs a specific suspect community to be acted upon 
(also see: Spalek & Weeks 2019). CM8’s comments place significant responsibility for ‘risk’ or 
dangerous divergence back with the societies (and environments) within which Muslims, in this 
example, live, a proposition outlined extensively in social movement theory literature (della Porta 
1992; Wiktorowicz 2004; della Porta & Diani 2006; Alimi 2007; Alimi, Demetriou, & Bosi 2015). CM8’s 
involvement in a programme that situates risk at the level of the individual could therefore appear 
contradictory, but he (and CM13) decided to work with Prevent to keep it from becoming worse, or 
less-useful, than it could otherwise be, reckoning that ”Muslims being involved in the delivery can 
prevent Prevent being turned into the monster some people say it is. I don’t think it is that monster, 
and Muslims being involved can hold it back.” 
Like CM8, other practitioners also considered the environment central: “There is less of a risk 
of radicalization and terrorism in societies that are more tolerant… which are welcoming of diversity 
and enable people to feel empowered, have a sense of belonging” (PLead16). Similarly, PPolice9, who 
had provided unofficial Channel-style interventions, commented on the everyday violence of 
children’s lived experience: 
 
I think gaming and the internet’s got a lot to answer for, are young people influenced by what 
they see? GTA and COD kill-scenes, stabbing a woman in the face with a bottle, I think that 
affects someone’s mindset. 
 
On a more explicit, quantifiable level, CM13, who deals with pre-crime and post-crime cases, 
mentioned that government foreign policy played an important role in drawing people into ‘riskiness’ 




They see what’s going on on a foreign policy level. This is the big theological debate, 
ideological debate, the refusal of the government to accept that our foreign policy and what’s 
happening in Muslim countries is an influencing factor and a recruitment factor. It is, every 
single person I've worked with [through Channel or criminal terrorism offenders], every single 
one of them, yes, it’s what’s happening on a global level, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria 
now. [Me: Every single one?] Every single one. Yep. they have been influenced. That’s where 
the imagery and where they see what's going on, the destruction. 
 
In this way, some Prevent practitioners have their sights well set in relation to former combatant 
testimony: they understand that external grievances and environment play a role in producing 
violence, or, as practitioners would frame it, producing potential risk of terrorism. There were a few 
comments in this vein, that environments of violence (often driven by government policy) help to 
create ‘risk’, belying their contribution to an intervention regime that draws the focus away from 
environments and down to the pathologized individual (Bouhana et al. 2018; Corner & Gill 2015,2017). 
But these Prevent officials did not follow the logic through, to suggest Britain might follow a less 
aggressive course of foreign policy, or encourage politicians to reform aggravating domestic policies, 
or curtail the use of Call of Duty. 
This brings us back to the culture of violence notion discussed earlier by CM11, because 
ultimately the rationale of Prevent is to make visible specific sites of risk (Martin 2014,2018). Even 
though Prevent’s all-risks-considered “calculative rationality does not begin by imagining [brown 
bodies] as the location of radicalisation risk” (Heath-Kelly 2017b, 299), imagined sites of risk are not 
equally dispersed across the population but are instead gendered and racialized. As Moffette and 
Vadasaria (2016, 293) write, the integration of security logics “builds upon already established grids 
of intelligibility… intrinsically connected to the project of race.” The public’s race-infused imagination 
is therefore enacted by vast numbers of public officials across the country performing their own 
interpretation of the Prevent Duty (Elshimi 2017; Furneaux 2018; Heath-Kelly & Strausz 2018; Dresser 
2019; Pettinger 2020a,b). So the culture of violence thesis, which postulates risk as existing amongst 
a savage and quantifiable Other (Springer 2015), is breathed back into life: where Labour’s community 
cohesion approach to Prevent had produced an explicitly racialized policy (Thomas 2012,2014a,b), the 
individualization of risk-spotting responsibility produces a similar-but-disguised outcome through the 
back door. This dispersal of racially-infused responsibility across all parts of the Prevent operation 
matters, because it allows practitioners to exist within a structure that functions through a racialized 
methodology without experiencing it as operating in this way. It allows the following comment to be 




Muslim millennials have a particular set of problems which is their lived experience of their 
identity, religious and cultural, is one that is inextricably tied in with images of violence and 
concerns about extremism and terrorism. 
 
Incidentally, corroborating this, British newspaper The Guardian carried statistics (Versi 2017) 
following the publication of Channel data in 2017, showing that whilst convictions due to so-called 
‘Islamist terrorism’ were 5 times higher than ‘extreme right-wing terrorism’, Muslims are 40 times 
more likely to be accepted as a Prevent referral, representing an 800% differential between crimes 
and perceived risk. But maybe because this mentor’s role is so front-facing and he does not consider 
his work as reproducing concerns about extremism and terrorism (indeed he pointed out later that 
the “vast majority of Channel cases [don’t have] very entrenched and extreme views”), or maybe 
because the policy is so diffusely spread, that his work – and that of others with similar concerns – 
does not sit in contradiction with his concerns for Muslim millennials. Yet, Prevent remains a counter-
terrorism policy, being situated within CONTEST (HM Government 2006), a point emphasized 
repeatedly (and occasionally rather vociferously) by more senior officials. 
What does this discussion point us towards? It shows us that whilst many practitioners 
recognize that the (often political) environment is important, and even though academically the 
critical practitioners might disagree, Prevent discursively re-entrenches ‘risk’ at the point of the 
racialized and gendered Other. In spite of the disparate personal views narrated by different 
practitioners, Prevent as an individualizing policy assemblage cannot conceive of any objective danger 
being constructed through anything other than the savage, distinct ‘Them’. It therefore shuts down 
space for discussions about structural reforms. It is important to remember how emphatically and 
intricately former combatants spoke of the political circumstances as important to their rationale for 
violence. Without being asked, many of them remarked that had the circumstances not been what 
they were, they would not have become involved. One of the most renowned and ferocious loyalist 
figures made a poignant comment towards the end of the interview: “I didn’t want that, life was not 
normal in them times. So it’s a pity that peace didn’t come much much sooner” (L49). 
Neoliberal formulations of risk-management systems ignore structural violence, in order to 
create a “fantasy [that] any ‘local’ expression of violence” is contained to a specific time and place 
(Springer 2015, 79). The localized spaces can then be governed, avoiding the need for self-reflection. 
The fantasy of the inherent violence of the Other relies on the myth that time and space are not 
connected to other times and spaces, nor are they always being (re-)negotiated and (re-)constructed 
(Massey 2005). As this myth is accepted, the governing of distinct populations becomes not only 
possible but essential, in order that the origin of violence is pacified. As the final chapter explores in 
greater detail, this striation, and the consequential closure of spatial and temporal relations, has 
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consequences for democratic participation, and resistance. The chasm between the knowledge 
produced by Prevent and that articulated by Northern Irish former combatants exists because 
practitioners are constantly refocusing their efforts on the individual at hand. Localizing and 
separating violence in this way is (even for critical officials) considered legitimate, because the 
implementation of Prevent operates so diffusely. After all, as their cases are overwhelmingly banal (as 
we will see throughout the thesis), practitioners have been recruited to perform “silver service social 
work” (PC6). They are rarely – if ever – confronted with their hypothetical position as counter-
terrorism officials making Britain safe from violence. Due to the banality of their caseload, 
practitioners’ work takes place away from explicit considerations of structural violence, and therefore 
away from the stories of unjust environments that were consistently described by ex-militants in 
explaining their violence. Deconstructing Prevent’s privileged gaze, which fixates on individuals as the 
locus of risk and which ‘sees’ so disparately from the testimony of people who would have made 
perfect Channel cases, can be accomplished by un-subjugating the stories of ex-militants (Heath-Kelly 
2016c). It is important to do this, in order that the universally-individualizing gaze of Prevent is 
disturbed and that “space [might be seen as] a product of interrelations” (Massey 2005, 10). 
To summarize this section, normality for Northern Irish citizens during the conflict, especially 
those in certain urban districts, was narrated as filled with violence amidst a backdrop of ontological 
insecurity. Normality for ‘brown bodies’, as described by a couple of Channel mentors, is experiencing 
the consequences of the Orientalist discourse materialized through spaces like Guantanamo Bay, with 
a backdrop of suspicion and securitization (CM8,CM13). Similarly, disenfranchised white bodies 
experience political, social, or economic exclusion, meanwhile assimilating tales of ethnic or religious 
invasion through the media and politicians (Neil Basu, in Waterson 2019). So Prevent, in excluding this 
broader political knowledge from its operation despite how much a few critical practitioners 
empathize with their cases’ grievances, ultimately problematizes only the individual. As a result these 
practitioners’ empathy is excluded from the imagining of solutions to the ‘problem of violence’. In 
other words, negotiations with ‘risky citizens’ revolve around their personal reformulation, and any 
empathy from those implementing Prevent about why cases appear risky in the first place becomes 
subjugated, disregarded so that the individual of concern can be moved away from ‘a state of 
riskiness’. Ex-militants spent almost every word of their interviews relaying the centrality of their 
surroundings in their movement towards violence. Yet we have seen that structural environments 
mean little to the functionality of Prevent, which is an assemblage that is fixated with reconstructing 
the individual outside of spatial considerations. The subjugation of structural conditions in Prevent 
occurs because it privileges abstracted ‘risk factors’, rendering knowledge from behavioural science 
and psychology hegemonic in accounts of violence. The dominance of these accounts squeezes out 
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room for the empathetic tendencies of more critical practitioners, and their intuitive perception of 
racist and violent environments, so that they are rarely heard within Prevent. 
 
 
Prevent and ‘Risk Factors’ 
We have seen how ex-militant testimony is disregarded by preemptive risk-governance. Ex-militants 
are not engaged by Prevent, with the exception of figures such as Majid Nawaz who market 
themselves as ex-jihadists in order to align their NGO work with Home Office priorities. The second 
half of the chapter will now assess the assumptions Prevent makes about the psychological drivers of 
violence, utilizing ex-militant narratives to disrupt the circularity of this knowledge and the 
anticipatory governance of terrorism (before it can ever occur and validate the knowledge claims). 
 
Establishment of Prevent’s Psychological Risk-Assessment Praxis 
This introduction to the ‘Prevent half’ of the chapter will briefly detail the historical establishment of 
Prevent's risk-assessment identifiers, known as the 22+ Extreme Risk Guidance (henceforth ERG) 
factors seen in Figure 4. It will then move into some of the supposed ERG risk factors themselves, like 
‘Mental Health’ and ‘Need to Redress Injustice and Express Grievance'. Specifically it will look at how 
the implementation of these factors is enacted through the Channel programme. 
Evidential problems beset the entire field of predictive terrorism studies, because the field 
recognizes that no causal links (nor sometimes even correlative links) have been established for why 
violence erupts (Herzog-Evans 2018). This is typified in the science behind the 22+ ERG factors. The 
ERG are a number of supposed ’signs of radicalization’, based on a study of “approximately 20” 
extremist-related offenders (Lloyd & Dean 2015, 8). The ‘22+’, refers to the 22 factors plus “any other 
factor that emerges from individual assessment” (NOMS 2014, 3): so even within the confines of a 
distinctly vague set of signifiers, subjective interpretation is foregrounded in the assessment of 
supposed sites of risk (Pettinger 2020b). Regardless of the ambiguity of the list, public officials – from 
teachers, to social workers, to health workers – are required under the Prevent Duty to report their 
clients (pupils or patients) if they spot these ERG signs and are worried by them. Family and friends 
also occasionally refer their loved ones to Prevent. Cases are accepted by Prevent and ultimately 
offered Channel mentorship by Channel panels (in the most worrying cases), signposted away to other 
services, or rejected outright, on the basis of these 22+ ERG factors. The signs are central to the 
ongoing management of Prevent cases too – every case that makes its way up to the Channel 
intervention programme is the subject of a Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) form. The VAF 
form has a checklist of these 22 ‘risk factors’, and individuals on Channel are scored bearing in mind 
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their progress (or regression). This form is continually updated as a case moves through their 
intervention journey (if intervention is sanctioned). The VAF form is a technology that reifies the locus 
of the problem as the person: a form for each individual, monitoring their personal progress through 
their (de)radicalization journey, through a checklist of factors about their individual vulnerabilities. 
There is no space in this list for the possibility of seeing structural environments as contributing to the 
potential incidence of violence, something that will become more apparent as we move through the 
interview data. The list of 22 ERG ‘risk factors’, the basis of the VAF form and referrals, is shown below: 
 
Figure 4: 22 Extreme Risk Guidance ‘Risk Factors’ (NOMS 2014, 3-4) 
Engagement Factors  Intent Factors Capability Factors  
Need to redress injustice and 
express grievance 
Over-identification with an 
extremist group, cause or 
ideology 
Individual knowledge, skills 
and competencies to commit 
extremist offences 
Need to defend against threat ‘Them-and-Us’ thinking 
 
Access to networks, funding 
and equipment to commit 
extremist offences 
Need for identity, meaning 
and belonging 
Dehumanisation of the enemy Criminal History 
Need for status Attitudes that justify offending 
 
 
Need for excitement, 
comradeship or adventure 
Harmful means to an End  
Need to dominate others Harmful end objectives 
 
 
Susceptibility to indoctrination  
 
 
Political/moral motivation  
 
 
Opportunistic involvement  
 
 
Family and/or friends support 
extremist offending 
  
Transitional periods  
 
 
Group influence and control  
 
 





The presence of these indicators is meant to signify that an individual might possess some propensity 
for engaging in terrorism-related activity. Longstanding terrorism expert Andrew Silke, who sat on the 
ERG oversight committee, said that when the demand for a preemptive policy arose, the government 
only had a reoffending assessment tool available (quoted in Furneaux 2018, 39-40). So instead of 
conducting new science to establish factors which precede terrorist violence, it just used the ERG 
reoffenders study. A temporal fracture occurs in the decision to utilize a post-offender risk-
management tool for those who have committed no crimes. It is clear from the documentation that 
this methodology was produced to manage reoffending risk (NOMS 2014, 5): “Those associated with 
Engagement [the left-hand column in Figure 4] describe the individual pathway into offending and 
offer clues as to how the individual may disengage [from crime].” In explicitly assuming an offence has 
been committed, the study is plainly not attempting an investigation of pre-crime ‘risk’, nor is a 
transparent methodology presented for drawing these post-crime explanations back to non-criminal 
management (Knudsen 2018). Indeed, a Ministry of Justice report (HM Government 2019, 5) notes 
that 
 
The ERG22+ is intended for use with people who have been convicted of any extremist or 
extremist-related offence and is completed by qualified forensic professionals, who have 
received training in its administration. 
 
As well as admissions like these that establish the ERG as post-crime reoffending indicators, the 
metrics are even described in the NOMS document as “essentially working hypotheses” (2014, 5). The 
science behind these signs has been contested by practitioners (Royal College of Psychiatrists 2016) 
and over 140 academics including Noam Chomsky (Guardian 2016; also see: Knudsen 2018; Scarcella, 
Page, & Furtado 2016), not least for encouraging the reporting of a wide range of banal behaviours by 
those who are not qualified forensic professionals. Prioritizing suspicion and the imagination of 
catastrophic futures (Salter 2008; Amoore 2013), this modality encourages active interpretation 
where “anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger” (Ewald 1991). In some 
sense, the half of this thesis that explores ex-militant testimony could be considered an alternative 
ERG study, except that it also offers open access to its research data. The data from the study of 
‘extremist offenders’ that informed the ERG risk factors was not made publicly accessible, and results 
were reproduced through an explicitly individualized, psychological framework because the study was 
“developed by psychologists” (Knudsen 2018, 39; also see: Younis 2020). This thesis aims in part to 
deconstruct that research. What other ways can we hear the ERG study that produced Prevent? If the 
lens of individual-psychology is disturbed, what else can we see? It is unsurprising and in fact necessary 
by definition for Channel, an individual-intervention scheme, to assume the personal psychology 
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explanation rather than geopolitics as pivotal, despite an explicit admission by the architect of Prevent 
Sir David Omand during my interview with him that the debate around motivations is not settled: he 
said that whilst the debate between structural-geopolitical and individual-psychological perspectives 
in academia continued, Prevent needed to press forward and act. As Massumi and Bordeleau detail in 
their study of Canadian police tactics preempting street protests from occurring, political engagement 
is short-circuited when anticipation takes prominence (2012). Preemption actively produces what it 
fears in order that its fears might be averted before they materialize: “It is positively productive of the 
particular form a life will take next. It conditions life's nextness. It is a force of life” (Massumi 2015a, 
71). Where preemption reigns, so too does the power of imagination. As imagination draws 
connections between psychological deficiencies and terroristic proclivity, preemption brings this 
vision to life through interventive programmes like the Prevent programme. Acting largely as a 
psychological intervention – as we will see – Prevent instantiates terrorism as a psychological problem, 
solvable through psychological means. Geopolitics, and other alternative ways to ‘see’ the cause of 
local flashes of violence, become lost as explanatory factors. 
So what sorts of cases do Prevent official come across, and how are the 22 ERG risk factors 
interpreted by officials and related to the people who end up receiving Channel interventions? Despite 
the ERG being “working hypotheses” developed for offenders rather than Prevent subjects, and 
despite their vagueness and the requirement for expressly subjective interpretation (Pettinger 2020b), 
practitioners were often definitive about the sorts of factors concerning the individual that constituted 
risk (although upon reflection this was often disrupted, discussed in Thematic Chapter 3). The 
following discussion illuminates the most-emphasized ERG factors, demonstrating how the 
experience-based Northern Irish testimony bears little to no relation to them. The consistent fold of 
broader grievance back onto the individual was eminently consistent, as we will now see. 
 
‘Mental Health’ 
One of the most central ERG risk factors to Prevent praxis is the presence of mental health concerns. 
The identification of mental health issues (given the presence of other factors, explored below) was 
consistently narrated as relating to terrorism risk, both by Channel mentors and strategic Prevent 
officials. Mentors have various specialisms, from religious expertise, to right-wing racism, to 
“nurturing interventions” (CM3). Mental health is one of these. Two Channel mentors I interviewed 
had specific experience in this field; one has an academic background in psychology (CM1), and 
another was an experienced clinical psychologist (CM11). Both spoke extensively about the terrorism 
risk associated with mental health. CM11, the director of a company delivering Channel mentorship 
who also personally delivers interventions himself, found it difficult to differentiate between 
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”vulnerability to extremism” and the presence of mental health conditions, a rather worrying turn 
given the sensitivities of stigmatizing mental health. However, his viewpoint is situated within a strand 
of academic literature that attempts to instantiate the relationship between mental health and 
supposed risk of terrorism (Corner & Gill 2015,2017,2019; Corner, Gill & Mason 2016; Lankford 2017; 
Bouhana et al. 2018).  When asked ‘what the most common signs of radicalization’ he had come across 
were, he remarked rather concerningly that those with mental health conditions inherently have/pose 
a greater risk: 
 
Of key factors in the presentation, one is the mental health, two is those people with learning 
difficulties… A large proportion of people who may have learning difficulties or a 
neurodevelopmental disorder such as ASD, Asperger’s, [or] autism, have an increasing risk 
because of the way they can be radicalized. 
 
This inherent relation between mental health and terrorism risk was not an isolated assessment. CM1 
elaborated on this interpretation somewhat, mentioning that, 
 
Extremist ideologies and ASD [Autism Spectrum Disorder] go hand-in-hand. ASD encourages 
a literal interpretation, a definitive, and that’s the way extremism works, hate/love, them/us, 
black/white, and very definitive answers. You are better because you are white, you are better 
because you are Muslim, that definitive on or off, binary thinking is a real challenge, so 45-
50% of my cases have got ASD. 
 
Prevent practitioners positioning ASD and other mental health difficulties as terrorism risk signifiers, 
because of the divergent perceptions they foster, was common. 
Yet aggression because of mental health issues as a terrorism risk is a considerable distance 
from anything I heard in Northern Ireland. The positioning of political violence as fundamentally 
irrational is seen more explicitly through this ‘risk factor’ than any other. We have seen how mental 
health is interpreted from the ERG list by practitioners, and how it rescinds the potential for rationality 
from Channel cases. These accounts sit awkwardly with the clinical accounts from Northern Ireland 
that I heard and the clinical threat that they ultimately posed for the British state. Many (including 
R29) mentioned that if somebody appeared irrational they became a liability, because they would not 
be as effective or threatened the integrity of operations. Had I posed the question explicitly to former 
combatants if mental health difficulties had contributed to their involvement, I am sure some of the 
interviews would have been terminated – at the minimum, I would have faced a significant 
confrontation. Showing the list of ERG ‘risk factors’ to R23 for his thoughts, the risk factors were so 
disassociated from his experience that he did not even understand that he was being asked about his 
relation to them. Instead, such is the strength of the disjuncture within which Prevent works, and the 
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distance between his experience and that of the ‘signs of radicalization’ on the page in front of him, 
that he considered them only being applied to so-called Islamist violence. Upon seeing ‘mental health’ 
on the sheet, he remarked, “Mental health, think they’re nuts, cos they take part in it, is that what it 
is?” He proceeded to rant ironically about Donald Trump’s comments that the recent Texas shooting 
in 2017 had been a cause of mental illness rather than lax gun control: “It’s not there’s nothing wrong 
with their gun control, it’s this guy was a nut!” 
The centrality of mental health concerns to Channel’s preemptive interventions, and its 
contestation by ex-militants (seen in the irony of R23), shows us that a distorted mind must be a sign 
of terrorism proclivity – or, terrorism proclivity must only come from those with distorted minds – in 
the eyes of the preemptors regardless of alternative knowledges that might suggest otherwise. Risk 
could not emanate from those with full mental capacity, goes the logic, yet this logic only holds when 
the stories of ex-militants are silenced. Preemptive intervention is enacted to close down the potential 
space for devastating futures to occur. By directing life towards particular trajectories, knowledge is 
circumscribed around that which the preemptors imagine as real (Massumi & Bordeleau 2012; 
Massumi 2015a). Alternative knowledges, like the suggestion that full cognitive ability would have 
precluded a potential recruit’s involvement in armed groups, are subjugated by this preemptive 
discourse, sustaining the picture of ‘the terrorist’ as mentally impaired. Rather than being political 
actors, those exerting violence are to be pitied and supported away from their irrational behaviour (a 
theme developed in the following chapter) – a framework made possible only by discarding the stories 
of ex-militants. 
 
‘Need for Identity, Meaning and Belonging’ 
Another ERG risk factor trait recurrently described in Prevent interviews as signifying risk was 
individuals searching for an identity and a sense of belonging. Social isolation was reported as 
concerning time and again, both by strategic and front-facing practitioners. It was occasionally quite 
difficult during interviews to remember that these officials were implementing a counter-terrorism 
programme, given the distinct vagueness and overt lack of causality connecting these ERG principles 
with terrorism risk. There were a number of particularly bizarre moments during my fieldwork in this 
regard. Practitioners occasionally brought up post-conviction cases they had overseen, attempting to 
explain why they engaged in criminality, extending these characteristics out to their Channel (non-
crime) cases. CM13 spoke of two Terrorism Act (TACT) offenders he had been counselling: 
 
So you can see what the issue is there, he’s an individual who’s emotionally had trauma in his 
life. Massive social isolation, a 32 year old guy, has no interest in women. Not married, no 
interest at all, this is not normal behaviour. […And the second:] This is a British born kid, never 
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seen a river in his life! What does that say about his mindset? He's profoundly unworldly, 
profoundly socially isolated, his whole existence was on the online space. 
 
Similarly, another Channel mentor (CM11) considered isolation the third most significant sign of risk 
after mental health and ‘complex needs’: “So the [third] one is people who are very isolated, within 
communities, and unable to get access to necessary support.” The conclusion drawn by CM13 follows 
this logic through: 
 
I don’t believe those who are being convicted of terrorism are terrorists. They're not, they're 
mostly damaged, vulnerable, confused, idealistic, isolated, disenfranchised… It comes back to 
what I call human factors, it’s trauma. Notional dysfunction, family breakup, domestic 
violence, social exclusion, isolation, fantasy, escapism. All those kinda things. And of course it 
is politically driven as well. 
 
This mentor, listing numerous personal traits and states, only mentions the role politics might play in 
motivating involvement in violence afterwards. This focus – narrating personal vulnerabilities over 
structural conditions as causing violence – was not atypical; in fact, politics being described as a 
secondary consideration was the common position of all practitioners if they considered the role 
external conditions play in producing violence at all. But before delving into some of the implications 
of this testimony, it is worth pointing out that like the ERG study, CM13 pulled these traits observed 
in TACT offenders across to his non-criminal Channel work. I asked him how different these TACT cases 
were from his Channel cases, and despite them not having committed crimes he replied, somewhat 
staggeringly, 
 
They're not, they're not. Go back to the [post-crime] case I worked on. Prevent did intervene 
there [as a referral, yet] they were never given a [Channel] intervention. They should have 
been! It’s all so crystal clear, they should have had a robust intervention, it wasn't provided! 
And so guess what they then moved on further down the continuum and ended up offending. 
And it’s in my report, Prevent failed them. 
 
In connecting risk factors from his post-crime work to his Channel interventions, comments like these 
render visible the rationality upholding the preemptive assemblage: unqualified and retrospectively-
fitted spatial explanations of sheer banality (“not normal behaviour”) are judged as infused with risk 
– in this case, terrorism risk. As Massey writes, not everything is connected, nor needs to be connected 
(2005, 11-12), so connections like these are established by privileging certain forms of knowledge. 
Preemptive interventions only make sense when considering non-criminal subjectivities intrinsically 
related to post-crime subjectivities. The “all-risks” approach of Prevent (Omand 2010, 11) ensures the 
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boundary between pre-crime and post-crime remains fluid, almost becoming unimportant: all people 
are potential allies but also potential dangers in the big-data search for divergence (Heath-Kelly 
2013a). This in turn fulfils and reproduces its own story, that anybody and everybody is a potential 
danger: the potential for the emergence of disruptive subjectivities is short-circuited by the 
preemptive paradigm (Massumi & Bordeleau 2012). 
When I asked CM13 how risk factors like these could be spotted effectively given their 
normality, he simply said, “I think we just have to be more vigilant.” The obsession with chasing down 
potential sites of risk disembeds spatial relations from the environment, and entirely silences temporal 
explanations for human behaviour as the present becomes the only relevant moment. This allows the 
Channel mentor to consider it shocking and ludicrous that somebody who had not committed a crime 
had not been given an intervention designed to prevent criminality, on the grounds that it was “crystal 
clear” that she would become involved in criminality because of vague signifiers like social isolation 
that also apply to much of the population. The implications of this logic will be explored further in 
Thematic Chapter 3, but these extracts highlight the distinction between the former combatant 
worldview that sees environmental conditions (space) and historical experiences (time) as important, 
and the risk preemption dispositif displayed by these Channel mentors, which individualizes space and 
disregards the past. 
When I undertook my Northern Irish fieldwork, any discussion of a ‘search’ for identity or 
social inclusion was consistently held away from motivations for violence. It was never central to any 
explanation about why former combatants became involved in violence in the first instance, merely 
arriving as a by-product of involvement. Occasionally such a topic was mentioned explicitly, or alluded 
to implicitly. As many did, L45 mentioned the feeling of belonging as important: “There was a group 
of a certain number of people, you relied on them, if you did your job right, they lived and you lived, 
so they become family.” Another (R30) spoke about identity being important in his (and others’) 
journey: 
 
The Irish language flourished in prisons only partially for [secret] communication, but more 
for Irishness, as the people became more aware of their culture [and] history: a land without 
a language is like a land without a name. We were determined to get our identity back! 
 
Involvement brought some sense of meaning and belonging – which was a ‘risk factor’ central to all 
discussions with Prevent practitioners – for ex-militants. However these were not once implied as 
driving involvement in violence: these traits were merely articulated as by-products of involvement. 
Often for former combatants, when an explicit ‘search’ for identity – like the learning of Irish – was 
discussed, it materialized only upon imprisonment. No matter how distanced ex-militants were from 
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sites of conflict, not once did the idea arise even implicitly that social isolation encouraged them to 
look around for purpose. And importantly, testimonies about these factors were always rationalized 
by the presence of external motivators, like the destruction of a native language by a colonial power. 
So Prevent constructs motivations for involvement as being comprised of individual searches for 
belonging and social inclusion. This logic turns on its head the testimony from Northern Irish ex-
militants, which consistently prioritizes circumstances above anything else, situating them as 
foundational. Had circumstances differed, the former combatants emphasized over and over again, 
they would not have become involved in the sort of activity Prevent alleges to combat. Contrasting 
this testimony of ex-militants with the descriptions by Prevent practitioners of their work illuminates 
the disjunctures between the realms of terrorism preemption and its most ideal subjects. The ERG 
principles and their enactment ‘on-the-ground’ bear no relation to how those who have actually been 
convicted for numerous terrorism crimes narrated their experiences. Discourses of preemption 
obtained from the mainland’s Prevent practitioners, and the stories told by those who ‘should-have-
been-preempted’ across the water, do not sit together because the preemptive paradigm cannot hear 
any other narrative than one that situates the problem at the feet of a disturbed individual 
(Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich 2013; Kruglanski et al. 2014; Corner & Gill 2015,2017,2019; Corner, 
Gill & Mason 2016; Lankford 2017; Bouhana et al. 2018). 
 
‘Need to Redress Injustice and Express Grievance’ 
Arguably the factor most related to the external oppression underlined by Northern Irish ex-militants 
as fundamental to their involvement, would be a “need to redress injustice and express grievance.” 
Yet in the original documentation this ERG ‘risk factor’ is followed by a short description that clarifies 
it as a subjective personal desire than having any objective relation to external realities: “Engagement 
with an extremist group, cause or ideology meets needs to express or act on feelings of anger, 
grievance or injustice” (NOMS 2014, 3, emphasis added). We can see this enacted through Prevent 
practice: PLead15 made the case that politics is relevant to counter-extremism, but only insofar as it 
provides talking points for Channel mentors, a possible point of risk-management leverage during 
interventions: 
 
In the 2011 strategy there's a whole paragraph I think it’s paragraph 5.27 either on the Iraq 
war or Israel-Palestine and how that's used by radicalizers and how that's an issue of 
contention. So we definitely do understand that that plays a role. We can argue about the role 
it plays, but it definitely plays a role in leading some people to believe that terrorism is an 




Such narratives recurrently deprioritized politics as a motivator, short-circuiting any discussion about 
broader environments by folding and refolding any issue back onto the individual as “their problem”. 
This is in itself a “taboo-enforcing practice” (Jackson 2012, 18), where everything outside the individual 
is excluded from negotiation. Whilst possessing a ‘sense of injustice because of external environments’ 
(with an initially unsophisticated political ideology) was how all Northern Irish former combatants 
portrayed their involvement, this is inverted by Prevent, as the interview extract indicates. Even in the 
earnest efforts to empathize, this empathy falls flat by individualizing anger over geopolitical problems 
as an “answer to their problem”. Had I asked former combatants if their involvement was a 
consequence of “their problem”, I would have been laughed (or kicked) out of the interview. There 
are no objective, historical facts, just subjective experiences in the moment. Relations of space and 
time outside of the intervention encounter become disembedded, geopolitics becomes a possible 
point of negotiation but only as a means to individual enlightenment, and the essence of state-citizen 
relationship is reduced down to private arbitration. Comaroff and Comaroff (2000, 305) write that: 
 
The personal is the only politics there is, the only politics with a tangible referent or emotional 
valence. It is in these privatized terms that action is organized, that the experience of inequity 
and antagonism takes meaningful shape. 
 
Such a mode of governance short-circuits the potential for political contestation (a discussion 
expounded further in Thematic Chapter 4). It is inconceivable that individuals on Channel would be 
encouraged to join street protests to voice their frustrations. Indeed, one potential protestor was 
referred to Prevent and visited by police having declared his intention to be arrested whilst protesting 
with Extinction Rebellion (Evans 2019). Instead, Channel cases are routinely placed onto leadership 
training courses with organizations like Princes Trust, or football coaching courses with Premier 
League football clubs (PC6). Whilst shaping people’s personal lives in this way might benefit them 
individually, the consequences for political engagement and the space for resistance must be 
considered. Siloing divergent knowledge and experience into individual encounters with the Channel 
programme, a programme shrouded in national security discourse, allows the conditions that Giroux 
(2004, 77) describes in Terror of Neoliberalism: 
 
The state removes itself from either addressing or correcting the effects of racial [and other] 
discrimination, reducing [such] matters… to individual concerns to be largely solved through 
private negotiations between individuals, and adopting an entirely uncritical role in the way 
in which the racial state shapes racial policies and their effects throughout the economic, 




Whilst Prevent practitioners spoke of individual disequilibrium as motivating violence, former 
combatants spoke of love, of a last-resort, as inevitability, of morality, and of empathy as inciting their 
involvement. When I asked R38, From the people who you’ve spoken to and who you know, what 
would the overriding message of their motivations be?, his reply was “A desire to right a wrong. A 
desire to right a wrong. That would be the dominating theme. In all the narratives that people that 
I’ve spoken to for countless years – a desire to right a wrong.” For another (R37), his personal rationale 
was: “I want a totally new Ireland, that's based on equality, and cherishing all the children equally… 
an Ireland of equals.” I followed up, asking if anybody else he knew thought similarly, and he 
immediately responded, “I would say [it was the same for] every single one of us.”  
Similarly to these comments, a Channel mentor (CM13) mentioned intense empathy, and love 
for children, as motivators for a TACT offender’s crimes: 
 
He saw all these kids [in the Middle East] being blown up, maimed, smashed to piece, he said 
that he’d look on the BBC and they weren’t reporting it. He said that someone had sent him a 
video, and it’s this kid who said he had a beautiful face and the camera pans down and 
obviously he’s been disembowelled, choking every time he coughs, he sees him die there and 
then. And that’s it, he just lost it. Then he saw in the media that Prince George is going to 
school, that’s it, boom. He just did it [calls for Prince George to be attacked]. So what's the 
motive? It’s deep empathy and compassion… He said “they haven't put it in the media, these 
kids are dying! What do we have to do to get people to wake up to the kids there?!” That’s his 
motive! 
 
Before unpacking this extract, it must be noted that the mentor here is expressing some 
comprehension of why this offender engaged in criminality, a contradictory stance to the praxis of 
Prevent: we will shortly see how preemptive politics suppresses (certain forms of) empathy. In this 
excerpt the mentor describes the injustice and pain of wars, much like the extracts from earlier in the 
chapter where CM8 and CM13 described the conditions Muslims face (in Britain and abroad). The 
overarching thrust of Prevent has been demonstrated to fold problems back onto individuals, and to 
disregard structural environments of violence and discrimination. We will continue to see this theme 
develop throughout the thesis. Yet very human moments like the extract just shown where critical 
mentors ‘see’ these environments – moments which appear to contrast with the individualizing tenets 
of Prevent – are possible because mentors exist as beings situated inside and outside the programme. 
They largely replicate and reproduce its universalizing claims, but also see limitations through their 
own lived experience. CM8 and CM13 might have been more critical because unlike CM1 and CM11 
they do not have a clinical or academic background in psychology (a background which privileges the 
focus on individuals). Moreover, they are people of colour, which presents its own life experience 
often including discrimination or rejection that they detailed on a number of occasions (see for 
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instance CM8’s extract about the ‘outsider status’ of Muslims in Britain earlier in this chapter), which 
Prevent is occasionally criticized for reproducing. CM13 had actually been officially stopped from 
providing Channel mentorship because his organization was deemed ‘extremist’ by the UK 
Government. However, he was re-recruited “through the back door [because] they haven't got 
[alternative mentors] who can deal with what I can deal with… So I'm still on the radar.” Perhaps 
experiences like these, and the other factors mentioned, allows Prevent practitioners (in certain 
moments and contexts) to ‘see’ in ways that might contravene its totalizing logic. Other mentors also 
appeared to contradict the totality of the preemptive logic at certain moments to certain degrees, 
although CM8 and CM13 were the two who diverged the most. 
Moving back to the purpose of presenting the extract above, we see the mentor raising 
empathy and compassion as the reason that the terrorist crime occurred. In line with this assumption, 
studying the Channel programme Douglas Weeks found that mentors prioritized “emotion” as the 
principle fulcrum around which intervention revolves (2017). This finding is corroborated by another 
researcher in the field: one official showed Asim Qureshi (2018) a VAF form, revealing the reasons a 
Prevent case was accepted for intervention. The document showed (and the official remarked) that 
there was so much empathy present that it was understood as a potential terrorism risk, because the 
person concerned might identify too intensely with others’ plights. Empathy and love (in the wrong 
contexts, by the wrong personality profiles) are rendered as risk-factors in the enactment of Prevent, 
signifying a potential violent reaction to come. 
The politics of affect is important to consider in relation to these silences produced by 
Prevent’s praxis. Where fear is mobilized through the force of preemption (Massumi 2015a), empathy 
is suppressed. It must be noted again that we are speaking here about certain forms of empathy: after 
all, the gaze of Prevent sees only certain, racialized risks (Younis & Jadhav 2020; also see: Wilcox 2017). 
For approved mentors, who buy into the premise that risk is potentially everywhere and who are 
working towards ‘risk-minimization’, empathy might be more legitimate. We will see over the course 
of the thesis (particularly in Thematic Chapter 4) that agency and approval is granted to those who 
have accepted the principal premises of the preemptive paradigm: that risk is everywhere including 
within ourselves and that, as CM13 himself said, “We just have to be more vigilant.” However, for 
those outside this knowledge structure, the preemptive paradigm excludes the possibility for tragedy 
(stories of painful spatial and temporal experiences) to have any meaning except that associated 
emotional responses to these stories might signify risk and need to be directed towards safety. 
Explanatory stories of ex-militants, people who we will continually see reject the principles of 
preemptive risk-management, are silenced by Prevent. The implications behind tragic stories, any 
wider than in relation to reforming the individual, are dispersed when risk-thinking is applied (Goldson 
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& Muncie 2006, 93). This disappearance of any broader meaning of spatial and temporal experiences 
produces a necessary foreclosure of empathy: the would-be empathic listener can only hear a tragic 
story and make risk-related observations. The ubiquitous presence of (irrational and apocalyptic) risk 
requires a different response from its listener than drawing out implications for society. As Aradau 
shows, the ‘politics of pity’ is combined with notions of risk-to-come (2004). Empathy – or displays of 
an internal assimilation of the emotional importance of negative spatial and temporal experiences 
(McCaffree 2019) – therefore becomes a potential signifier of risk. This rationality flips the dozens of 
hours I spent talking with interviewees, who often appeared emotionally invested in their histories 
and who encouraged me to understand (or empathize with) their position. The dispositif of risk neither 
grants the bearer-of-tragedy the possibility to dwell on external lessons from their hardship, nor 
allows the would-be empathizer to share the tragic burden themselves by listening. Instead it 
mandates the observance of risk from this pain. Closing down the possibility for external environments 
to have meaning and impact upon social relations furthermore short-circuits processes of change; 
empathy is a trait through which ex-militants described both their engagement and disengagement 
from violence (see Thematic Chapters 3 & 4). 
 
‘Over-identification with an Extremist Group, Cause or Ideology’ 
The final ERG risk factor we will assess in light of ex-militant testimony is an ‘Over-identification with 
an Extremist Group, Cause or Ideology’. The Prevent Strategy deems ‘extremist ideology’ a key factor 
in the identification of risk (HM Government 2011b). Former Prevent police officer PPolice9 explained 
that “you can't get a Channel mentor without an ideology.” The category for inclusion on Channel 
changed as of 2018 (HM Government 2018c, 8): “This year, the new category ‘Mixed, Unstable, or 
Unclear Ideology’ has been added to describe type of concern”. The document makes explicit however 
that even ‘Unclear Ideology’ is one of the many “kinds of ideology.” It is therefore unequivocal that 
identifying the presence of ‘ideology’ whether practitioners can determine its boundaries or not, is 
central to Prevent’s identification of risk: for someone to pose a potential threat, they must by 
definition be ideological. For some practitioners, differentiating between ideology and seeing violence 
as legitimate was impossible. Indeed, ideology was a central risk factor in the eyes of every Prevent 
official, CM11 remarking that Channel mentors are people “who work in terms of people from a radical 
viewpoint.” Practitioners often spoke about the two main types of ideology identified by the process 
as Islamist and right-wing extremism. Yet mental health-related (CM1) and nurturing (CM3) 
intervention specialisms also exist, and Channel panels are interested in those who are angry about 
animal rights and infrastructure projects (PC5). Similarly, CM1 supports “people who come from very 
angry and resentful and racist point of views, to the more ideologically driven in terms of having very 
105 
 
strong Nazi views, pagan views, or pseudo-pagan views.” Some of these, presumably, would be 
classified under the new Unclear Ideology category. CM1 continued, saying that success could be 
measured by “who’s disengaged from [their] violent ideology.” 
Most Northern Irish former combatants, especially republicans, narrated that circumstances 
and ideology were linked, but that circumstances triggered their initial involvement and any 
(sophisticated) ideology often followed only afterwards. There were few self-professed republicans 
amongst my sample before the mid-1960s. Although some had family ties to earlier republican 
movements, most republicans stated their involvement resulted from violence enacted on them or 
their communities. For Protestants, their involvement was similarly explained by attacks on them and 
their communities, and also a threat of being taken into a united Ireland. I asked a republican peace 
activist (R43), who did not become involved in the conflict himself, about Prevent’s idea of ‘extremism’ 
being related to involvement in violence: 
 
[Me: Would you say that many people you knew who were involved - and also I’ll include 
dissidents - how many of those would you have said have ‘radical’ views?] Radical views. Very 
few. Very very few. I think that there are most of the ones I would talk to, some of them have 
good political heads. 
 
Another republican central to the Civil Rights Movement in the late 1960s, and a member of the OIRA 
(R30), speaking in the context of a discussion on terminology, said, 
 
A lot of young people would have joined in 1969 the IRA because their houses were burnt. 
And they thought they were joining the IRA just to shoot back. They didn’t join it because of 
the liberating ideals which exercised me, which went back to the 18th century, you know you 
had the principles of the French Revolution being endorsed by radicals here in Belfast. That’s 
why I get angry now when I see ‘radicalization’ – I’d be proud to be a radical!... For most people 
certainly that I knew, all believed they were doing it for the greater good. 
 
Many republicans considered their time in prison as a time of being politically ‘awakened’ and 
becoming fervently anti-British-state, seeing reunification as the only option to end the injustices they 
saw. R34 spoke about his movement from ‘ignorance’ to ‘politicization’: 
 
[With everything going on] you couldn’t see any other way of getting justice apart from within 
a united Ireland. [Me: So was that idea for you of a united Ireland a big motivating factor?] It 
woulda been yeah. As well [as the external chaos]. But never it would never have come about 
probably if the civil rights movement hadn’t have been gone, if the Troubles hadn’t been 
started, or a war hadn’t have started, whatever you want to call it. Like I was sorta ignorant 
of the state I was living in up to that point, but I soon became politicized very very quickly. I 
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learnt more. And then going in to the H Blocks as well, we called it the H Blocks University, 
you were politicized even more. 
 
Another (R29) said, “There was a honeymoon period where we thought the Brits were there to help 
us, and then gradually they did the same things the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary] had done to us 
before. You’ve got to understand me, I didn’t want to do it, I felt compelled.” A leading figure in the 
republican former combatant community (R23) spoke about being educated into realizing that getting 
the British out of Ireland was the only solution: “Imprisonment is also a major educator because of 
the classes because of the highly educated, politically motivated people who are also captured. 
[Education was a] great driver [of becoming anti-British-state].” Yet a number of republicans spoke 
about their impassioned politicization and adoption of a ‘sophisticated ideology’ during imprisonment 
simultaneously helping them to realize that violence was not going to produce the results they 
wanted, especially given British de-escalation (R23).  
Encounters between social movements and the state are covered extensively in social 
movement literature on political violence (della Porta 1992; Ellison & Martin 2000; Wiktorowicz 2004; 
della Porta & Diani 2006; Alimi 2007; Alimi, Demetriou & Bosi 2015). This literature observes the 
engagement between state forces and non-state forces as encounters of escalation and de-escalation, 
and was developed by the contributions of ‘framing theory’ which “[brought] ideas back in” (Oliver & 
Johnston 2000, 37). This field suggests that the framing of narratives is important, but that these 
narratives are associated with relations between groups in society rather than dehistoricized and 
decontextualized ‘individual perspectives’. Traditional conflict and terrorism literature describes the 
relative unimportance of ideology as related to incidence of violence and preventing conflict 
(O’Connell & Berard 2005; Horgan & Bjorgo 2009; Clubb 2016a,b; Ferguson 2016a). The testimony of 
these former combatants lends weight to the findings of these literatures: developing an ‘ideology’ 
was not foundational to republican violence, nor was it correlative to their disengagement. 
Equally, several loyalists framed their involvement through the ‘ideology’ of patriotism. L26, 
as a loyalist fighting to maintain union with mainland Britain, became agitated when he recalled that 
he was imprisoned despite his involvement being motivated for what he considered the British State: 
 
Many many hundreds of thousands of people joined [through violence or support]. Basically 
through patriotism as we seen it… Many of us lay for years and years, blanket protests and 
everything else, in British prisons as ultra-British subjects, patriots. 
 
However, this framing of involvement through the lens of patriotism, like republicanism for those who 
engaged on the nationalist side, was only articulated in the context of material conditions. L49, 
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notorious in the loyalist community, claimed that he epitomized the actual cause of loyalism, 
mentioning that journalists had told him the same. He remarked about his involvement that, 
 
It was done to keep our country free from threat of republicans… Me and L27 and L26 were 
the real driving force in loyalism, there was a real cause in people like us. Nine out of ten of 
loyalists were fools. 
 
For L26, L49, and other loyalists, their involvement in violence was framed in relation to attachments 
to Britain and associations of Britishness. But such patriotic sentiments were always described in the 
context of a desire to rebuff republican violence and wanting to ensure their security and identity was 
protected, alongside fears of being governed unjustly as a minority in a united Ireland. Simple notions 
of romantic or idealistic ties to another place purely for historical or ‘ideological’ reasons were entirely 
absent. The conditions in which their violence occurred was much more fundamental to their stories 




Throughout this first thematic chapter we have seen that ex-militant stories – and the structural 
causes of violence which are prioritised in their narratives – go unheard by the preemptive paradigm. 
Articulating material environments as irrelevant to the incidence of ‘terrorism risk’ means that Prevent 
silences the stories of those who have committed terrorism offences. Having no history to them, risk-
identities are able to be constituted and reconstituted on a whim (Walker 2008) – as we have seen in 
the hasty repurposing of the ERG22+ guidance from a post-offence to a pre-emptive risk assessment 
tool. Ideology, empathy, and other supposed risk factors become reconstituted as drivers of risk, while 
ex-militants deemed them unimportant. 
Ex-militants described their environments as foundational to understanding their involvement 
in violence. They were submerged in violence, the stories went: they told tales of their friends, family, 
and neighbours being killed, feeling like their country and identity might be taken from them, and 
spoke of the injustice of their surroundings. Every interview was consistently framed in these terms, 
and there was no lack of passion or detail in the retelling of their histories. Broader political 
environments as well as specific experiences of violence and trauma were crucial to how all ex-militant 
narratives pivoted around the reasons for committing terrorism offences. Yet when we look at how 
Prevent ‘sees’ the motivations for engaging in violence, it is clear that there is fundamentally different 
knowledge at work. We see that preemption does not seek to understand relations of space and time 
(current environments or histories). Instead, the risk dispositif looks only to the future, to secure it 
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through interventions in the present (Aradau & van Munster 2008a). The impetus to anticipate the 
next terrorist attack is only upheld by the ignorance of stories that frame external conditions as 
important: frustration at grievous environments is recast as psychological frailty (Younis 2020). 
Subjects are considered only in terms of disparate risk factors, and so “concerns about the meaning 
or motives behind offending” are largely irrelevant (Goldson & Muncie 2006, 93: emphasis added). 
Because of the disregard for spatial and temporal considerations, the line between non-criminal and 
criminal subjectivities becomes blurred and constantly moves (Amoore & de Goede 2008), and 
everything becomes infused with both productive- and risk-potential. The dispositif of risk, 
compounded by the development of neoliberal politics in Britain, organizes reality entirely differently 
than that of the subjects it governs. This is because to comprehend their stories as legitimate and to 
give explanatory power to anything other than disturbed, Othered individuals would disrupt its very 
foundations that say danger and violence is always irrational. Qualities otherwise considered normal 
human traits (excitement, social inclusion, strong affiliation with causes) can therefore be redrawn as 
potential signifiers of terrorism risk, in spite of the testimony of those who have “been there, done 
that, got the t-shirt” (L26). The 22 ERG risk factors, and the praxis of Prevent, is focused not on 
conditions like those narrated by ex-militants, but on the internal experiences and personality profiles 
of children. Rather than a ‘sense of adventure’ or ‘transitional periods’ having no other implications 
than signs of youthfulness, factors in the ERG list become problematized through Prevent's gaze as 
being associated with national security risk. Of course, these factors are ‘seen’ through racialized, 
gendered eyes, informed by mainstream and State narratives about what constitutes threat (Wilcox 
2017; Pettinger 2020a). Prevent was founded on psychological assumptions, by psychologists, for the 
purposes of detecting which individuals should be intervened upon. It is hardly surprising, therefore, 





Negotiating Agency (Thematic Chapter 2) 
 
Introduction 
The preceding discussion about motivations demonstrated how the political environment – so 
important to ex-militants – is silenced by the preemptive paradigm. Building upon this, how does the 
commitment with which Northern Irish former combatants spoke about their engagement in violence 
compare with Prevent’s understanding of risk? This chapter traces the fault lines between former 
combatant testimony that speaks of an active and conscious involvement in violence, and the Channel 
programme’s interventions upon subjects who are articulated as passive and not demonstrating any 
commitment. This second thematic chapter takes three distinct parts: it looks firstly at the sense of 
obligation and moral duty that ex-militants articulated, assessing this testimony in light of how Prevent 
excludes the importance of commitment to violent subjectivities. The discussion then moves on to 
explore how ex-militants described consciously involving themselves in violence – even where they 
considered themselves ‘radicalized’ by ideologues and other influencing factors, or where they 
described themselves as having only reluctantly engaged. Agency and choice were always 
foregrounded. The chapter contrasts this narrative with counter-radicalization interventions upon 
vulnerable subjects, which discards the potential that violence could be associated with deliberation 
and choice. Finally, it examines how ex-militants rejected any notion of being persuaded away from 
violence – suggesting that external factors had to change in order for them to disengage. This 
testimony is juxtaposed with Prevent's preoccupation with redirecting ‘risky’ cases from redress of 
their grievance, presupposing that those constituting security risks can be coaxed out of violence. We 




Commitment, Obligation, and Intent 
The motivations described in the previous chapter, which preceded from an environmental context 
and personal experiences of injustice, oppression, and violence, were coupled with testimonies that 
detailed a strong desire to effect change. This first section looks at the emphasis ex-militants placed 
on communicating their seriousness and even some compulsion to effect this change, and contrasts 






Northern Ireland: Commitment and Obligation 
Given that methods of effecting change through legal political means were limited – many 
interviewees pointing to protests being beaten off the streets, and the police and army being 
ineffective at providing security – violence was described in many interviews as a last resort, and 
sometimes as a reluctant choice. My findings are generally substantiated by existing literature on this 
subject. Whilst fighters in Cyprus who struggled to explore changes in their identity from pre- to post-
involvement narrated their commitment “without qualification” (Heath-Kelly 2016c, 154), generally 
accounts of involvement in violence are situated within a process of gradual change. When delving 
into their histories, the movement towards self-articulating as “I as a committed militant” was 
represented in interviews with Portuguese ex-militants as the consequence of a series of negotiations 
and interrelationships with their external environments (da Silva 2019, 37-54). Social movement 
theorist Donatella della Porta frames the movement towards more-intransigent involvement as 
emerging from relations of escalation, often in the context of close networks and other localized 
factors (2013, 235-262; also see: Heath-Kelly 2013b, 119-149). What remains clear is that frames of 
commitment play a significant role in explanations for violence, as we will see. 
Many ex-militants from both sides of ‘the Troubles’ emphasized that they would have made 
essentially the same choices given the same set of circumstances, diverging only on different tactics 
they might have employed (L26,L35,L49,R23,R37). They narrated overwhelmingly that their 
experiences had such an affective impact on them that they could do nothing but engage in 
reactionary or responsive action. They spoke consistently as seeing violence as a last resort, and 
sometimes a necessary evil (L27,L44,R23,R28). R34 remarked, “I was very reluctant you know to go 
the military way. And held back a long time. But eventually there was no way out for me. It was one 
or the other. Either you take a stand or you go away.” L41 spoke about seeing no other option in order 
to quell violence against his community: 
 
We knew that the police and army weren’t being allowed to take [republicans] on [and] were 
being handcuffed… So that's why a lot of young men became frustrated, they felt the IRA were 
acting with impunity, and there was nothing being done against them to hit back. And we 
believed the way to hit back was a loyalist paramilitary group. And the one we joined was the 
UVF. 
 
One republican, a former Hooded Man (R43), remarked that he had become engaged as an active 
republican because of his experience of being picked off the streets along with a dozen other young 
boys and men, and tortured for days. During the interview he became impassioned speaking about 




I think in too many cases, certainly in my experience, there is no alternative but to engage in 
violence, because people feel that it is the only possible solution to what they see as a grievous 
wrong. 
 
Corroborating these claims – that their commitment was unqualified – is the fact that despite having 
made comments like these across the board, many interviewees are now engaged in peace activism 
and community conflict resolution projects (including this interviewee). Seeing violence in one era as 
a reasonable response – and considering it irresponsible in different circumstances – was a theme 
narrated again and again. All spoke of the sense of being forced into a corner out of which they wished 
to get. 
However, rather than solely as a “last resort”, some framed their involvement more actively 
as an obligation. Because the wrongs in society that needed correcting were so fundamental and 
profound, their stories went, it was necessary to become involved to bring about change for the good 
of society as a whole. The sense of feeling an imperative to act was narrated consistently. R25 
mentioned, 
 
To me it seemed like an obligation in a sense, for me it was if you seen something wrong within 
society you should do something about it to make it right, to rectify it. And to me the thing 
that was wrong was that we’re under British occupation. 
 
R29 spent almost a month on hunger strike whilst in prison, and described facing “stress positions, 
dogs, I ended up in hospital loads of times with dog bites.” When asked, knowing what he knew now, 
if he would have made the same choices, he replied, 
 
Would I do it again? Absolutely. Would I let my kids do it? Not a chance. I’m glad the conflict’s 
over, and we need peace, we live in different circumstances now so violence isn’t appropriate, 
but I would definitely have done it again, no question. We did it for peace, we had to. 
(emphasis added) 
 
This sense of an active obligation that drew them into involvement was spread consistently across 
both loyalists and republicans. Some went even further, claiming explicitly that the morality behind 
their actions was “right”. Noting that he thought Northern Ireland would probably be in the same 
position had violence not occurred, R48 said: 
 
But was it a waste of time as far I was concerned? No. I don’t think so. Because I don’t regret 
anything I done… Did I think it was morally right? At the time I probably did think, actually I 




Equally, R34 answered the question Did you ever have a problem with the morality or justification 
behind getting involved? by remarking, 
 
No. No. [Me: How come, why?] Well for a start, what was happening to your people, to us, to 
the nationalist people, you felt justified in joining an armed conflict against them you know. 
You just felt justified, if that meant killing British soldiers then so be it. If it meant killing RUC 
[police] men then so be it. Cos as far as I was concerned it didn’t need to happen. It didn’t 
need to happen in 1968, there was only one simple demand, one man one vote. But the 
[unionist] Orange State wouldn’t give it. 
 
Time after time, the debate was moved away from the potentially problematic use of violence, and 
placed back onto the circumstances in which they found themselves. Overwhelmingly, because 
violence was being exerted onto them, they were justified in their mobilization of violence: there was 
no moral case to answer. 
Where moral quandaries were relayed (in a few interviews), former combatants made the 
point that these dilemmas were superseded by the realization that circumstances would not change 
unless violence was deployed. L44, speaking of his upbringing that was situated in a regimented 
culture of law and order – even being a “wee bit obsessed with [it]”, with family members being police 
officers – said that seeing so much violence being exerted against his community “perhaps ameliorates 
the sense of morality that you have.” Similarly, speaking of the abhorrence he felt over his own 
involvement, L26 said, 
 
Rationally, it was the only thing to do. So there was no choice involved. The choice would’ve 
been not to be involved at all, in anything radical or violent. And yet radical and violent in that 
case was what we were facing with the IRA, and therefore that had to be faced with a loyalist 
radical and violent reaction. 
 
This was corroborated during an interview with B42, the former chief prosecuting counsel of Northern 
Ireland who prosecuted hundreds of terrorism cases during the conflict. When asked How could the 
state have stopped people joining the paramilitaries, he replied: 
 
I think you’d need to have a very very clever programme to have stopped- I can’t imagine what 
it coulda been. The problem if you’re a British minister when you’re trying to deal with 
republicans is they [republicans] woulda said, “Your soldiers have killed umpteen of us in the 
last year, what’s that about? You’re just a colonial power, we want to be treated the same 
way as our brethren in the 26 counties.” So I don’t think any programme would’ve neutralized 




Even the chief prosecutor understood the republican uprising as inevitable, given the circumstances, 
so its perhaps unsurprising that where ex-militants wrestled with moral questions, the environmental 
conditions were widely seen (and articulated by ex-militants) to produce and justify violence. 
Illustrating further a professed commitment to their respective causes, all interviewees spoke 
of being aware of the costs of involvement, and the potential hazards for them and their loved ones. 
They realized they were inciting raids on their homes, or searches of their families by the police or 
army (L26,L45,R28,R47). Moreover, interviewees would consistently remind me that they had known 
two possible outcomes of engagement: prison or death. Some mentioned that they were protected 
by a sense of youthful ‘invincibility’ and didn’t consider the risks as much as they might have (L44, 
R48), but the dominant tone was one that emphasized the potential graveness of their decisions. It 
must be noted again here that considering positionality is and remains fundamental to (this) social 
research. Interviewees speaking to a researcher – and an eager listener – telling him their life story 
and relaying their passion and commitment to their causes, is not a neutral interaction. With nearly 
all those involved in violence (and as a result all but one of my interviewees) males, I could not help 
being aware of the gendered nature of the conflict, and consequently the tone of interviews. These 
were men whose lives were defined by their involvement in the conflict, and cynically, whose jobs can 
rely upon an intrigue, a morbid fascination, and even an awe of their histories. Indeed, R33 remarked 
that I should be careful listening to possibly tall tales from prison, as these are sometimes exaggerated 
by tour guides to enhance the romanticism and nostalgia of a defining time in their lives. Performance 
is central to the construction of identity: turning Simone de Beauvoir (1949, 295) around, “One is not 
born, but rather, becomes a [man].” So as interviewees relayed to me how they were endangered, 
risk-taking beings, they became endangered, risk-taking (masculinized) beings (also see: da Silva 
2017). Through “the stylized repetition of acts through time” (Butler 1988, 520), their identity 
becomes a new phenomenon. For instance, in a double interview, I asked L40 why he engaged but 
certain others didn’t. L41 interjected, “He had balls… I’m only joking there but I think that’s part of it.” 
This was an environment dominated by the adventures of males, supported by females (who often 
carried guns as they were less likely to be searched). But, regardless of the performance of bravery in 
producing the fascinating tour guide or the memorable interviewee, the prevalence of historic 
violence is very apparent. Northern Irish citizens were imprisoned cumulatively for over 100,000 years, 
and a series of tenacious prison protests (from refusing prison garb and wearing only a blanket, to 
smearing faeces over their cells, and engaging in hunger strikes) occurred. So the testimony of former 
combatants that emphasizes their commitment is substantiated by decisions they made in the 
aftermath of involvement ,even while the masculinist performativity must be noted. 
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Moreover, they demonstrated numerous times a surprising depth of humility and acceptance 
of their own failures, indicating that their testimony was not merely a performance of 
unproblematized and unadulterated commitment. They lamented their inability to think more 
strategically during the conflict (R34); appeared profoundly sad, frustrated, even distressed, that they 
had not achieved more social and political progress within Northern Ireland (L26); and noted their 
inability to make more sacrificial decisions, like joining the hunger strike (R29). As noted earlier, R37 
began crying as we were speaking in the rain, standing outside the Museum of Free Derry. Though 
demonstrating this moment of vulnerability, he later responded to the question: Were there times 
when you doubted your commitment or decided to commit less to being an active republican, by 
saying, 
 
Never ever. Never ever. And there are times obviously when you look at your life and you get 
married and you start getting children and you wonder “can I continue?” but for me… if there 
was ever any doubts creeping in I woulda went to the city cemetery, where our volunteers are 
buried. And I woulda went to Aemon Lafferty who was the first volunteer to be killed in the 
struggle. Went to Aemon’s grave, who I knew and went to school with. I woulda stood and 
talked to him. And then I woulda moved on to… all the volunteers and spoke to them. I never 
once was able to get to the last volunteer to say “I was thinking of leaving [the IRA]” – I've 
never got to that. 
 
Prevent: Presumed Intentions and Commitment to Act 
Bearing in mind this testimony from former combatants, we can see that the list of Extreme Risk 
Guidance (ERG) ‘risk factors’ operationalizes a far lower level of commitment for somebody to be 
considered a potential terrorism risk. As can be seen in the ‘Intent Factors’ in Figure 1 (see Thematic 
Chapter 1), the categories “‘Them and Us’ thinking” and “Attitudes that justify offending” indicate that 
Prevent operates on the cognitive rather than behavioural condition of its constituents (Heath-Kelly 
2017b). The Channel programme functions, in the words of security officials, to minimize terrorism 
risk, and considering intent plays a significant role in how risk assessments are made (CM1).  
A lack of demonstrable intent played a significant role in conversations with Prevent 
practitioners. Children posting disturbing content on social media or making outrageously racist 
remarks was represented as justification for Channel intervention. Occasionally, a mentor would say 
something like, “I've been to referrals where I've been very glad that this structure exists, for 
someone… who actually has been posting and tweeting and sharing some very extreme and 
concerning stuff” (CM8). But more often, the threshold for intervention was narrated as being lower 
even than this. People who are considered ‘low-risk’ and just in need of a bit of support were described 
as typical cases. CM3 said, “With some of the cases I’ve had the person’s been quite young and he’s 
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just said a few things.” This was a sentiment roundly corroborated by other mentors. One mentor 
respected in the Prevent community remarked, 
 
So most Channel cases have been very low-level… It’s great to have the opportunity to help 
the young people, have these discussions and explore alternatives to a viewpoint which may 
not of itself be supportive of a violent organization like ISIS, but it’s built on a very narrow-
minded understanding of the scriptures (CM8). 
 
The possible intent of Channel cases to engage in violence, or their capability to act on their remarks, 
was occasionally narrated very candidly as entirely absent. CM3 told me, 
 
Really when the police interview the person, they look at capability, ideology, what’s been 
said… Sometimes we don’t think he’s got any capability at all, however [the Channel panel] 
say, “We’d still like you to meet them because you know [how] to put them on the right path.” 
 
In an even more explicit example, CM10, speaking about a young boy he was supporting through a 
Channel intervention, said, 
 
He is not trying to be a terrorist. He's being influenced by Anwar al-Alaki’s lectures [on 
YouTube], and his mind is shaping in such a way, along with he’s listening to other things, but 
other things are mostly boring and not as interesting. So he’s not set out to be a terrorist, he 
doesn’t want to harm people, but he's coming across material which is attractive because [of] 
the way it’s presented or the issues they're talking about (emphasis added). 
 
The patronising description of this boy renders his agency incapacitated; he becomes entirely passive, 
not comprehending the consequences of his actions, whereas the mentor sees through enlightened 
eyes (a point returned to later). This assumed vulnerability sits awkwardly with how the trajectory 
towards violence was narrated by ex-militants – as purposive, deliberate, intentional. We can see here 
that preemption shifts the threshold for involvement in violence downwards; every moment is a 
counter-terrorism moment. Preemptive logics do not require the demonstration of capability – only 
the possibility that capability and intent may at some point arise (Massumi 2015). In associating what 
is clearly articulated as a lack of intention to cause harm with national security concerns through 
involvement with a counter-terrorism architecture, youthful innocence and naivety no longer 
represent mere vulnerability. The dispositif of risk, a central mechanism of neoliberal governance, 
offers us an alternative vision: the vulnerable, the bearers-of-tragic-stories, the insecure, no longer 
only need to be consoled or supported for the sake of consolation or assistance. The “politics of pity” 
becomes accompanied by a “politics of risk” (Aradau 2004, 251). Through the lens of risk, vulnerability 
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occupies a dual position, exemplified through the Channel programme: young, uneducated children 
are in need of support, and they also pose a potential national security risk (Heath-Kelly 2013a). 
Similarly, in the international domain, ‘humanitarian intervention’ is inscribed with security logics 
through the assemblage of risk-management (Aradau 2004; Sabsay 2016; Chandler 2016).  
Where former combatants explained their actions as a reluctant last resort or as a moral 
imperative, Channel cases were never described as demonstrating anything like genuine intent. 
Instead they were spoken of by their mentors as not being expected to cause – even being averse to 
causing – harm. The significance of this omission, and the irrelevance of intent to interventions that 
supposedly manage terrorism-risk, is that the meaning behind involvement in (potential) violence 
disappears from the field of view. Where ex-militants could not tell their stories without recounting 
the intensity of their feelings, of why they became so driven to despair or revenge and arriving at a 
point where they considered causing harm an obligation, big-data calculative rationalities like 
contemporary ‘counter-radicalization’ regimes are ultimately disinterested in why behaviour occurs 
(Heath-Kelly 2017a). Like we saw in the previous chapter, attributes the person displays become 
detached, disconnected, separated off the person for a surgical operation, to be remade and recast, 
improved, made productive. The display of behaviours (and imagined future behaviours), rather than 
the person, becomes the functional component of social relations (Massey 2005, 10). 
It was relayed to me a number of times that interventions can be provided for the sake of the 
individuals concerned rather than as any overt security measure, and are discursively detached from 
considerations of risk. CM8 remarked that, 
 
There have been a number [of] quite young [Channel cases]. And one of those I then 
discontinued cos I felt it was completely inappropriate. And in a couple of cases – it’s literally 
six sessions spread out once every 2-3-4 weeks, over maybe a three month period – I've kept 
them going cos I felt the young person I've been working with appreciates and values this 
opportunity and it’s really an opportunity to give them some mentorship. So I thought, “ok 
well if that’s useful to you I’ll be very happy to come and see you once every few weeks and 
we can talk about XYZ or talk about how you're getting on in school or family or whatever”… 
It’s more like “great I've got a mentor for a while!” 
 
Removing any emphasis on security provision from a counter-terrorism programme dismantles the 
historic terrorism narrative that sought to delineate ‘us’ from the barbaric ‘them’ (Mgbeoji 2018): 
‘mentorship’ and therefore ultimately friendship itself (as CM3 described his role) plays a concealed 
but fundamental role in ‘risk-management’ (see: Weeks 2017). Infusing friendship with security-
consciousness is emblematic of the dispositif of risk, which takes everything as producing security 
information (Aradau & van Munster 2012). Indeed – and bearing in mind the programme has counter-
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terrorism as its official remit – various Prevent interviewees mentioned they felt more like social 
workers than anything else. Prevent is unconcerned that there appears to be minimal or sometimes 
no indication of commitment or intent to perpetrate violence. Young children without any destructive 
intent can be reconceptualized and reconstituted as a potentially terrorizing Other. This subverts 
‘terrorism convict’ testimony: the passion, the intense anger, and the moral outrage against injustice 
and oppression narrated in every interview with ex-militants is silenced from conversation. The lack 
of apparent drive to act in violent ways becomes irrelevant to the preemptive rationality. Instead, the 
matter of concern is the (imagined) possibility alone (Amoore 2013). Where children are described as 
not intentionally engaging with ‘risky’ behaviours, and consciously not wanting to produce harm, 
demonstrate how human agency is an excluded equation from the production of risk knowledge 
(Amoore & Raley 2017). 
Prevent's relative disinterest in considering intent was most apparent when Channel mentors, 
who function “at the coalface” and are most exposed to the individuals receiving Channel support, 
testified overwhelmingly that thoughts of violence are often entirely absent from their cases, and 
instead that monitoring and amending ideas is far more central to their work. Situating this finding 
were comments made by Channel mentors like, 
 
If the person refuses [an intervention] and the reasons for the referral aren’t that strong, 
they’ll just drop it and they’ll leave it because you don’t need to be devoting man hours to 
something’s which isn’t serious (CM3). 
 
CM1 told me explicitly that they occasionally consider risk as declining, before intervention even takes 
place, even declaring that in these cases violence “isn’t going to happen”, yet mentoring is still 
provided: 
 
So I might come into a certain person’s life where they’re already disengaging… So they might 
still hold views that are quite racist, you know they’re not going out and they’re not gonna 
cause harm to someone they perceive as different. So their risk of like acting violently is 
declining. But in terms of their attitudes, they might still hold strongly radical attitudes 
compared to you and I [sic] (emphasis added). 
 
Here we see that these individuals are not going to harm anybody, yet their risk is somehow still 
declining. This ‘double-think’ is explored more in the following chapter, and again, I must emphasize 
that this research does not attempt to make claims about whether Channel cases ‘might pose risk’ – 
but rather how contemporary British counter-terrorism conceptualises, constitutes and employs risk. 
This model must be contrasted with former combatant narratives, narratives which detailed external 
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conditions so serious that they could do nothing but respond. It is hard to relate these stories of ‘seeing 
no other option’ to the accounts from Channel mentors that continuously referred to any lack of 
demonstrable intent from their ‘vulnerable cases’. By rejecting and subjugating the emphasis that ex-
militants placed on their sense of aggrievement and consequent commitment to act, the risk dispositif 
excludes from its calculations any consideration of the affective impact of environmental conditions. 
Moreover, with this turn towards governing ‘lack-of-intent’ as signifying potential risk, the space for 
empathizing even with those who demonstrate no intent towards violence diminishes further. The 
seeing-everywhere of risk – in sites where the constituent presents a disinterest in enacting the risk-
identity imagined about them – produces a circular and incessant drive for ever more security (Ewald 
2002; Aradau & van Munster 2008; Heath-Kelly 2018). Intervening upon spaces that do “not want to 
harm people” creates the conditions for the future association of non-intent with risk-management, 





This second section explores the concept of ‘radicalization’, contrasting how ex-militants described a 
conscious movement towards violence (even when accepting that they were ‘influenced’ towards 
engagement), and how Prevent assumes the passivity of those on the trajectory towards terrorism. 
Contestations over agency were among the most fascinating moments during my fieldwork, and the 
discussion around radicalization was an illustrative example of how the two knowledges interrelate 
and contrast. 
 
Ex-militants as Normal, ‘Conscious(ly Radicalized)’ Everymen 
Many former combatants explained their involvement in dangerous, risky behaviour through 
narrating themselves as being drawn willingly into violence, and as ‘otherwise normal’, non-other, 
regular people caught up in exceptional circumstances. Former combatants told me they are often 
portrayed as outsiders, in line with historic discourses (Said 1987). L41 said, 
 
Some people who’ve written books about it have called us monsters, this and that. We 
weren’t anything other than ordinary people… We weren’t parachuted in! We weren’t 
dropped in here from Mars, nor were we any different than young men growing up in towns 





Contestations over language to reiterate that the environment produced violence was a particular 
feature of interviews with republicans, although loyalists also engaged in these discussions (as seen 
with L41). At the beginning of an interview, R22 even went as far as to note that, 
 
I would never acknowledge that I was involved in ‘violence’, because coming from the 
perspective I’m coming from, the whole sense of how the conflict in the North has been 
portrayed you know has been set in the context of ‘people involved in violence’, ‘men of 
violence’. 
 
I was reprimanded for deploying the terms ‘political violence’ and ‘paramilitary’ by former 
combatants, especially by republicans, who framed their involvement through the discourse of war 
and an army. They were not terrorists – they were normal, indistinct, everyday people who found 
themselves deploying exceptional force as a response to exceptional circumstances. Sometimes the 
emphasis of their normality took on a subtle tone. A number of former combatants made the point 
that they had been straight-laced, remarking in a couple of instances that they “didn’t even drink or 
smoke” (R23, also R29). As we were walking up the Falls Road, R33 mentioned to me his revulsion for 
pornography and the detriment it is to society. He continued, “I was near to being a pacifist, I didn’t 
like violence, I hated violent films and TV, I’m not a violent man, but the circumstances meant I had to 
become involved. I don’t like guns, at all.” These moments, where pornography, alcohol, and other 
‘social ills’ were positioned as antithetical to their nature, situated them around their distaste for the 
extreme and the abnormal, the possibly degenerate. In these moments, as they narrated themselves 
away from the barbaric Other who smoked and drank, they were (re-)humanizing themselves, 
establishing their violence implicitly as exceptional and in relation only to extraordinary 
circumstances, behaviour they would never otherwise have considered. 
After articulating themselves as normal and reasonable, ex-militants framed their 
involvement as a result of (pro)active decisions, even where they regarded themselves as having been 
influenced, radicalized, or drawn into engagement. Discussions around the concept of ‘being 
influenced’ were some of the most fascinating moments of my research, particularly bearing in mind 
that the logic of Prevent functions through assumption that dangerous radicalizers are responsible for 
pulling vulnerable people who ultimately can’t control themselves into becoming risky and engaging 
in criminality (CM13,Plead15). In conversation with L46, an ex-militant who had completed his 
doctoral thesis on ‘loyalist motivations for engaging in violence’, he described a series of events that 
had been particularly devastating, including the Bloody Friday republican bombs around Belfast. He 
then remarked, “It’s almost like a sorta subliminal indoctrination if I could use that term [towards 
seeing violence as a] legitimate response to violent republicanism.” The discussion moved onto the 
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concept of ‘radicalization’, and he described Protestant firebrand preacher and politician Iain Paisley’s 
influence in drawing scores of young men into engagement in the conflict: 
 
[Me: Do you think that people like Iain Paisley and others who were quite vocal-] Radicalized 
people? [Me: Yeah] Well I can see your point and yes it’s hard to argue against it, particularly 
when you look at the discourse in the rhetoric and language of him and others at the time… 
[They were] particularly influential in recruiting young people like me into paramilitarism… 
Every single one of the 14 former life sentence prisoners that I interviewed for my own 
research all named Iain Paisley as being influential to them politically growing up. And to them 
joining the paramilitary group. Every single one. 
 
Testimonies like these, of some abdication of actorness, were occasional but not frequent. However, 
they were in every instance rationalized and explained through an emphasis on the environmental 
setting within which violence had taken place. L46 had spent a significant amount of time articulating 
the circumstances he had grown up in, and the violence he experienced (as in the data from Thematic 
Chapter 1). 
This framing of some passivity and/with agency (the implications of which will be explored 
more thoroughly in the following chapter) was narrated consistently. For instance, L40 observed, “You 
had… young boys like ourselves… growing up being recruited – willingly recruited by the way, not 
forcibly.” He mentioned that for him, 
 
There was family influence, I don’t mean being pushed, but my family were already involved 
in the UVF. And when I seen what was happening in this road, when I was 16 I’d made the 
decision that I wanted to become involved in this. 
 
Similarly, L41 told me that prominent figures in Northern Irish society had provoked his involvement, 
and so I asked him if he had considered himself “fully rational”. His answer was intriguing: he 
immediately answered in the negative, but then explained that he had actively subscribed to his own 
‘radicalization’: 
 
I was quite taken, besotted, completely and utterly radicalized by Iain Paisley. I went to 
Paisley’s church with my uncle, I wasn’t going to hear the gospel… I was going hoping to hear 
him make calls for the government to take on the IRA… And I believed that every word Iain 
Paisley said was true (emphasis added). 
 
He maintained that one of the proudest moments of his life was taking the oath with the UVF, and 
spoke passionately and with satisfaction about loyalist violence having prevented Northern Ireland 
from being reunited with the Republic of Ireland. We will soon see how Prevent invariably silences 
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this testimony from ex-militants, by excluding the possibility for any active or ‘logical’ participation in 
violence (or, ultimately, any meaningful political contestation: see Thematic Chapter 4). 
Republicans often contested the term ‘radicalization’, seeing it as a term that compromised 
the notion of determined and purposeful involvement. R30, a former member of the Official IRA, 
vociferously argued that the terms ‘radicalization’ and ‘de-radicalization’ are mobilized to demonize 
those who pose a threat to the existing order. He then remarked, 
 
People go about their business, they’re just like sort of robots. And whatever comes on TV is 
right. And they would regard somebody like me as totally off-his-head, revolutionary, 
‘radicalized’, you know, and all I wanted was one-man-one-vote, fair employment, fair housing 
and all. 
 
Occasionally I felt unable to bring the term radicalization up in interviews, and I would never have 
asked many if they considered themselves ‘radicalized’. The common refrain from all interviews was 
that if the (political) environment had changed, then “the conflict mightn’t’ve ever happened; we 
could have had an entirely different history – because there would have been no need to use violent 
means” (R33). Had I deployed the framing of ‘radicalization’ in this context, they would have 
universally accepted that the circumstances around them had instigated their involvement. In 
conversations with those who were talking about family and friends being shot and killed, or having 
protests for equal votes beaten off the streets, it would have felt particularly inappropriate to ask this 
question. This inability to ask questions that are central assumptions of Prevent itself displays a 
fundamental disjuncture between the two worlds of knowledge. 
If I had asked them literally, all republicans and loyalists alike would have accepted that they 
were ‘influenced’ towards violence by their material environments, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
and by ‘radicalizing others’ (like politicians of the day, especially for loyalists). The idea of being 
influenced, however, was always qualified by deployments of active language to help them explain 
their involvement. Regardless of how much regret they carried, regardless of how frustrated they were 
at being discriminated against in society, and regardless of how dismayed they were with the Good 
Friday Agreement settlement, these stories were the same. Heath-Kelly writes that the conditions of 
victory or defeat can contribute to the telling of different stories by ex-militants (2015). My sample 
was limited in the sense that former combatants from ‘the Troubles’ who might be ashamed of their 
violence tend to avoid talking about it, and it is difficult to interview these people as a result (L31). 
Maybe my research is made up of (self-identifying) victors, and their stories are shaped accordingly 
(Sermijn, Devlieger, & Loots 2008; Allen 2017). I might not have interviewed the thousands of ex-
militants who saw themselves as ‘radicalized’ and who wished they had been spoken out of violence 
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preemptively. However, I spoke to several ex-militants who were religious converts (including L26 and 
L41) and who saw a distinction between their youthful, violent selves and their forgiven, adult 
identities, and every ex-militant who commented spoke of regret that violence had taken place (the 
complication of singular subjectivities is explored in the following chapter).  
Despite the complexity and nuance of ex-militant testimonies and their deployment of agency, 
the claims made by Prevent about terrorist violence stand in contrast; they are universalized, and 
resolutely leave no room for agency, as we will now see. 
 
Prevent’s Assumptions of Risk-Infused Vulnerability 
Where ex-militants spoke of external influencing factors and some passivity accompanied by 
conscious involvement in violence, Prevent constructs an absolute disconnection between meaningful 
intent and ‘terroristic subjectivities’ by mobilizing discourses of vulnerability. There can be no 
considered or deliberate act of harm: genuine commitment is necessarily absent from cases that might 
pose risk (as we saw earlier), precisely because those who might perpetrate violence are inherently 
vulnerable, misguided, and solely in need of pastoral guidance (Elshimi 2015; Lindekilde 2015). 
The assumption of the vulnerability of Channel cases was consistently relayed to me during 
interviews with Prevent practitioners. My second interview was with the director of a company that 
produces theatre productions to disseminate Prevent messaging for young people (PCC2). At one 
point during our conversation in his living room, he mentioned that children are vulnerable by 
definition: “The more we looked into [researching for productions], the more we don’t specifically 
target vulnerable young people, I think it’s that young people are vulnerable.” This was a sentiment 
carried over into all of my interviews. Sir David Omand made the point to me that young people and 
children are impressionable, and therefore more amenable to intervention. Yet although children are 
particularly vulnerable through the eyes of neoliberal risk-thinking, prominent Prevent practitioner 
William Baldet argues that everybody is ultimately vulnerable, a site of possible risk (2018). 
Assumptions of vulnerability (and consequent risk) that Prevent makes about its subjects carry 
through into Channel interventions; the emphasis on pastoral care and support was narrated 
consistently by mentors. CM10, continuing to speak about the boy he had described as “not trying to 
be a terrorist”, said, 
 
So that boy now needs Prevent support, and he’s given that support, and he’s talking to me 
and he understands “oh OK”, so ideas need refining, and there are other sources to turn to. 
But I’m not going hard on him and saying, “Ah! How can you listen to a terrorist?!” you know. 




Time and time again feminized articulations of vulnerability were mobilized to justify the protection 
of society through Prevent (Gray & Franck 2019). This often gendered, supposedly nurturing 
mechanism described by CM10 was consistent with the testimony of other mentors. Regardless of the 
boy’s lack of intent that we saw earlier, he has been visibilized as presenting ERG risk factors (as a site 
of risk on a racialized basis; see: Kundnani 2009; Wilcox 2017; Pettinger 2020a,b; Younis & Jadhav 
2020). Being a child means that he is vulnerable and impressionable. Riskiness, the ability to pose a 
danger to the status quo, necessarily emanates from a place of irrationality. The assemblage of risk 
preemption cannot accept that those that might pose a danger could be credible actors, because 
danger is antithetical to its logic. The imposition of risky subjectivities onto ‘the vulnerable’ suppresses 
the possibility that the potentially-violent may possess agency; after all, they are fundamentally 
illogical and irrational (Chandler 2016). Ex-militant testimony however disturbs these claims made by 
preemptive governance: their stories revolved around their involvement in violence emerging from a 
place of conscious choice as well as being influenced by external circumstances. 
Various interviewees said that Prevent could be ‘spoken of’ as a safeguarding technology 
(Plead15,PC5,CM11), a framing that has emerged as Prevent has transformed through time (Heath-
Kelly & Strausz 2018). The apparent makeover of Prevent, where its prized jewel Channel now 
operates “to safeguard those at risk of being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government 2015, 2, 
emphasis added), has been driven politically. CM11, who had held significant regional responsibility 
for Prevent in a previous post, told me that officials had realized (especially Muslim) communities 
were resistant to the implementation of Prevent in their area. He continued, “So we said ‘OK we'll get 
rid of the term Prevent… in the community and talk about “how do we safeguard these people?”’ It’s 
amazing how people change.”  When asked how successful he thought Prevent might have been 
during the latest Northern Irish conflict, PC6 both justified the methodology of this thesis (looking at 
ex-militants from the Troubles against Prevent’s assumptions) and deployed safeguarding logics to 
explain why violence occurs (demonstrating the ignorance of risk-thinking to ex-militant testimony): 
 
I think they had such a focus on the military aspect of the war if you like, that prevention at 
an early stage- I think safeguarding has become more of a thing than it was back then. If you 
think of all forms of abuse – sexual, anything else – we're a lot better at dealing with it now 
than we were in the 70s and 80s. So I guess there’s natural learning as far as that’s concerned.” 
 
Framing the political environment within former combatants detailed as “abuse” that requires 
“safeguarding” de-spatializes and de-temporalizes the structures and systemic oppression they spoke 
of, bringing everything back to the specific time and place within which the abuse occurs: it is 
perpetrated by individuals rather than a result of environments, and should be dealt with on a case-
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by-case basis. Had I suggested to ex-militants that their involvement was a result of ‘abuse’ and a 
problem solvable through safeguarding them, I imagine they might have laughed or been offended, 
but certainly they would have left me in no doubt they felt it ridiculous. CM11 situated Channel as 
inseparable from its pastoral functionality, saying that “for every Channel referral [that] is made, a 
safeguarding referral is now [also] made.” In this account there is no space for structural 
considerations, or awareness that patterns of behaviour might have been produced by something 
other than the individual, that a broader political environment could have contributed to the incidence 
of violence. Whilst this thesis does not make structuralist claims as to the causes of violence, the 
circularity of Prevent’s narrative is disrupted by listening to stories from ex-militants, who spoke of an 
active engagement with their surroundings, of their own response to their environments. Prevent, 
conversely, through its practitioners’ testimony and its own practice, circumscribes the problem at the 
space of the individual, and at the specific moment of abuse that occurs against the individual. It seeks 
to intervene in order (largely) to protect them, rather than assume the individual might want to effect 
change, or respond to that abuse (Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier 2019) – a point explored more 
in the final chapter. Elshimi (2017, 169) writes that these rationalities of intervention on ‘vulnerable’ 
people suppresses the ability of individuals “to freely and rationally negotiate and contextualise their 
wider political, social and religious terrain.” This conception of the universality of potential 
vulnerability, and the consequent “rob[bing of] the subject of its belief in the possibility for autonomy, 
[is central] neoliberal thinking and practice” (Reid 2016b, 71). So as Prevent and the preemptive 
rationality are embedded ever-more into communities, as risk-consciousness becomes rhizomatic and 
embedded in contemporary societies, the space for political contestation shrinks. 
These framings of vulnerability were especially patent when officials noted that Prevent 
focuses on protecting the individual from themselves, often deploying mental health concerns as the 
justification for intervention. CM10 framed his typical case, and his role, in the following way: 
 
Maybe you have an emotional problem, maybe you have mild Asperger’s or something. Some 
mental health problem… For me it’s a very caring way to safeguard a person from succumbing 
to his vulnerability, or her vulnerability. And stopping that person from becoming groomed or 
recruited. 
 
Another mentor (CM1), after revealing that “45-50% of my cases have got ASD [Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder]”, also told me that, 
 
There’s always an element of wanting to prevent risk of harm, and what I do is to try and be 
part of that safeguarding process. So safeguarding that person from harm, and safeguarding 
them from further risk of putting themselves in jeopardy. So them and others. So my 
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responsibility is to safeguard that individual as well as others that might become at risk from 
their behaviour. 
 
The ‘politics of pity’ is consistently emphasized over the ‘politics of risk’ by Prevent officials (although 
the constant re-visibilization of risk-potential is central: see Thematic Chapter 3). Shown by the 
discursive positioning of ‘risky behaviour’ being passively “succumbed” to (as in the quote from CM10 
above), and mentors emphasizing the prevalence of mental health conditions as central to their work 
(CM1,CM10,CM11), this rationality sits at odds with the testimony of former combatants: their 
narratives told of impassioned and moral conviction being central to their involvement. Indeed, many 
spoke about how those who were not fully committed would compromise operations, and were an 
unwanted liability. In comparison with the testimony provided by former combatants from Northern 
Ireland, the assumption of vulnerability and the imposition of identities devoid of agency was central 
to discussions of Prevent interventions. The subjugation of agential responses to environments 
through the deployment of vulnerability and safeguarding discourses means that it becomes logical 
to simply direct people away from engagement in violence, a point which will now be explored. 
 
 
Being Persuaded from Violence 
It is clear how central frames of commitment were to ex-militants’ accounts of their involvement. We 
have seen throughout the thesis so far, and will see below, how Prevent functions through the premise 
that potentially-risky individuals can be coaxed from engaging or ‘moving down the path’ towards 
criminality. I put this central assumption of Prevent to ex-militants: how did they describe the 
possibility of being ‘preempted’ or coaxed from engagement in the first place? Did they frame their 
commitment as stronger than the possibility of being persuaded away from violence? 
 
Ex-militants on ‘Preemptive De-radicalization’ 
All former combatants baulked at the idea that somebody could hypothetically have spoken or 
directed them away from involvement prior to their engagement. In every instance the answer to my 
question was, other things being equal, the most emphatic “no”. Towards the mid-point of my 
fieldwork in Northern Ireland, I recognized that I knew how the interaction would go when I made this 
query. I would ask, “Do you think you could have been talked out of engagement, by anybody?” and 
they would emphatically respond, “No.” I would wait a couple of seconds for them to elaborate (they 
rarely did), repeated back to them, “No?” and they would then reiterate, “No” and only then 
elaborate. After this by-now-expected exchange with one interviewee (L40) towards the end of my 
fieldwork, he continued: “Definitely not in those days. I wouldn’t listen to anybody.” Even before you 
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joined? “Again you’re back into dealing with a 15-16 year old. The decision was made.” L35 replied in 
a similar vein, “My mind was made up. My mind was made up when I was 13. I didn’t know what I was 
and do, but I knew I was gonna do something.” 
Considering social relations as exchanges of force was a theme that extended from discussion 
around the structural or environmental violence that former combatants were exposed to. Answering 
the question “Before the circumstances changed and you felt that violence was no longer necessary, 
do you think you could have been talked out of violence?”, R28 replied, 
 
No. No. I understood that I could not be intimidated, they couldn’t intimidate me, they 
couldn’t scare me, that if they wanted to stop me, they would have to kill me. But there was 
no other way. Nothing they could say to me was going to change my view that we would have 
to get the British to negotiate at the table.  
 
In a response that touched on similar themes L26 spoke at length about his view of reproducing 
violence. After a discussion where he established himself as coming from a troubled home, and as 
having been bullied constantly by peers and beaten by teachers, he spoke about how violence could 
have been prevented through a political solution. I asked him, Do you think that in that place of… 
wanting a political solution, do you think that a family member or a friend or someone you respected 
in the community, do you think they could have talked you out of that journey towards violence? He 
replied, 
 
Me personally, no, it wouldn’t have happened, cos by that stage I believe I was too far 
ingrained in the culture of might is right, and the weak go to the wall… The IRA were bullying 
our people, bombing, slaughtering, someone had to stand up and do something. Otherwise 
we could walk with our heads down as cards. There was no choice involved. You had to go in, 
you had to do it, and then you had to go and do it again, proactively, to make sure they 
understood that if you created violence, this is what’s and happen to you and your people. If 
you support those who’re creating violence you’re a legitimate target. Now people 
understood that, and suddenly things started cooling down. So you take yourself into the 
situation of being persuaded out of that as your question said. You can’t be persuaded out of 
full commitment like that, by someone that’s gonna say “come on let’s get yourself home.” 
 
The logic that violence produces rewards – which this particular former combatant had consistently 
been exposed to – was narrated as incentivizing his engagement in the conflict. Responding to 
(perceived unjustified) force with force of their own was a particularly dominant theme in interviews. 
The extract from L26’s interview was the most explicitly Hobbesian any discussion on this topic 
became, but the sentiment of deploying force outwardly to combat inbound violence – to protect 
themselves and their communities – was the implicit sentiment from all interviews on both sides. For 
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many, their framing of being unable to be drawn away from engaging in violence was situated around 
the logic that violence can produce ‘good’, committing them to enacting their own violence. 
In several cases where family members suspected or guessed that they had become involved 
in violence, these relatives had tried to dissuade them from continued involvement. L27 mentioned 
that a very good friend, who was closely involved with the founders of the UVF (and who therefore 
had significant credibility within the loyalist community), had spoken with him about L27’s 
involvement. During the conversation, this individual had tried to dissuade L27 from engaging in 
violence. I asked L27 whether this conversation had made a difference to his thought processes or 
behaviour, and he replied, “No I just laughed. I seen it as the waffle, while I respected him, I just saw 
it as the foolish waffle of an old man.” Speaking to R22, I probed whether people in his life had 
discouraged him away from involvement: 
 
Of course! [Me: Were they family of friends or both?] Both. Mostly family, but friends as well 
but mostly family. [Me: Did that have an impact on you?] No! [laughs] [Me: (Laughs) Why?] 
Well, again it comes down to what I’ve been saying to you, the more politically aware and 
conscious I become of what’s going on about me, the more I suppose become committed to 
republicanism, more committed to the notion that we need a united Ireland. And being 
engaged in struggle was the way to achieve that. 
 
Laughter indicates an incongruity of some sort within the same assemblage (Beattie 1779, 318). This 
interviewee had just spent ten minutes explaining how he had faced significant oppression from the 
state, discussing his involvement with regard to anti-colonial struggle. It was apparent to me in this 
moment that I had produced a rupture by reducing his years of frustrations and exposure to 
environmental violence to a few conversations. R38 said that his mother had pressed him not to 
continue, asking about the legitimacy of violence, but he described not being able to see past the 
context within which he was living: 
 
I can’t see what argument [would have persuaded me not to have engaged in violence]…  No, 
I couldn’t have been talked out of it, no matter who came to me. Enough people tried… The 
facts on the ground didn’t allow for benign interpretation of what the British were doing. And 
any arguments that would’ve been put forward to us, that somehow the British were benign, 
and [those arguments given as] a reason for not engaging in violence [would not have 
worked]. Cos we were always seeing these people were all around beating us, torturing and 
killing us, what the fuck were we supposed to do? Just take it from them? 
 
Many former combatants explicitly re-interpreted the question ‘could anybody have talked you out of 
engagement’ as relating to the external circumstances within which they lived. Asked the same 
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question, Do you think you could’ve been talked out of violence at any point, and if so by whom?, L26 
replied, 
 
Yes I could’ve been talked out of violence very easily, by British ministers in the British 
government, or the government of my country here… coming along and saying “right we're 
going to be proactive and we're going to take on the IRA.” 
 
Many interviewees engaged with the question this way, framing their ‘counter-radicalization’ (where 
‘radicalization’ is associated with a trajectory towards engagement in criminality) as linked inextricably 
with some material change in circumstances. L49 echoed this sentiment, responding to the same 
question with, “Well at the end of the day I supported the Good Friday Agreement, so if the ingredients 
were there to bring about peace, then surely.” 
 
Prevent: Persuading Cases Away from the Edge 
Set against the deliberate engagement with which ex-militant stories revolved around, Prevent 
establishes a subject able to be persuaded away from ‘risky’ activities. The mobilization of vulnerability 
discourses opens up space for the premise that “people who are identified as being vulnerable [can 
be stopped from] being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government 2015, 5). 
Practitioners narrated an expectation that they are able to navigate ‘vulnerable people’ out 
of the journey towards potential criminality through discussions and social support, precisely because 
of the vulnerability and openness of those receiving support from the programme. Mentors told me 
on a couple of occasions that their mentees had shown an explicit desire to be mentored: “A lot of the 
time people are like accessible and are like, ‘Look I don’t know why I feel like this, but I’m open to 
finding out and I’m open to new experiences’” (CM1). This sentiment was corroborated by a Prevent 
coordinator (PC5), who described this particular mentor as being effective because he is 
“approachable for young people.” Some mentees’ eagerness to be involved in the scheme was also 
relayed to me through their desperation upon the near-conclusion of their mentoring (CM3): “You can 
see the ones who’ve genuinely connected, they start to get anxious and say, ‘We've only got three 
sessions left, can you not extend them please?’” Rather than being enthusiastic about the prospect of 
personal mentorship, or being unsure of themselves and needing help to work out how to deal with 
problems, Northern Irish former combatants coherently produced very specific stories that they 
recollected as generating very intense feelings, which in turn they used to explain their involvement. 
Rather than expressing the desire to receive the pastoral support of Prevent (Elshimi 2015), they 
narrated themselves as willing and able to navigate their environments through what they considered 
reasonable responses (such as keeping out of the way, joining street protests, or ultimately engaging 
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in violence). PC6, a prominent Prevent official, mentioned the begrudging acceptance that some 
people showed before entering the process of receiving Channel mentorship: 
 
You have to sell it sometimes, you know, it’s not every time where people go, “Brilliant, when 
do we start?!” Do you know what I mean? More often than not, it’s, “Tsch ahh do I have to?” 
“Well I think it’and be good for you” type of thing. So you do have to sell it a wee bit, you do 
have to maybe not coerce people but I suppose sell the benefits of it… They might get 
additional support with mental health assessments and housing and things like that. 
 
The concept that people in (historic or contemporary) Northern Ireland might display an openness to 
state-provided, individual-level support without any political reforms, was so far from former 
combatant testimony that R43 labelled such a premise “nonsense” (more on this in Thematic Chapter 
4). All former combatants spoke of having family members and friends shot dead by the British army, 
seeing republican bombs terrorize their neighbourhoods (and fearing for their survival), or being 
attacked indiscriminately by loyalists (in a context of structural disenfranchisement), as producing 
their own anger and fierce sense of injustice, which in turn encouraged them to engage in violence. 
Needless to say, I did not suggest to my Northern Irish interviewees that the deliverance of social and 
mental health support might have enticed them from becoming involved. 
Obviously aware that Prevent officials are not experts on the Northern Irish conflict, I 
expected, as they operate ultimately as counter-terrorism officials, that they must have considered 
what might have been able to draw ‘vulnerable people’ like the former combatants I interviewed away 
from engagement in violence in the past. So I posed the question, Do you think Prevent would have 
worked during the Northern Irish conflict? Occasionally in their responses, officials remarked that 
Britain would have done well to approach the Northern Irish conflict through the framework of 
Prevent. They accepted that the way we approach counter-terrorism has changed significantly but 
suggested a pre-emptive, mentorship based approach would have been useful to dissuade Northern 
Irish youth from joining paramilitaries. One of these, PC6, was very familiar with the history of the 
conflict (and actually told me that he had experienced one Northern Irish Prevent case). He made the 
case that during the conflict, 
 
They probably woulda been well served to look at social and economic factors, people’s 
vulnerabilities, people’s friendship groups and grievances and all those sorts of things to try 
and not necessarily tell them “you’re wrong, you should never aspire to have a united Ireland” 
but “here’s why you shouldn’t progress it through violent means”. 
 
The notion held that former combatants were ultimately always vulnerable and could have been 
preemptively spoken out of violence. (It should be noted that many of these responses assumed a 
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racialized predisposition, focusing solely on republican, Catholic-perpetrated violence). Had PC6 
spoken to those who had engaged in violence during ‘the Troubles’, I expected that he might 
reconsider his cases, and the broader terrorism-related framing within which his work is situated, very 
differently. 
Where the two worlds of knowledge seemed especially divergent was when both sets of 
interviewees spoke about responding to grievance. Former combatant stories were held together by 
extensive descriptions of engaging with their environments, narrating frustrations and their own 
attempts to shield themselves from or confront injustices. After expressing exasperation with the 
status quo and the sense of having no other choice, they redressed the imbalance through illegal 
means. Prevent functions through limiting the space within which reactions can occur. The recasting 
of grievances as subjective and as ultimately unimportant is fundamental to how agency is understood 
and de-mobilized by the preemptive rationality. PC6 said, “Sometimes it hasn’t even been a real 
grievance, in my eyes anyway, but that doesn’t matter cos if it feels real to them you kinda have to 
deal with it.” The logic upholding this practitioner’s statement is that some grievances are real, and 
others are imagined. We will deal with the latter more in the following chapter, but for now it is worth 
exploring how the imposition of Prevent’s privileged knowledge and practice delegitimizes both of 
these. For the ‘imagined’ problems which aren’t real grievances, because those receiving Channel 
interventions have misinterpreted their grievance as objective, their ability to negotiate with their 
environments (and their very agency) is necessarily compromised. In this and, all that is needed is 
cognitive enlightenment (Rose 1991,1992). The power of discussion was consistently posited by 
practitioners as a potential solution to pacify those who might otherwise turn to violence. One 
Channel mentor (CM1) even discussed this in relation to the Northern Irish conflict – without my 
prompt: 
 
Had we drawn out people’s suspicions and fears and like senses of grievance and stuff like 
that, perhaps we'd be in a different situation. It goes for the same with issues around Irish 
Republican terrorism, and stuff like that, if people had listened to each other on both sides, 
maybe we wouldn’t have seen decades of atrocities happening, maybe we wouldn’t have seen 
children and you know elderly people getting blown up in churches and stuff like that… I use 
the IRA as an example of supporting my point of view that ultimately people need to sit down 
and discuss the issues. 
 
Remembering how Northern Irish interviewees framed their involvement as a duty, an inevitability, 
and a fight for survival, the persistence of this view amongst Prevent officials was startling. It points 
to the particularization and localization of affective issues, and to the perception that grievances are 
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only ever personal problems to be negotiated on a private, individual basis (see Thematic Chapter 4; 
also see: Giroux 2004; Roberts 2004; Mountz & Hyndman 2006; Aradau & van Munster 2012). 
In a couple of cases, a slightly more critical lens was adopted. One Channel mentor (CM3) 
answered the question whether Prevent would have worked in the following way: 
 
It depends on what the grievances were. What were the grievances of the Irish? You’ve got to 
look at the grievances of the individual. And can you address those grievances by trying to 
convince them otherwise? Or was it a political grievance? I mean if it was political then you 
have to deal with it politically. I mean they wanted independence didn’t they. So it’s not 
something you can do with Prevent. 
 
So whilst the pacification-through-private-negotiation perspective is pervasive, not all practitioners 
bought into totalized individualization. Yet even this slightly more critical account – which concedes 
that political environments may affect human behaviour – shows the prominence of vulnerability-
thinking: the quote was infused with individual grievance rather than considering structural 
oppression. Prevent assumes an explicitly psychological approach, which doesn’t – cannot – look to 
external circumstances. It examines only vulnerable individuals, who have been wrongly convinced 
that the status quo is bad enough that a response is necessary, and at the same time any structural 
considerations are necessarily not considered. A closed loop has therefore been formed around this 
methodology, enabling its self-fulfilment (Ericson 2008). If grievances are real, goes this logic, then 
Prevent cannot act. Therefore, and despite contradictions examined in the following chapter, its 
practitioners understand Channel cases’ grievances as subjective perceptions – which have been 




The dominant narrative from all former combatant testimony, with regard to how they made the 
decision to engage in violence, was that both external influences – which changed how they perceived 
their choices – and their own choices in relation to those external influences, mattered. They accepted 
some abdication of a hypothetical totalized agency, by describing extenuating circumstances as 
inciting their involvement in conflict (occasionally referring to themselves as having been 
“traumatized”; see Thematic Chapter 4). Yet these accounts were never separated from an equally-
emphatic admission – sometimes pride – of their own proactive engagement, even when they had 
regrets concerning their involvement or the peace process. We then see Prevent constructing a ‘de-
radicalizable’ subject that necessarily possesses intrinsic vulnerability, and a subject able to be enticed 
out of relative riskiness – because the very presence of riskiness is merely a result of non-agency. 
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The first two Thematic Chapters have examined how ex-militants explained their own 
positionality – their motivations and sense of agency – and how this testimony subverts the logic of 
counter-radicalization interventions. We have seen some of the consequences of the substantial 
disjuncture between these two discourses. Most particularly this is seen in the form of the suppression 
of spatial and temporal relations that preemptive governance generates (the meaning behind stories 
disappears), and the problematization of vulnerability as inherently associated with riskiness 
(rendering potentially disruptive agents as possessing no autonomy). Thematic Chapters 3 and 4 move 
away from assessing assumptions of individual profiles in relation to stories that drew ex-militants into 
violence. We move into an exploration of the premises and consequences of the two worlds of 
knowledge. Uncovering further hidden forms of knowledge and contrast between the two discourses, 
we investigate risk-thinking itself and how it silences the ability to imagine potentially conflicting 
realities. Later, in Thematic Chapter 4, we will finally see how both sets of interviewees imagine the 





How Risk-Knowledge is (un)Known (Thematic Chapter 3) 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter explored how agency was narrated by ex-militants and Prevent practitioners, 
showing that where Prevent assumed the vulnerability and irrationality of subjects who might pose 
risk, those whose risk actually materialized articulated their agency through more nuanced frames 
that allowed for them being influenced alongside conscious deliberation. In this third thematic 
chapter, I build upon the conclusion that the risky subject Prevent imagines bears little-to-no relation 
to its retrospectively most ideal constituents, by investigating how both sets of interviewees 
considered the concepts of preemption and risk. I continue in this chapter to investigate the 
relationship between silenced and hegemonic knowledge across eras of British counterterrorism, by 
utilizing the frame provided by Deleuze and Guattari (2010) in their seminal work on the dualistic 
modes of being, between nomadology and the State. If the State’s counter-radicalization assemblage 
is concerned with striation and ordering (as we will shortly see), how do ex-militants describe the 
notion of being striated and ordered? Deleuze and Guattari’s work on nomadology is useful here, to 
allow us to unpack two fundamentally different ways of knowing. Their central discussion revolves 
around the State’s concern with organizing and categorizing (crops, buildings, people) being 
antithetical to the logic of nomads, which is concerned with flowing and negotiation (through 
movement across open spaces, rather than being fixed down). 
Prevent practitioners spoke of an ability to know and manage objective spaces of risk in their 
constituents, and I was struck by how ex-militants were unconcerned with investigating or considering 
‘their own risk’. Ultimately this chapter seeks to assess how risk is a) known; b) categorized; and c) 
seen by the State (Amoore & Raley 2017), and the relationship between this ordering knowledge and 
the testimony of ex-militants. Did ex-militants consider themselves knowable, categorizable, or 
seeable? To compare these knowledges and determine where silences between discourses might 
exist, the chapter firstly looks at the preoccupation of preemptive governance to know. We find the 
endeavour to categorize and fix down contrasts sharply with the contented non-knowing (Deleuze & 
Guattari 2010) central to ex-militant interviews. It then explores the disjunctures between how 
interviewees narrated simple/ complicated, (non-)ordered subjectivities. We find that Prevent 
subjects are categorized into binary groups, in-or-out, and are described as existing along straight lines 
between fixed points (extremist/ safe). When this discourse is contrasted with the stories of those 
whom Prevent would have wished to categorize and order, we find a resistance to these binary logics: 
ex-militants articulated having multiple and conflicting motivations and subjectivities. Finally the 
chapter looks at how risks are made visible by Prevent, and how ex-militants narrated the potential 
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for (their) ‘riskiness’ to be spotted. How is seeing through the eyes of preemption navigated; are all 
spaces seen, or are only certain moments and spaces looked at? Does the gaze of the preemptor make 
sense to ex-militants, or do they reject the idea of ‘seeing risk’ entirely? 
The primary question driving this chapter is how is knowledge about risk known, between the 
two discourses? Where does knowing end, and unknowing begin? How do – and can – these disparate 
ways of being relate to each other? The following discussion helps us see how the universalizing logics 
underpinning the dispositif of risk (of suspicion and anxiety) might be subverted, through the 
subjugated experience of those about whom Prevent makes the most foundational claims. 
 
(not) Knowing ‘Risk’ 
In Nomadology: The War Machine, Deleuze and Guattari explore two disparate forms of knowledge. 
Explicating the clashing objectives and ways of being of the State and nomads, they describe how the 
State aspires towards territorializing and reterritorializing space, whereas nomads deterritorialize 
space. They write, 
 
With the legal [Statist] model, one is constantly reterritorializing around a point of view, on a 
domain, according to a set of constant relations; but with the ambulant [nomadic] model, the 
process of deterritorialization constitutes and extends the territory itself (2010, 45). 
 
These two contrasting modes of being are foundational to understanding how interviewees from my 
research articulated their (lack of) intentions with regard to ‘knowing risk’. The logic of the State is 
concerned with territorializing and reterritorializing so that categorization and ordering can take place. 
The logic of nomads, alternatively, is concerned with deterritorializing, so that movement continues. 
Throughout this chapter, we can see how the assemblage of Prevent territorializes and reterritorializes 
space, and the logic of Prevent can be considered here as ‘the State’ using the framing of Deleuze and 
Guattari, because it locates and intervenes upon certain fixed points. Equally, ex-militants 
demonstrated a disinterest in territorializing space, and can be considered demonstrating a ‘nomadic’ 
form of being in this context given their rejection of hypothetical discussions about where risk might 
have resided. Instead of territorializing space (engaging with hypothetical questions to ‘find out’) they 
demonstrate a contentment with not knowing the answers, not having to reassemble how their past 
might have been altered in order to know. This first section of the chapter explores how Prevent 
engages in war-gaming hypothetical futures, whereas former combatants appeared overwhelmingly 
disinterested in reconfiguring their stories or futures. Prevent engages consistently with 
counterfactual knowledge and reimagining states of being, but ex-militants saw their actions (outside 
of structural, political reform) in terms of inevitabilities, rarely considering whether they might have 
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made fundamentally different choices. Their disinterest in reassembling and hypothesizing – 
especially when we bear in mind their accompanying interest in moving towards meaningful peace – 
renders noticeable the anxious narrative told by Prevent about continually searching for signs of risk. 
 
Former Combatants: Content Unknowing 
Where ambiguity and a lack of knowledge around the subject’s risk profile produces anxiety for 
Prevent (explored below), former combatants generally disregarded any discussion of hypotheticals 
surrounding their histories. We earlier discussed how, whilst occasionally mentioning that they might 
have taken a different path involving merely more effective and directed violence, they 
overwhelmingly articulated their action in terms of inevitabilities. Throughout my interviews I 
consistently attempted to pose questions to them as though I was a Prevent official, trying to 
understand ‘how to improve Prevent’ or ‘how preemption could learn from their experiences’ (in 
effect, colliding the two worlds of knowledge). I asked questions like, “What would have made you not 
become involved in paramilitarism?”, and, “Why did you get involved, but your friends and family 
didn’t?” 
One loyalist interviewee (L44) struck me as the most remarkably straightforward person I had 
ever encountered, seeming the type who might have been a good detective. I attempted to tease out 
some possibly more concrete risk factors than those given in the ERG list (Figure 4). Wearing my 
Prevent practitioner hat, I asked, Looking back would you have made the same choices again as you 
did back then? He responded, 
 
That’s a very hard thing to say, because as I say I’ve forgotten the context really, I was a 
reasonably – in my opinion – rational person, I took that decision at that time and the 
likelihood is I would probably arrive at the same conclusion again [if] the same set of 
circumstances presented themselves. Obviously if they presented themselves now I’d be too 
old, I wouldn’t be fit to run away! But if I was a young man in a similar set of circumstances 
with the same mindset… it took me a long time to become involved, a relatively long time, 
you know there was violence going on for a few years before it became too much for me, and 
considering other things in relation to it. 
 
Although other responses were less couched, the sense of inevitability relayed here was typical of all 
responses. R33, who estimated that 50 friends of his had been killed during the conflict, told me on a 
tour that he couldn’t “dwell on making different choices, given the circumstances.” Another 
republican (R22) answered the question, Do you think you could have been talked out of engagement 




Well the short answer is it didn’t happen… Particularly members of my family, parents and 
that, they didn’t want me to be involved, and they tried to stop me [but that] didn’t happen. 
You know it’s as straightforward as that. 
 
They pushed back against or didn’t engage with these questions, because their imaginations were 
being stretched: their account, consistently, was that their circumstances were so extreme that their 
reactions were a natural (and desirable) consequence, and were inevitable. 
Many often refused to engage with the conversation on the basis that they couldn’t answer, 
and that the question itself was unfair. I asked R48 Would you go back… and change anything about 
your involvement? He replied, 
 
No I don’t think it’s a fair question, I don’t think you can ask a question as to what I would 
have done differently. You might think you mighta done something different, but I don’t think 
you can answer it… I think you can give reasons for what you did at the time. I think the things 
that you did do were right in your opinion, they were right at the time. 
 
Another (L40) spoke even more explicitly. To the question So what would have made yourselves not 
[become] involved in paramilitarism? he retorted, “I actually just hate talking hypothetically, [about] 
‘what if’.” I asked R34 to speculate about the future, saying, Do you think there’d ever be conditions 
that would ever justify the use of violence again? His response: 
 
A person asked me one time about the hunger strike, “If the situation arose again would you 
go on the hunger strike again?” I says, “It’s a hypothetical question, you can’t insist-” “No no 
no but I’m talking about if it did.” And so I says, “Right, I would.” “You’re a fucking lunatic!” he 
says! [laughs] But it was an impossible question, you can’t answer a question like that… The 
political situation [from back] then is never gonna come round again. 
 
Generally these conversations were centred around trying to encourage them to reformulate their 
histories, looking back to deduce whether some form of (Prevent-style) intervention might have 
produced a different result. But they resisted to ‘territorialize’ this space of knowledge on a consistent 
basis, suggesting the premise of the question was unfair. Additionally, they would complain about 
being asked hypothetical questions, and often refused to answer why they became involved but 
others didn’t, suggesting they only could speak for themselves – including L46 who had written his 
PhD on loyalist motivations. Occasionally I problematized their potential future risk-profiles (how likely 
would you engage again?). They consistently responded by redirecting the conversation back towards 
the environment and other groups (including the State) as producing conditions where violence 
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appeared logical, deterritorializing the space in which perfect information upon their riskiness might 
have come about. 
 
Prevent: Anxiety to Know, and to Fix 
In the same moment as questioning former combatants like a Prevent practitioner might have done, 
I was interested in how Prevent officials narrated their intent to know risk. Where many former 
combatants described an aversion to engaging with hypotheticals, the logic of preemption functions 
through an acquisition of information and the playing out of possibilities, to know where risk resides 
(Ericson & Haggerty 1997; Aradau & van Munster 2008; Amoore 2013; Martin 2014,2018; Heath-Kelly 
2017a). 
Navigating the unknown through hypothesizing about what has not happened is fundamental 
to Prevent, and preemptive rationalities (Massumi 2015a; McCulloch & Wilson 2016). The architect of 
Prevent, Sir David Omand, mentioned that some of Prevent's work might be evaluated, but that 
ultimately this field relies upon counter-factual knowledge. As a result of this inbuilt reliance upon 
negotiating hypothetical knowledge, discussing the ‘what ifs’ of citizens’ terrorism-propensity was 
consistently referred to by officials as standard practice. Despite this approach being comprehensively 
rejected by former combatants as a worthwhile exercise because of their lack of alternative choices 
and even discussing the morality behind their violence, Prevent practitioners adopted the rationale of 
testing and re-testing possible causes or inducements to violence. I was particularly struck by the 
entrenchment of this methodology when I observed official Prevent training. During the course, the 
video material and the host pointed to an ominous reflection: “It might be nothing – but it could be 
something” (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent training, provided by PC5). PC6 also made the 
comment that, 
 
I think that’s always one of the things in the back of my mind working in Prevent, managing 
risk… [The borderline cases that we reject] give me sleepless nights because you just never 
quite [know], it’s human nature, you can’t predict, you know! 
 
These examples illustrate effectively that the ‘promotion of security’ through Prevent requires a 
condition of inherent insecurity, never knowing, and perpetual fear, always working to stave off the 
next attack (Aradau & van Munster 2007; Heath-Kelly 2016b). Rather than concede that they would 
never ultimately know the success of their work, this state of insecurity was described as advancing 
rather than interrupting the movement towards territorializing and reterritorializing space: there was 
never a moment in all my interviews with Prevent interviewees that they considered not looking, not 
searching for the “needle in the haystack” (Aradau & Blanke 2017, 373). 
138 
 
Because risk can't be objectively perceived, it requires alertness to signals that might be 
imagined to be corroborated with incidence of violence (Massumi 2015a, 10). As a result, the potential 
signifiers of terrorism risk are banal (see Thematic Chapter 1. Also see: Pettinger 2020a,b). CM3 said 
that “people might use vocabulary which is very offensive, and very dehumanizing, so you never know 
they might move on and do other things.” The constant state of alertness – to everything that might 
be associated with risk – which this modality requires is a fundamental feature of the endeavour to 
preempt and direct the future (Massumi 2015b). Practitioners told me that they won’t be able to stop 
every attack, but they will try (Pettinger 2020b). This endeavour produces not peace and security but 
a cyclical fear and insecurity, because there is always more work to be done, more risk to unearth, 
more banal behaviours which could point to the presence of risk (Ericson 2008). In essence, it becomes 
a never-ending, self-perpetuating, and futile enterprise that reproduces only more anxiety and fear 
(Massumi 2015). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s seminal dialogue on nomadology, taken from A Thousand Plateaus, 
speaks about the inverse logics of the intent to know and the intent not to know (2010). Writing about 
how the State orders and striates, and how that which is not the State (in their writing, ‘nomads’, and 
in this context, the non-State former combatant) flows without fixed boundaries, they write, 
 
It is the difference between a smooth (vectorial, projective, or topological) space and a 
striated (metric) space: in the first case ‘space is occupied without being counted’, and in the 
second case ‘space is counted in order to be occupied’  (2010, 18). 
 
Where the purpose of the State is motivated to impose itself on the subject, to (re)order and provide 
its own meaning to and constrains upon the subject, former combatants expressed little urge to fix 
down or quantify risk. The difference in approaches to ‘knowing risk’ was especially evident when 
questioning R22 about the difference between those who did and those who didn’t engage in violence 
(asking, again, from ‘my position as a Prevent official’). He simply replied, “I never made the 
comparison.” Where the precautionary logic of Prevent displays symptoms of anxiety from a 
profoundly unsettled (and unsettling) position, testimony from Northern Irish ex-militants 
consistently demonstrated profoundly settled and un-reopenable reflections. 
Prevent’s methodology revolves around testing and re-testing hypothetical risk factors, to 
determine which possible combinations of behaviours might produce risk in which possible scenarios. 
PPolice9 spoke about some associations of ‘risk factors’ that might draw the attention of Prevent: 
 
If you’ve got a 15 year-old lad who’s saying “all Muslims should be killed” and the school’s 
reported it to you, you go and speak to the teacher and his parents. That 15 year-old kid’s 
comment could be [saying] “sorry mum I was being silly.” It goes on your records, and it’s filed, 
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it’s never looked at again or maybe reviewed at some point. Shelved and [we] go onto the 
next one. But if that child said that and had [also] been researching bomb-making online it’s a 
different kettle of fish. 
 
Prevent practitioners are concerned with knowing all possible risk-combinations, in order that those 
deemed potentially dangerous can be set before the surgical tools. We will see throughout the chapter 
that openly accepting contradictions was central to ex-militant testimony, whereas the preemptive 
modality is obsessed with comparing, reformulating, and fixing identities down into graspable and 
governable subjectivities. Prevent demands to imagine and direct the future, in order to construct the 
most productive trajectory for its constituents (Aradau & van Munster 2008). This requires knowing 
what the future could entail, and, as a result, its very modus operandi functions through deploying 
imaginative possibilities to know what these potential pathways are. 
Why are we talking about the intent to (not) know? What is being silenced, excluded from the 
contemporary counter-terrorism discourse, when considering the two ways of seeing? The 
consequences will become clearer as we move through the chapter, but for now these fundamentally 
different forms of knowing – Prevent’s anxious searching for the missing piece, former combatant 
disinterest in hypotheticals – highlight a profound disparity in how risk is understood. Prevent assumes 
a future-obsessed disregard for the past but former combatants generally looked backwards; as we 
saw when I pressed ex-militants (including those now actively working to promote peace) to speculate 
about their potential future risk, they consistently refused to engage in these conversations, 
suggesting that the question didn’t make sense. The hypothetical questions didn’t make sense 
because they framed their actions as an inevitability and even desirable given the circumstances. 
Prevent’s knowledge-acquiring, risk-reformulating obsession shuts down the space for frustrated 
reactions to be considered a natural and inevitable consequence of a persistently insecure 
environment. This is important because it constructs the world merely in terms of risk factor 
recalibrations: rather than stopping for a moment to consider alternative explanations or solutions, 
everything becomes a possible point of individual (re)learning and (re)improvement – there simply is 
no other way to see. Everything is negotiable under this paradigm and political reform becomes 
unimportant: if we just negotiate more effectively with those whose trajectories may have led to 
violence, then violence won't occur. This is a never-ending game (Heath-Kelly 2016b). If violence is 
occurring, it isn't because an environment inevitably produces this reaction, it's merely because we 
haven't hypothesized about risk-profiles well enough. The war-gaming of hypotheticals with this 
aspiration in mind leads us down the route to more safety. Such a modality sets the gaze firmly on the 
specific context and specific moment, dehistoricizing and despatializing the discussion about why 
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With such different starting points regarding the intention to know risk, how do these logics manifest 
in the speech and actions of interviewees? How does former combatants’ disinterest in exploring 
hypotheticals relate to how they explained their subjectivity? And how does Prevent practitioners' 
obsession with wargaming the possible relations of risk factors influence how they categorize others? 
We will see that former combatants are content to territorialize and deterritorialize their subjectivities 
without having to reterritorialize them (Deleuze & Guattari 2010). In other words, they were content 
with imagining some articulations of their identity, but also to sit with apparent contradictions – and 
not look for resolutions to these conflicts in the next moment. They narrated multiple simultaneous 
subjectivities, using different and clashing characteristics to explain themselves and their involvement. 
Conversely, Prevent fixates upon manoeuvring the potential futures of its constituents, ascribing 
certain risk profiles to certain people, who are directed away from the possession of multiple 
motivations and instead ushered towards singular productiveness. ‘Productivity’ here is taken as the 
ability to surpass resilience and arrive at a point of thriving in the face of a turbulent environment 
(Reid 2019). 
 
Former Combatants: Multiple Subjectivities 
Continuity was central to former combatants’ self-representation (see: Heath-Kelly 2016c; Joyce & 
Lynch 2017; da Silva 2019). They narrated their subjectivities (characters, ways of thinking, 
motivations) often as similar or even the same today as during the conflict. One question that I 
consistently asked them was When did violence change as a legitimate strategy for you? R37 provided 
a very typical response: 
 
Well it has never changed as a legitimate strategy! I believe Irish people have the right to take 
up arms against the oppressor. I do believe at the time the armed struggle began back in 1968 
and 1969 that it was the only form that was gonna bring about change. We had no democratic 
way of achieving change. 
 
Their violence was not narrated retrospectively as wrong, nor their capacity for violence problematic, 
even in times of peace. This was narrated almost unvaryingly on both sides of the conflict, including 
with those who now work as peace activists. As has been repeated throughout this thesis, ex-militants 
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framed their actions as being contingent upon the circumstances in which they found themselves 
(Cash 1998; McAuley, Tonge, & Shirlow 2009). Although they no longer engage in violence and have 
‘deterritorialized’ that space, they could openly consider reterritorializing it again (though, such space 
might always be deterritorialized in the next moment). Incidentally, Deleuze and Guattari (2010, 84) 
write that “this [constant movement] has obvious consequences: namely, this matter now can only 
be followed.” Although the philosophers refer to the ‘ideal type’ of nomadism – the perfect iteration 
of ambulance being only a hypothetical construction – it has implications for the governance of the 
potential terrorist. The State must follow those who might oppose it, always catching up with their 
movement. This is the form of knowledge we see in Prevent. We will later see how one practitioner 
describes its anxious search for risk as “an ever-changing treadmill” (PC5). One moment is defined by 
chasing down, another by slowing down and supporting, the next by chasing again. But its purpose is 
always to territorialize and reterritorialize; it does not deterritorialize space to leave it 
deterritorialized, and entirely give up the chase. 
Former combatants recurrently spoke of themselves in unproblematic terms as having both 
peaceful and violent potential, with disparate, conflicting identities. Interviewees would often 
encourage me to consider for myself their position of possessing multiple and contradictory 
subjectivities – or multiple and contradictory ways of thinking and being. They knew me only as a 
peaceful and relatively friendly researcher, who had demonstrated no signs of any desire to engage in 
intentional harm. After telling me he had no regrets about his involvement, R38 began: 
 
Where do you live? [Me: Leicester.] If France came into Leicester tomorrow morning because 
[the] British wanted Brexit, and the French and Germans didn’t and they shot 14 people in 
Leicester, before they crushed your head you’d want to shoot them! You might have 
reservations about Brexit and everything else but if they came in and shot people dead – your 
people on your streets – you’d say, ‘Fuck them, they deserve to be hit back!’ And if [people 
disagreed] you’d say, ‘Why do you not [think this way]?’ 
 
So here, and at various points during my two months of interviewing ex-militants, I was offered the 
opportunity to assume multiple subjectivities and hold potentially contradictory positions at the same 
time: a peaceful researcher, who might engage in violence. Comparing the movement and essence of 
nomads with the board game Go, Deleuze and Guattari write that the pieces 
 
make the outside a territory in space; consolidate that territory by the construction of a 
second, adjacent territory; deterritorialize the enemy by shattering his territory from within; 




Importantly – evidenced by the final hypothetical question in the interview extract just above – the 
potential to harbour more than one, linear motivation was narrated to me as a reasonable, natural, 
even desirable state. 
Occasionally former combatants would speak about their desire to engage in peaceful protest 
in order to bring about reform, and the trajectory towards violence as a negotiable continuum opened 
up by the distinct lack of peaceful alternatives. R30 remarked that boycotting Protestant shops 
 
was a very powerful tool that people [used]. It’s non-violent, and it’s totally legitimized, [they 
were] quite right to do that… And that led on to moving from survival to a place where people 
thought that they could create utopia. Where they would be free and safe to do whatever 
they wanted, and allow other people to be in a similar position. So you move from survival to 
a place where you were more proactive in terms of the violence to create a bigger change, 
but all within that – for most people certainly that I knew – all believe they were doing it for 
the greater good. 
 
Violence was described by this interviewee as existing within a fluid relationship with other, non-
violent forms of protest, and in relation to constructing a utopia for the greater good. Physical violence 
was portrayed not as an exception, but as situated alongside non-criminal forms of action; not as a 
disconnected and momentary flash but as interconnected and related intimately to ‘peaceful’ 
resistance. Similarly, the move from physical violence back to non-violence was also relayed as a 
continuum, a negotiation with their environments: many supported ceasefires at various points during 
the conflict, and most encouraged a wholesale demobilization in the 1980s and early 1990s. R37 said 
that “by 1992-93 we realized that compromise would have to be on all sides, and the peace process 
was born.” 
In one particular moment during an interview with L26, I was struck by how he articulated his 
explanation around disparate and multiple motivations. He remarked that he had explored legal 
options, like joining the police and army, and then spoke about his recourse to illegal means. His Ulster 
Freedom Fighter (UFF) activities saw him involved bomb-making, transporting weapons and 
explosives, and shooting people in the head. He then described this role in a way that took me by 
surprise, declaring that he was “having to be a counter-terrorist. And counter-terrorism was a very 
reluctant thing at all times.” Deploying gruesome violence was a security measure, one that combated 
violence in society. He continued, “You’re morally reprehensible for your own actions, and yet [your 
actions] were seen to be absolutely necessary... it was a terrible schizophrenia.” Non-linear, conflicting 





The only regrets I have is that we took life. Really, I don’t wanna be contradic- it doesn’t keep 
me awake at night but I feel a bit that all those people [are] dead, it’s a pity the British 
government didn’t bring about reform in a meaningful manner. 
 
Even though this interviewee did not want to sound contradictory, these conflicting remarks typified 
the sentiment that was narrated over and over again by ex-militants: active and necessary 
involvement in violence without regret, alongside remorse that this behaviour caused the damage 
that it did. In one moment we have the ex-militant territorializing the space of remorse, and in the 
next this space has been deterritorialized and abandoned (not that it won’t be reterritorialized again!). 
During one interview, sitting in his car in (London)Derry town centre, R48 told me that whilst in prison 
another inmate tried to stab a prison guard. R48 leapt onto his friend’s back, stopping the attack. As 
well as his friend thanking him for interrupting his moment of senselessness, the guard later came to 
him, and simply said: 
 
“I could never understand you, I can't work you out, I can't even work you out now, but thank 
you for saving my life,” and he turned on his heel and walked away, and that was it! [Me: Why 
did you stop the attack?] I think it was natural reaction. 
 
Never once did it cross my mind that these interviewees had wanted to cause as much damage as 
possible: moments like these demonstrated to me their comfort with conflicting positions, and their 
contentment with deploying and abandoning a violent-or-peaceful subjectivity from one moment to 
the next. 
The possession of multiple, potentially contradictory identities was narrated in similar ways 
when former combatants discussed how they regretted not being more directed with their violence. 
Working as a conflict-resolution peace activist, R47 said, 
 
What the IRA really needed to do was stop the armed struggle or the armed campaign within 
the 6 counties [of Northern Ireland], needed to stop completely, because all it was doing was 
just terrorizing their own people. But they needed to propagate it more and wage it in 
England, because whenever the IRA carried out bombings in England the British people and 
British press and politicians woke up to it. 
 
Various (republican) interviewees made similar remarks; that they had misunderstood British 
intentions and strategic interests, and wished they'd killed fewer working-class citizens and British 





[We ended up thinking,] “What if the Brits don’t really care about the body bags going home?” 
Well [then] we’ll try a coupla big bombs in the financial headquarters in the Canary Wharf. 
And low and behold, the Brits came back to the negotiating table. So what we learnt was it 
doesn’t matter how many upper-working-class tom-tits-Brits you kill. Didn’t matter. That’s 
just collateral damage to the British government. We had misread what was important to the 
British people. Or to the powerful. It was important to the families of those poor buggers we 
killed, but it didn’t matter a toss to [the British government], that’s our view. My view. But it 
took a long time for me to get that appreciation (R23). 
 
This interviewee, who a moment ago regretted their taking of life and “all those people [now being] 
dead”, wished that republicans had directed violence in a more effective manner. He was holding 
together both the regret that people had died and his own involvement in their killing – maybe a desire 
for other people to have died. These sorts of accounts were relayed to me consistently. 
Highlighting the possession of conflicting considerations more explicitly, on a few occasions 
even love and violence were discussed together as being intricately connected. I asked R28, known 
locally as a ‘hard man of the IRA’, whether he'd have changed anything about his involvement. 
Speaking of his pride that he had been involved, and saying that his involvement is even “how I define 
myself… [It] sort of shapes my world view”, he then made the following remarks: 
 
Could we have done anything differently? Absolutely, all sorts of things differently. Do I regret 
my involvement with the IRA? No. Do I regret all sorts of things the IRA were involved in? 
Absolutely, every day of the week. But I don’t regret having become involved with the IRA… 
Hatred doesn’t play a part in my make-up. And it’s always been about the love of an idea, and 
the love and the aspiration of a future, sort of a whole new dispensation in the future where 
we can move beyond a lot of the sort of ancient tensions and hatred, that sounds a wee bit 
cliché and stuff but it’s very real, I feel very strongly about that (emphasis added). 
 
Similar comments were made by L41, who spoke in equally passionate terms about his homeland, and 
the importance to him of appreciating his Irish and British identity. Though he didn’t use the word 
‘love’ explicitly as a motivation for his engagement, he spoke in a similarly impassioned way about 
protecting and nurturing his national identity, and that of other unionists and Protestants. He said at 
one point, “I love Irish ballads, songs by great Irish singers, ballads about Irish rivers,” and later showed 
me a 7-minute clip of him singing Irish opera. These conversations – in particular the moment from 
R28 above – occasionally reminded me of the dichotomies explored by Judith Butler in Vulnerability 
in Resistance where vulnerability is reconsidered as a means of resistance (2016). As ex-militants 
played with concepts often understood to signify weakness (like their love and vulnerability, 
appreciating ballads about Irish rivers) to explain their own struggle, I was struck by how consistently 
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their accounts cut against the simple, linear subjectivities expected by Prevent of its constituents, a 
discussion to which we now turn. 
 
Prevent: Singular, Productive Subjectivities Only 
Prevent's constituents are articulated as having mobile, varied, and (un)known motivations and 
character traits by its practitioners: "feeling aggressive towards their neighbours" (CM1), "no longer 
poses a threat to national security" (CM3), "there are concerns" (CM8). Yet, in a way never discussed 
by former combatants (including peace activists), visualized attributes which fall outside of the realm 
of productivity are located, unpicked, and recalibrated through Prevent’s operation. As Deleuze and 
Guattari (2010, 20) write, the State’s knowledge is "held by space in a local movement from one 
specified point to another [rather than] being distributed by turbulence across a smooth space." In 
other words, the potential for these multiple subjectivities being openly negotiated is restricted by 
the need for striated, ordered state-knowledge: they (are) move(d) from one location to another, 
without allowing a process of autonomous exploration (Massey 2005). The categorization and fixing 
down of behaviours into governable entities – and therefore the carriers of those behaviours – is a 
fundamental component of State-knowing (Deleuze & Guattari 2010, 33). 
Prevent navigates subjectivity by attempting to reconstitute the possession of multiple 
motivations towards being unitarily productive. Reminding ourselves that ‘productivity’ here is taken 
as the ability to transcend the survival of devastating environments and arrive at a point of prospering 
in their midst (Reid 2019). The drive towards productivization (the process of moving towards thriving 
in terrible conditions) was most patent in moments of banality, where practitioners discussed 
supporting Channel cases to better themselves: “Whether or not [Channel has] stopped them from 
committing a terrorist attack, it’s improved their life chances full stop.” Their terrorist intentionality 
aside, an intervention will make them grow more than they otherwise would. This relentless ushering 
towards generative productivity was also narrated when practitioners spoke about the possibility of 
harm as objectively outside the realm of productivity. They spoke with no consideration for any 
emancipatory potential behind other motivations: “Everybody’s got grievances [but] it’s not fine for 
us to go off and be violent” (PC6). There is no negotiation here: violence is destructive, never 
productive. 
The point being made is that certain behaviours are categorized explicitly in relation to risk-
consciousness which are necessarily, by definition, not related to safety. Order and striation is the only 
way in which Prevent can operate, see, know. The ‘carriers' of risk, citizens who demonstrate these 
risk-related behaviours, become intervention sites. They are identified so the body of that which is 
currently unproductive or which might pose a threat to (the concept of) productivity, is reconfigured 
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towards resilience, positive intent, single-minded peaceability. We are not playing Go here; this game 
is Draughts: diagonal moves only, forwards not backwards (at least, no ‘backwards’ movement is 
permitted until enlightenment occurs and you are ‘kinged’ with the revelation that risk is everywhere 
and will always need managing). 
When this process of reconfiguring is completed (see Thematic Chapter 4 on resilience-
training), subjects are moved further down the binary line away from ‘risk’ and towards ‘risk-
conscious’ or ‘safer’. They are made (in)visible as sites of potential risk-vulnerability/safety through an 
‘intersubjective’ negotiation involving the imagining of and acting against risks and vulnerability 
(Karyotis 2012, 391; Gray & Franck 2019). PC6 eloquently made exactly this point himself during the 
interview, that 
 
The partners round the [Channel panel] table I don’t think would agree to somebody exiting 
the process if they didn’t feel certain that that person was no longer at risk of any harm, or 
there's no longer any threat. 
 
Whilst the dispositif of risk assumes that risk is potentially everywhere (so nobody can be entirely 
ruled out as potentially threatening), this Channel panel discussion is merely determining the 
(in)visibilization of the always-hypothetical risk. Cases – humans – always pose a hypothetical risk; 
nobody is averse to the gaze of risk-management technologies (Heath-Kelly 2017b). This process of 
Channel panels sanctioning or concluding intervention sessions is merely concerned with the raising 
or hiding of potential risk sites. Indeed, Channel cases are revisited after 6 and 12 months of 
completion, and it can be years before data is taken out of the system even if referrals are rejected by 
Prevent (Paget 2020). The system of continued ‘overhang’ reveals that risk is always envisioned, just 
in more latent form. The negotiation, through this process of (in)visibilization, is situating Channel 
cases as either inside or outside risk-consciousness, either positioning them (along 
racialized/gendered lines) as productive-enough, or primed for more productivity-generating 
interventions. The categories between which Channel cases are moved are specific points, identifiable 
dots on a map. Rather than moving openly through smooth space (like ex-militant descriptions of their 
multiple identities), specific categories are imagined and defined between which individuals of 
concern are moved by risk-managers. This makes little sense to ex-militants, who are aware of the 
disjunctures inherent in the State’s inside/outside categories: 
 
We're trying to in the British sense de-radicalize everybody else, but when a young man joins 
the British Army, that young man is being trained to be a trained killer, in a very radical 
manner. And so it comes down to the point that there are legitimate radicals and illegitimate 
radicals, and really the only thing that comes between the two is whether or not you’re part 
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of the British State forces. And if you’re not part of the British State forces you’re a terrorist, 
you’re a bad radical… It became very very confusing. 
 
A fundamental component of the State’s science is to “isolate all operations from the conditions of 
intuition, making them true intrinsic concepts, or ‘categories’” (Deleuze & Guattari 2010, 33), which 
as L26 pointed out, can be fundamentally contradictory. Regardless, any deterritorialization, any 
letting go of certain spaces like the deprioritizing of ISIS-related concerns, is accompanied by 
reterritorialization of other concerns, like the new focus on the threat from Al Qa'eda (Heath-Kelly 
2018). The strategies of the State are constantly aimed at (re)claiming and (re)capturing spaces (De 
Landa 1992). 
The drive towards (re)constructing individuals into linearly-intentioned, productive beings, 
was often articulated through the problematization of Channel cases as having ‘potentially concerning 
futures’ which needed pruning away. One Channel mentor (CM10) commented that a boy receiving 
mentorship “doesn’t want to harm people, but he’s coming across material which is attractive”, 
revealing a particular temporal discontinuity: the original and explicit lack of intent (doesn’t want to 
harm people) is complemented by a condition – “but!” Whilst the boy’s actualized thoughts are 
harmless – in the eyes of the mentor – the potential for his derailment is still worth making visible. He 
can't watch videos on Syria because they might encourage him to think in ways we can't understand 
or negotiate with. The videos are harmless. The boy is harmless. BUT! together, they could be highly 
destructive. CM8 mentioned that Channel deals with “people who haven't broken the law yet, but 
there are concerns.” This constant oscillation, the raising/hiding between safe and risk (Younis & 
Jadhav 2020), does more than highlight the danger of multiple subjectivities: it functions specifically 
to categorize Channel cases as not-yet-productive-enough. There is still work to do! Despite 
practitioners (including PC6) rejecting the ‘conveyor belt theory’ – a theory assuming those designated 
‘extremists’ are on a trajectory towards violence unless intervened upon (McCauley & Moskalenko 
2017) – it was consistently raised (and subsequently hidden) that such individuals possessed criminal 
capability, despite the admission that they had never demonstrated criminal intent. So the potential 
for non-compliance with the making of life is narrated as problematic. Northern Irish testimony, which 
was situated through open negotiation, relative contentment with contradiction, and often an 
empathy with why somebody might turn to violence, sits in sharp contrast to the logic of preemption 
for its lack of intent to impose its will upon the object of concern (Deleuze & Guattari 2010). 
Moreover, when Prevent practitioners discussed the moving of Channel cases between 
definitive points (from unsafe to safe, from unproductive to productive), the mobilization of 
imagination was most potently visible – and it illuminated some startling discursive ruptures intrinsic 
to categorizing non-criminals alongside possible counter-terrorism concerns. Many times, 
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practitioners spoke of the national security implications of interventions, and the role of Channel in 
diverting violence. Several practitioners for instance deployed the term ‘disengaged’ to describe an 
individual’s movement from necessary inclusion to their completion of the Channel process (Pettinger 
2020a,b). PLead15 mentioned that Channel mentoring would be offered “if there is an individual who 
needs to be disengaged from terrorism or de‐radicalized so to speak.” Another well-regarded official, 
PC6, made the observation that 
 
I'd like to see more of a focus in the literature maybe centrally on disengagement. Because 
see for me, if you're not being violent, happy days. And I think that’s more realistic and 
probably easier to achieve than de-radicalizing somebody. I think it’s easier to stop somebody 
doing something violent, than it is not only to stop that but also to persuade them of the why 
they shouldn’t be doing the violent thing in the first place. 
 
This is a phenomenally intriguing extract. Here, a senior official is making the case that Channel is a 
behavioural modification programme, disinterested in changing people's minds. Indeed, he later 
confirmed, "We’re not the thought police… I would draw the distinction of violence or the threat of 
violence, or the promotion of violence" (also see: Weeks 2017, 175). However, individuals on Channel 
had never engaged with terrorist movements or demonstrated behavioural criminality, otherwise 
they would have fallen under the criminalizing Pursue stream of the UK CONTEST strategy. As this was 
only my second Prevent interview, I did not understand the disconnection this moment, and the talk 
of behavioural disengagement, would have with much of the other testimony I heard from 
practitioners. As I would later find out, Channel mentees were often discussed by mentors away from 
considerations of violence and actively not showing interest in causing harm, as we have seen. I asked 
CM8 whether the legitimacy of violence [is] something you'd talk about with your Channel cases. He 
replied, “Only if it’s relevant. One of the important things in doing Channel, because it is pre-crime 
space, you don’t want to exacerbate introduce or create a problem which wasn’t there when you 
started.” One extract from CM3 brings this total disjuncture together. He said that Channel panels are 
“prepared to sanction the case… as long as [they] think the person poses a threat." I then wondered, 
as a mentor since the national rollout of Channel in 2012, whether he had come across anyone you 
thought was actually likely to pose a risk. He replied, “Erm possibly one person, one person… One 
person I thought, ‘Well yes he looks like he’s capable of doing it’ but then again you never know.” 
The categorization of Channel cases (and anticipatory risk-governance itself) is enacted 
through the “illusion and childish prepossession” of impartial and absolute knowledge (Burckhardt 
1951, 81; also see: Haraway 1988), which situates those making risk-judgments as separate from 




The [Prevent police] officer might have come across a referral. And then they might ring [me] 
and say, “Look I’ve got this case, the individual’s said this this this this, what do you think, 
should I convene a Channel panel, should I take a look further?” And I advise them further and 
say [in some cases], “Look, it’s not what it looks like… it’s not as serious as what it looks like.” 
So what you then do is explain [to the police officer], “This is what he means” and you provide 
them reassurance. 
 
An official who has never met the individual concerned, receiving information from a third-party over 
the phone, can make determinations about terrorism propensity. Although this is a particularly candid 
example, this filtering process – the deployments of neutral knowledge to position somebody as inside 
or outside the gaze of intervention, in order to reduce anxiety – is fundamental to the preemptive 
rationality (Heath-Kelly 2017a). Another practitioner spoke of the risk-judging process as being able 
to be objectively formulated: “We don’t know what level of that risk [is] till we sit down [in a Channel 
panel] and talk about it” (PC5, emphasis added). We will see soon how significant ruptures arise 
between these claims and other accounts from Prevent practitioners who said that risk can never be 
known. But the excerpts shown here situate risk-knowers (which are those officials imposing 
knowledge upon Channel’s constituents by defining their potential for terrorism intent) as 
invulnerable. They are uniquely enlightened to prescribe risk-infused identities upon others, 
functioning, in the words of CM8, to provoke "the securitization of a kid”, and position them as 
potentially outside the realm of productivity. 
Similar moments, where practitioners spoke of making objective decisions about the risk 
profiles of Channel cases, were observed when they represented what constituted counter-
radicalization success: 
 
[After the intervention,] if the intervention provider has done his job well and correctly then 
definitely the intervention provider should be able to make an informed judgment about if 
the person no longer poses a threat… Many of my cases I’ve been able to clearly say, “Look I 
believe the person no longer poses a threat, he’s been successfully de-radicalized” so to speak 
(CM3). 
 
After a cognitive shift takes place in a Channel case – after all, they were never described to me as 
presenting any aggressive physical behaviour – they are designated as safe, no longer in need of 
oversight or redirection. (It must be noted that this was the mentor who said that he'd only come 
across “possibly one” case likely to pose a risk.) Furthermore, the propensity of officials to stratify 
objectively was expressly demonstrated in the quantification of risk-subjectivities. Prominent Prevent 




The success rate of those that take up the option of an intervention through Channel is 
somewhere in the region of 78-82% of all cases exit the process with no issues around 
extremism, radicalization, or terrorism, still there. So as a success rate it’s pretty remarkable 
(quoted in Talking Terror 2019). 
 
The circumscription of extremists as distinct from non-extremists is recurrently relayed definitive, and 
knowable through an objective gaze. Yet the boundaries drawn between these two identities, the 
categorisation of certain people into certain spaces of risk-visibility, is not a neutral but highly political 
process (Aradau & van Munster 2008; Jackson et al. 2011). As has been described by numerous works 
on Prevent, subjective judgments are central to its operativity (Coppock & McGovern 2014; Elshimi 
2017; Heath-Kelly & Strausz 2018; Martin 2018; van de Weert & Eijkman 2019; Dresser 2019; Pettinger 
2020a,b). The marking of some as safe and others as potentially unsafe is outworked through personal 
judgements about what constitutes safety and danger (Pettinger 2020a,b). These judgements are 
necessarily fluid and negotiable, various interviewees even mentioning that they don’t know whether 
a greater number of referrals is problematic or a sign of success (PLead16, PC5: also see Thornton & 
Bouhana 2019; Pettinger 2020b). Moreover, decisions made by practitioners throughout the process 
are contested by other practitioners – some deeming a case ‘safe’ and ‘concluded’ whilst others say a 
terrorism risk is still posed (Pettinger 2020a). Importantly, this way of knowing is substantially 
different from the form of knowing described by former combatants, seen earlier. I showed the list of 
ERG categories to R43, who is a peace activist in Belfast. He had been exposed to Prevent in the past, 
but spent a few moments taking in the list, remembering its contents. A minute later he scoffed, 
 
It’s fucking nonsense! Jesus Christ. I- I just laugh. Honestly, that doesn’t mean anything to me 
at all in terms of a strategy that will influence people who are outside mainstream society 
because they believe that what’s happening to them is wrong. That’s a nonsense. You’ll excuse 
me but that’s an academic saying “I know best.” 
 
Deleuze and Guattari (2010, 15) write that “the law of the State is… that of interior and exterior,” 
plainly seen in the accounts from Prevent practitioners. Prevent – and preemptive risk-governance – 
is fixated with productivization (driving cases towards thriving in the face of devastating 
circumstances, see Thematic Chapter 4), an impetus which made little sense to former combatants. 
Former combatants instead described themselves as holding multiple, contrasting identities 
simultaneously, rejecting the binary insider-outsider identifiers. Multiple and disparate inconsistent 
subjectivities make no sense to a programme which is attempting to move its constituents from 
"unsafe" to "safe", from one specific and subjectively imagined point of possible unproductivity to 
another specific point: life-generators. Ex-militants describing their movement through open space – 
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in one moment territorializing and in the next uprooting and moving on – is antithetical to the premise 
of a logic that always moves to fix, quantify, and organize. The discrepancy between the descriptions 
of varied, conflicting identities (like those described by ex-militants) and the strategies of striation that 
underlie Prevent show us that only particular forms of citizenry are appropriate. Identities which are 
recognized by fixed points and able to be moved along a straight line are privileged, where the 
potential to harbour potentially disruptive motivations is suppressed. We will explore the 
consequences of this move further in the following chapter, but for now it must be noted that the 
disjunctures between Prevent and ex-militant testimony exemplify the logics articulated by Deleuze 
and Guattari (2010), and that the space to explore and to be without conforming to State-sanctioned 
categories is restricted. The implications of this can be seen in contestations over whether protest 
groups campaigning for environmental sustainability in the face of climate disaster are “extremist” 
(Dodd & Grierson 2020). 
 
 
Hide and Seek: Making Spaces of Risk (in)Visible 
We now examine how Prevent looks for possible risk and in its attempts to order and direct (more on 
direction in the following chapter). The process of risk-visibilization is a foundational technology in the 
knowing of risk (Martin 2014,2018; Amoore & Raley 2017); how do former combatants explain their 
‘ability’ to be seen and known? I seek throughout this final section to interrogate how ex-militants and 
Prevent officials narrated their ability to (be) see(n as) risk, to (be) categorize(d) into safe/ unsafe. We 
see how former combatants disrupt the ordering intent of Prevent through constant oscillation and 
movement through non-striated (hidden) zones. Ultimately, and complementing the emphasis which 
they placed on the possession of multiple conflicting subjectivities, we find that they declared 
themselves unwilling and unable to be ordered and governed through the striating state apparatus. 
Moreover, they found the intent to ‘see risk’ facile, because ‘risk factors’ – even in a context as 
explicitly divided as Northern Ireland – are not associated with the presence of risk. 
 
Former Combatants: Invisible, Unseen 
I framed questions as though a Prevent practitioner to deduce how former combatants discussed the 
potential to be spotted: would looking out for them have been a worthwhile venture? How did they 
narrate their involvement against why people close to them didn’t get involved? Might they have been 
preemptively spotted before becoming involved in violence? With many ex-militants now enacting 
peace initiatives to prevent the same sort of violence they were culpable for, and all seeing violence 
as inappropriate or irresponsible now, I thought this would be a fruitful line of inquiry. 
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When I asked former combatants about whether they would have been able to be spotted or 
identified as ‘risk’ prior to involvement in relation to their peers, they nearly unanimously answered 
in the negative, saying that “I’d never tell anybody I was involved, so nobody knew” (L35), and that 
“it’s not something you’d be openly talking about… You’d be secretive about it” (R25). They knew that 
any vocalized intent to commit crimes (which included membership of proscribed organizations) 
would have resulted in them or their families facing significant consequences, like being monitored by 
the police or security services, their houses raided, or being pulled in for questioning. During one of 
my very first interviews, I asked R23 Did you have friends and people around you that you were talking 
to at the time you moved into the IRA and discussed that with them? He stopped, looking shocked. 
“Oh god no. Oh no!” On another occasion I asked L45 Do you think that before you got involved 
someone you respected, maybe your parents, could’ve said ‘don’t get involved’ would that have made 
a difference? He responded: 
 
I played it very ‘scheme-and’ cos I knew they woulda- my father’s [very old now] and he’s 
never forgiven me, he never will cos I was the black sheep, I brought disgrace to my family. 
[Me: If he’d have said to you then “what’re you doing, don’t get involved”-] To be honest Tom, 
he wouldn’t have really knew. So yes your house is getting searched but you’re always bluffing 
it off “oh I was just knocking about with such and such.” 
 
The message from ex-militants was consistently that they remained silent in order to protect the 
integrity and effectiveness of their operations and themselves from being ‘seen’ by the state. 
Correlating these accounts, CM13 demonstrated how the preemptive rationality of Prevent is 
mobilized through unknowing (Jackson 2012). He made the case that those who genuinely pose 
serious risk don’t publicize themselves, intentionally making themselves ‘unseeable’ (much like the 
former combatant stories): “The dangerous people are the ones who don’t have these 
[vulnerabilities], the dangerous ones are really clever ones, they never get caught by the way.” The 
essence of the nomad, as explicated in Nomadology: The War Machine, is of a constant oscillation – 
once there, then gone, territorializing, reterritorializing, and deterritorializing moment after moment. 
We must remember that the State follows nomadic ways, trying to colonize the science of nomads in 
the wake of their movement (De Landa 1992; Deleuze and Guattari 2010). Indeed, ex-militants 
described always being cautious about whom they socialized with, because people they had known 
for a long time might have been recruited by the State to pursue them (R30). 
Trying to tease out some form of control group to understand the potential variables that 
might have indicated some inclination towards involvement – thinking as a Prevent official – I queried 
ex-militants what they thought the differences in behaviour might have been between those who 
engaged and those who didn’t. However, not unlike their refusal to answer when I probed how their 
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characters might have provoked involvement (or pointing me only to ‘courage’), they could not tell 
me what behaviours to look out for because of the importance of secrecy to the effectiveness of their 
violence. Moreover, they consistently remarked that the reasons people became involved were too 
banal that it was impossible to determine what to look out for. R25 mentioned that “I found from 
talking to people that the line between taking that step and becoming involved and not becoming 
involved it was a pretty thin line”, saying that it could have been “something as simple as you know 
my father had died recently and I was looking after my mother in a home.” R43 said it could have been 
seeing “news bulletins [and] how they were presented”. When asked what differentiated those who 
involved themselves and those who didn’t, R23 replied, “Good question. I don’t know.” Not that it 
would have been desirable for former combatants who articulated involvement as a moral choice to 
contribute to a ‘risk-spotting apparatus’ – discussions around observing behaviour was an illogical 
avenue of exploration for them. 
L27 spoke more candidly about the difficulty and even inanity in attempting to ‘spot risk’: he 
said that such an approach 
 
wouldn’t work [in contemporary Northern Ireland] because everyone would need to be de-
radicalized, including the teachers who often try and radicalize the kids! There’s not enough 
people to do the de-radicalization jobs! 
 
Many interviewees pointed to their sectarian upbringing, where their elders and teachers warned 
them against fraternizing with the ‘other side’ (Catholics and Protestants): L27 said, 
 
[At] the school that I went to, the textbooks would’ve been covered in machine guns, Red 
Hands [inciteful symbolism], “Taigs” [an offensive name for Catholics], “Up the [I]RA, kill all 
papery”. That would never be seen as something to show they’ve been radicalized (emphasis 
added). 
 
Comments like these were adorned on street signs across Northern Ireland. There was a moment 
when I drove from Belfast to (London)Derry, and saw “IRA” graffitied onto a road sign. Being familiar 
with how the IRA is considered in Britain, I wondered what the equivalent ‘offence’ might be 
considered back on the mainland, and settled on “ISIS”. I was then struck that spraying “ISIS” on a wall 
in Britain might be investigated as a terror offence – at the very least would likely have sparked a 
Prevent intervention. Loyalist-related militaristic language and pictures were similarly painted on walls 
across the country (see Figures 5 & 6). The way this language is governed differently, especially given 
the account of L27, is antithetical to the rationality of Prevent. As we will see, these sorts of racist and 
violence-infused comments would be visibilized as cases of potential risk in mainland Britain. L27 
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continued, making the point that little has shifted in the political culture in Northern Ireland, explicitly 
saying that people’s perspectives hadn’t changed at all, but the reason violence has stopped is because 
the external political circumstances had (see Thematic Chapter 1). So even now in Northern Ireland, 
these sorts of sectarian and offensive utterances (‘Taigs’, ‘up the IRA’) alluding to violence or 
proscribed terrorist organisations would firstly not be out of the ordinary, secondly are even 
encouraged by teachers (several others said that politicians propagate similar narratives), and thirdly 
would never be considered as a signifier of violent potentiality. Yet, 12 miles away in another part of 
the UK, the very same type of comments are associated with incidence of potential future terrorism. 
But even still, as we have seen in previous chapters, the threshold that provokes an offer of Channel 
intervention is far lower than the racist and violence-related comments outlined by this interviewee. 
 






Figure 6: Author’s Photograph of Mural on Wall in Belfast, Nov 2017 
 
 
L27, who was extremely well-connected with the loyalist community, with high-profile 
academic researchers, and with other influential figures, introduced me to B42 – one of Northern 
Ireland’s most senior barristers – for an interview. B42 had prosecuted hundreds of terrorism cases 
during the conflict. L27 and in on the discussion, which took place in a café in central Belfast. The 
conversation turned to Prevent, which B42, as a long-serving lawyer, was “astonish[and]” by. After 
discussing the programme, L27 spoke to the stark difference existing in Northern Ireland (as one 
region of the UK), and that operating on the hyper-security-sensitive British mainland: 
 
Like in the old Frankenstein movies, if a teacher did that [made a Prevent referral] here, 
everyone would be hunting the teacher down!... What I would say people need to understand 
about Northern Ireland is what you call radicalization in England has a culture here. People 
need to understand that. When you’re sitting in the Falls Road you’re being told about the 
righteous fight to get the British out of Ireland. They won’t see that in the modern context as 
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radicalization. They will see that as part of our culture. If you’re sitting [in] the Shankill you’re 
being told about how our people armed themselves [or] smuggled guns to secure the state 
for Protestants. If you said that in England, you’d be sent to the police. That’s engrained in our 
culture here. That’s the difference. 
 
B42 concurred, making the point that “it [Prevent] would never work here” because of this culture. 
Yet this political culture is not ‘visibilized’ through a preemptive assemblage as infused with terrorism 
risk. The political construction of Prevent is so alien to one region in the UK that considering divisive 
language as potentially terrorism-related risk factors would have those that operated on this basis 
chased away like in the story of Frankenstein: in this account Prevent’s is a monstrous, ghastly, and 
terrifying logic. The categorizing logics of the State, often accepted in mainland Britain (Busher et al. 
2017), appear largely nonsensical to actors central to the conflict in Northern Ireland – on both sides, 
including B42 who represented the State as a well-known prosecutor during the conflict. Ex-militants 
in Northern Ireland articulated their violence and peaceability as an alternating, fluctuating entity, and 
their visibility equally so, in order that they outmanoeuvred the State. 
 
Prevent: Locating Risk 
Since Prevent is a preemptive assemblage concerned with harbouring the “capacities of peering into 
the future and revealing the unknowns to be tamed and governed” (Aradau & Blanke 2017, 374), I 
was equally interested in how Prevent officials narrated their expectation that they would be able to 
locate spaces of ‘potential risk’ – such as those who ultimately became involved like the Northern Irish 
ex-militants had. How do State officials on the Prevent programme describe their appropriation of 
nomadic science and their pursuit of the potentially disruptive nomad; how do they articulate 
identifying which ones to realign with the State’s categories? 
One mentor (CM13) spoke about the need for an awareness of the “critical junctures” in 
people’s lives, to see the individual’s pivotal moments so that they could be stopped before they 
perpetrate violence. An extract from this particular interview is fascinating in two respects: one 
because it shows how the practitioner retrospectively frames this missed counter-terrorism 
opportunity through astonishing banality, and two because he insists that the potential to connect 
these banal moments with the trajectory to terrorism can not just be explained retrospectively but 
seen before they occur. In this excerpt, CM13 discusses an individual he was mentoring (in a way not 
unlike the Channel programme, before Channel existed, and before he was recruited to Channel). This 
particular ‘mentee’ later went on commit terrorist attacks in London on 7/7: 
 
I always say [‘counter-radicalization’] is about connecting people in the critical junctures in 
their life. For me I realize this was a critical juncture for him – he’s met a girl he finally wanted 
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to be with, and he’s come to me as an elder and he says, “Help me help me [to get married]” 
and I didn’t realize his need to be in that relationship. I said, “No you’re too young, she’s too 
young.” So at the critical juncture he goes elsewhere, then that creates a series of further 
events- [Me: That you could never have predicted-] But we can predict it, I would say at that 
critical juncture don’t dismiss human factors. All of them have these critical experiences and 
junctures in their life where they are crying out for someone to intervene. 
 
Fulfilling somebody’s need to be in a relationship is associated with preempting terrorism, and 
according to this practitioner, this desire was a counter-terrorism moment able to be spotted before 
the attack occurs: “we can predict it”. Later the same interviewee explained that a convicted Terrorism 
Act offender he provides counselling for hadn’t been interested in women or getting married before 
he committed a terrorism offence, observing that “this isn’t normal behaviour… You can see what the 
issue is there.” What becomes ‘visibilized’ and therefore known as risk (Martin 2018) only makes sense 
in the aftermath; it is inconceivable that in the moment one man’s desire to get married, and another 
man’s lack of interest in getting married, are pivotal moments for risk-based intervention. This 
retroactive logic follows the ‘logic’ of Tony Blair’s comments about 9/11: 
 
Gradually the connection was being made. [Attacks took place in] Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria, 
Yemen, Palestine, Lebanon… the ideological link with an extreme element that professed 
belief in Islam was ever more frequently expressed. Until September 11, the splashes of colour 
on different parts of the canvas did not appear to the eye as a single picture. After it, the clarity 
was plain, vivid and defining (Blair 2010, 343). 
 
Before non-State violence materializes, before the nomad emerges, it is unseeable, untraceable, 
unknowable – after all, its essence is fluid movement through open space, always oscillating and 
ceding its territory for another space (Deleuze & Guattari 2010). But when violence erupts, it is 
apparently supremely obvious why, and we should learn for next time. Only after the event can the 
‘whole picture’ show us what to look for, and what is privileged as visible (re-)produces the future 
gaze. Yet practitioners like CM13 somehow made the case that this completed picture – the whole 
future – is seeable before its materialization. This retroactively-fitted ‘logic’ produces a rationality 
whereby “one is judged not by what one should have known but also by what one should have or 
might have suspected” (Ewald 2002, 287). Consider this testimony from CM3: 
 
Some people might use vocabulary which is very offensive, and very dehumanizing. So you 
never know they might move on and do other things, you know if they’ve started with words 




Any moments that have the potential to bring about unproductivity (or an inability to thrive despite 
their circumstances) need an intervention; the intention is to see so that order and productivity can 
arise, as we saw earlier in the chapter. No wonder the big-data framings of preemptive governance if 
moments like these are illuminated as counter-terrorism moments (Amoore & Raley 2017; Heath-
Kelly 2017a; Wilcox 2017). 
Anyone slipping through the net only produces a stronger desire to see (Aradau & van 
Munster 2005) to a hypothetical point where “we can predict it” (CM13). The claim therefore follows 
that “experience [must] grow, [alongside] better education” (CM10) so that which should be seen can 
be more easily found: as CM13 quipped, “We just have to be more vigilant.” Yet this rationality held 
no ground in the eyes of former combatants; they were universally unconcerned with finding more 
spaces of risk, rejecting the logic that (their own) risk could be spotted in any sense that is mobilized 
through Prevent. I am arguing that the constant (in)visibilization of riskiness is enacted through a lack 
of knowledge disguised as objective, knowable calculations, where frames that disregard risk-
consciousness demonstrate a calm, determined contentedness. The gaze of Prevent can be subverted 
by speaking to those whose ‘risk’ actually materialized: on the underside of the unknown we find an 
absence of freneticism, a calm sense of inevitability and response in the face of grave danger and 
violent surroundings. Ex-militants do not ‘see’ the lines and points as defined by the State – describing 
them in particular, but also every other citizen – as legitimate. Their stories exposed a rejection of 
these risk-laden narratives, prioritizing a different way of seeing and knowing. Despite its history of 
‘terrorist’ violence, despite the many dissident groups operating in contemporary Northern Ireland, 
and despite many peace walls being erected after the Good Friday Agreement (R43), the making of 
outrageously racist and offensive remarks would “never” have been seen in the context of terrorism-
related risk-thinking in that province of the UK (L27), because of the ubiquity of social and political 
divisions. 
The way in which risk is seen by Prevent made no sense to interviewees from my Northern 
Irish fieldwork. The barrister who had prosecuted hundreds of terrorism cases during the conflict (B42) 
remarked, “I think [Prevent] would be litigated to destruction here. Aside from that I don’t think any 
teacher from a north Belfast or west Belfast school would turn anybody in.” The ‘working against risk’ 
is operationalized differently in Northern Ireland (through peace outreach, explored in the following 
chapter), but more fundamentally the concept of looking for risk itself is deconstructed by Northern 
Irish testimony. This mode of risk-thinking was absent from my interviews in Northern Ireland. 
Observing the picture in Figure 7, which was taken in a loyalist museum concerning conflicts 
throughout Irish history, the discrepancy is very apparent: in a culture where dissident groups still 
operate today, weapons are set amongst children’s crayons to play with whilst they colour in. 
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Moreover, remembering how those involved in ‘the Troubles’ said that Prevent would never work in 
Northern Ireland because “everyone [including the teachers] would need to be de-radicalized” and 
that the culture was (and is) of profound and entrenched sectarianism (L21,L26,L27,L39,R20,R28,R43), 
it is apparent that Prevent’s praxis is constructed upon an obsession with seeing constructions of risk. 
Driving in Belfast between Falls Road (Catholic) and Shankill Road (Protestant) you are confronted with 
25-foot-high ‘peace’ walls and a thick metal gate that still, in 2020, shuts every evening at 7pm to 
prevent skirmishes between communities. Even in this context, comments like ‘up the IRA’ “would 
never be seen as something to show they’ve been radicalized” (L27). Yet in another part of the UK – 
mainland Britain – counter-terrorism interventions are justified for children displaying racist 
outbursts, watching videos about Syria, and with mental health difficulties, and violent conduct 
retrospectively explained because of ‘marriage/no-marriage’ dichotomies. A fundamentally different 
way of seeing risk is mobilized in one part of the UK than another: everything in mainland Britain – 
including the most human drive of romantic relations – must be seen as connected with risk 
potentiality, but in Northern Ireland – where iron gates separate communities – outrageously violent 
remarks would “never” be associated with radicalization risk concerns. 
 
Figure 7: Author’s Photograph of Loyalist Museum in Belfast, Nov 2017 
 
 
This obsession with observing risks in every possible space highlights disparities in how risk is 
‘seen’, an issue that speaks to the constructedness of risk (and again, situating it as distinct from ex-
militant testimony which abandoned risk-thinking). I asked CM10 the question How is it determined 
that someone’s potentially moved from ‘posing a risk to themselves or other people’, to ‘no longer 
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posing that kind of risk’? He replied saying that “it depends on our individual capability or judgement, 
subjective or otherwise. There’s nothing hard and fast.” This much was clear: who becomes ‘seen’ as 
risky/ not-risky was outworked through significant disjunctures and disparate conceptions of risk. 
During my interviews, for instance, one Prevent Coordinator (PC6) said that schoolchildren watching 
beheading videos should not be a matter of referral, whilst another (PC5) said children watching these 
videos “should be” referred (see Thematic Chapter 1). Internal discrepancies like these were common 
(Pettinger 2020a,b), precisely because it is necessary that ambiguity and different interpretations play 
a central part in neoliberal ‘risk-managing’ assemblages (Peck & Tickell 2002; Brenner & Theodore 
2002; Aradau & van Munster 2011; Jackson 2012). In Northern Ireland, conversely, all discussion 
pivoted around assessing the circumstances. After speculating that his “jack-the-lad” character and 
confidence might have made him more likely to engage, R48 concluded as did all other former 
combatants (more, or less, as explicitly) that “I don’t know… I think for most of it, it’s circumstances.” 
The very premise of ‘spotting of risky behaviour’ made little sense, even in the accounts of peace 
activists: when destabilizing circumstances occur, it is seen that there is little utility in examining 
behaviour, because it is inevitable (and desirable) that people will respond. The State attempts to 
define life, behaviour, intentions, through fixed points and make objects seen in relation to these 
points (Deleuze & Guattari 2010). Under this logic citizens exist somewhere on the line between the 
fixed points of ‘extremist’ and ‘non-extremist’. The point being made is that the line is the measuring 
point. All citizens can be found along this line in the gaze of Prevent. Yet this gaze is disrupted when 
we consider the testimony of those whose ‘risk’ actually materialized – their narratives don’t ‘see’ in 
relation to the line or the definitions provided by the State. Instead they articulate a constant 





The conditions of knowledge-production in each era are so different, that radically different styles of 
thought are evident. Preemptive governance is obsessed with finding the “needle in the haystack” 
(Aradau & Blanke 2017, 373), and mobilizes its gaze by striating unknown spaces into knowable, 
governable, directable entities. Ex-militants simply don’t contend with this way of seeing or knowing, 
but spoke instead of inevitabilities and desirably-disruptive responses. Thinking in terms of risk and its 
preemption doesn’t make sense to them. The styles of thought in each discourse are so profoundly 
opposed that there can be nothing but silence and disregard between them. 
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Imposing striated forms of imagination minimizes the space for citizens to exist with multiple 
conflicting motivations: pointing ‘risk cases’ towards single-minded productivity short-circuits 
alternative ways of knowing, seeing, and being. The State categorizes and ‘sees’ by territorializing 
specific points and assessing objects in relation to these points, and the lines between them. There 
are not infinite subjectivities, but only ones sanctioned by the State’s territorialization and 
reterritorialization. The disposition of nomads towards deterritorializing space, detailed through ex-
militants’ focus on hiding and not fixing down their identities, is absent from State discourse (De Landa 
1992; Deleuze & Guattari 2010). Had the State imposed a counter-extremism assemblage upon 
Northern Ireland during the conflict, its binary and moralizing gaze very well may have prevented the 
movement of various paramilitary groups towards peace – a theme unpacked further in the following 
chapter. The imposition of preemption through the State’s fixed points around ‘extremism’ and ‘non-
extremist’, as Massumi (2015a,b) explains, is significant anxiety and a closing down of the future. The 
final chapter will now analyse precisely what the future might entail for these two disparate forms of 






The Construction of Meaningful Peace / Solutions to 
Violence (Thematic Chapter 4) 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters we saw ex-militants narrate their realities through rationalities of space and 
time, whereas Prevent officials were fixated upon locating and managing (the moment of) risk. What 
is produced by these disparate logics; what solutions do they point us towards? We will see 
throughout this final chapter that the testimonies of ex-militants are situated around the frame of 
establishing meaningful peace, and its attainment as occurring through political engagement and 
negotiation with others and external environments. The aspiration of Prevent practitioners, 
conversely, revolves around minimizing flashes of violence; personal resilience is described as the 
vehicle necessary for moving towards this end. The chapter has three parts: firstly it juxtaposes the 
desire for political activism and mutuality of ex-militants, assessing this against Prevent's focus on 
reforming individuals. It then considers how these goals are achieved: political activism through 
negotiation (for ex-militants), and individual recalibration through training in resilient behaviours and 
cognition (for Prevent). The chapter concludes by examining what results from these two approaches: 
ex-militants articulate political and environmental change as desirable aspirations, whereas Prevent 
practitioners in mainland Britain focus on political and environmental continuity. We see two 
fundamentally different logics resulting in disparate conclusions about the role of political activism. 
Ex-militants emphasize the importance of political change, trust, and mutuality – ultimately in a move 
to open up space for a process of political contestation, and to open up time by imagining a different 
future. Prevent, alternatively, sets suspicion of the inherently vulnerable human as necessary in its 
establishing of the present as the ‘concluded future’. Seeing only political continuity, it offers no room 
for change and closes down space for political contestation, instead offering personal resilience as 
emancipatory in the face of constant, never-ending attacks in a world of threat and danger. We find, 
as in all other places across the thesis, that the preemptive logic only makes sense when ignoring the 
stories of those subjects it makes claims about. 
 
 
Political and Individual Solutions 
As we saw in the previous chapter, former combatants narrated a continuum between their violence 
during the conflict and their (ongoing) political activism. They described fostering political engagement 
as desirable, speaking of the potential for peace in relation to a material change in their environments. 
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Prevent, conversely, seeks to manage violence (rather than achieve ‘peace’ through engagement with 
others in society) by problematizing the individual, seeing their localized ‘risk factors’ as the point of 
recalibration. During the first section of this chapter we will see how this disconnect manifests in both 
interviewees’ testimonies, showing that the preemptive rationality hides activism as a desirable mode 
of social existence, whereas ex-militants see it as the only pathway to meaningful peace. 
 
Northern Ireland: Political Solutions 
The potential legitimacy of violence took a prominent role in discussions when interviewees spoke 
about outreach with young people. All interviewees supported non-violent approaches to rebuilding 
society in contemporary Northern Ireland. As L26 said, even the “many of us [who] still don’t… want 
anything to do with [the] Good Friday Agreement” often work for peace initiatives. Mentioning his 
involvement in youth work, R24 (Youth Outreach Director for a prominent ex-prisoner organization) 
said that armed resistance from previous eras should be celebrated, but emphasized that non-violent 
political reform should now take precedence because the circumstances had changed. Remembering 
that “1916” refers to the Easter Rising, the armed rebellion against British rule on the island of Ireland, 
he said, 
 
[We would tell them] let’s celebrate 1916, let’s celebrate whatever happened in the past, but 
[now] let’s sit down and map out a new island of Ireland… so that everybody benefits from 
the economic system, social system, judiciary, whatever else it might be. That's what we’re all 
about, that’s what we're trying to get people to understand and do, that's why we do 
interviews with people like you, we go into schools and talk to young people, give people the 
opportunity to be part of a living history [like I was]… We changed the nature of the state that 
we had here… We broke that, we destroyed that, [and whilst] I'm sorry that people died… I'm 
[still] proud of [my part] and I have no ifs or buts looking back on that (R24). 
 
L45 remarked that he instructs his own children in this way: “[I] say to my kids, [violence] would be a 
very very last resort” if they were being discriminated against, and would tell them that his own 
violence during the conflict “had to be done.” Many interviewees – including peace activists – relayed 
the sentiment that whilst “it’d be easy for me to sit here and say ‘violence is wrong’” (L27), at the end 
of the day if their security was under threat or they faced intractable political exclusion, then violence 
may again be necessary. This stance was fundamental to how former combatants saw bringing peace 
to their society: material, environmental changes needed to occur, and in their absence, violence may 
be legitimate if no other option was available. 
Encouraging people to become “part of a living history”, as we saw in the extract from R24, 
and opening up space for radical political engagement was a common theme of how many other ex-
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militants framed desirable citizenry – within the bounds of both violent and non-violent political 
contestation. Their relative disinterest in persuading people of the absolute rights and wrongs of 
violence occurs because, as we saw earlier, the desired end-state that former combatants articulated 
as leading to a peaceable society is not individual enlightenment and a mere absence of conflict, but 
practicable political reform. As we have seen, loyalists focused in interviews on the importance of 
ensuring safety, security, and nationhood, and republicans on more equitable economic and political 
relations. They narrated that changes to their physical security, political exclusion, or the “economic 
system, social system, judiciary, whatever else it might be” as fundamental to putting violence away. 
Political contestation is widely regarded as having brought the conflict to a close (Ellison & Martin 
2000), with the Good Friday Agreement a particularly transparent culmination of these contestations 
(Bigo & Guittet 2011). As we move through the chapter it will become clear that political manoeuvrings 
are deprioritized by Prevent, even to a point of making no sense in the face of its individualizing 
impetus. 
Where political agreement and conciliation was framed as conducive to a lack of violence, a 
failure of politics was articulated as equally conducive to seeing violence as necessary. Ex-militants 
repeated over and over again that where space for being heard or making difference in the face of 
injustice was closed down to a point of feeling powerless and seeing no other solution, that violence 
became appropriate: 
 
Bloody Sunday should have strengthened the civil rights movement [but the leadership left, 
and it] collapsed… Then people like me were high and dry, with no vehicle to protest, 
whatsoever… If you wanted to keep going on to do something, you had to go the military way 
(R34). 
 
This sentiment was narrated by many other republicans, because at that moment in time, “when I was 
growing up, I had no right to a vote” (R37) and protests on both sides were beaten off the streets by 
the state. L26 spoke similarly of seeing no other choice given the political circumstances: “we had to 
take up [arms because] the British army was failing to deal with the situation.” Long-serving peace 
activist from Belfast, R43, said about dissident groups that 
 
If politics fails, then there’s absolutely no doubt that some of them would go back to violence. 
This isn’t “oh we’ve all given up, group hug, and we’ll get on with things in a political sense”, 
it’s only because they think that they can achieve their aims through politics. And it’s what I 
said previously, and rightly so, violence is a last option, it shouldn’t be a first option. But the 




We have discussed ex-militants’ focus on external politics and environmental frustrations at length in 
previous chapters. But here, it is incumbent to mention this focus again in relation to how they framed 
violence as no longer needed (or, in Prevent-speak, as ‘managed’), because of how it sits in comparison 
to Prevent officials’ comments on the role of politics. As we will soon see when we examine Prevent 
– and discourses of the War on Terror (Bigo & Guittet) – the need for political engagement vanishes. 
At least, in Prevent's implementation, politics plays no important role. Occasionally practitioners lifted 
the veil to reveal a disparate view – one that mirrors the perspectives shared by former combatants. 
Senior Prevent figure Will Baldet made the point (corroborated by PLead16) on a podcast that: 
 
If activism fails to achieve its aims – positive activism, protest, demonstration – [then] my 
concern is that [it] can spill over into violence. If the political processes don’t seem to be 
working, if protest isn’t working but you desperately want to bring about change, what 
recourse are you left with? That's my great concern. I do think a fractured society is making 
the [radicalization] problem worse (DryCleanerCast 2018). 
 
This account was not unfamiliar territory to the dozens of testimonies I heard from ex-militants, nor 
indeed from other government officials and policy-makers thinking about ‘radicalization’ from a 
contemporary perspective, including the Communities and Local Government Committee (2010, 4) 
who suggested that the Government has been preoccupied “with the theological basis of 
radicalization, when the evidence seems to indicate that politics, policy, and socio-economics may be 
more important factors in the process.” These views fit with the established field of literature which 
links policy with violence (Kalyvas 2001; Collier 2007; Balcells 2010), and with ex-militant testimony, 
which consistently brought the rationale for engagement back to the distinct lack of other options and 
wanting to change society when protest wasn't working, allowing violence to be seen as momentarily 
legitimate, even desirable and necessary. 
 
Prevent: Individual Solutions 
Former combatants' imaginaries of ‘putting violence away’ revolved around political reform and 
emancipation, and the reconstitution of external materialities in order that meaningful peace could 
be established. However, as we will now see, Prevent largely disregards considerations of these 
factors, instead focusing on the individual as the relevant unit of concern. Prevent assumes a 
subjugated, restricted, and suppressed individual unable to resist the structures of society or the 
environments within which they live, and frames ‘peace’ in terms of their economic and social stability, 
alongside personal enlightenment (for a broader discussion on this issue see: McFee 2016). The 
preemptive rationality consistently folds everything back onto the individual, and onto the person's 
individual vulnerabilities, imperfections, and inadequacies (Chandler 2016, 142). As a fundamentally 
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psychologically-informed technology, it cannot look at structural factors or look outside of the 
individual risk factors at all. Its purpose is to recalibrate individuals, to improve their standing in 
relation to their environments – a theme returned to throughout this chapter. 
Whenever questions were posed to practitioners regarding the importance of (foreign or 
domestic) government policy on the incidence of risk, conversations were always drawn back to 
thinking about how an individual could be remade without reference to those external realities. A 
typical response would follow this quote from PC6: “Everybody’s got grievances, everybody’s got 
vulnerabilities, everybody’s got issues, that’s fine, we should all deal with them in an appropriate way. 
It’s not fine for us to go off and be violent.” Aside from this practitioner’s apparent concern with 
violence being contradicted by Channel mentors explaining that their cases seldomly think about 
violence (Pettinger 2020a), the account from PC6 excludes any externalities from the equation. 
Everybody’s grievances, their own vulnerabilities and issues, rather than broader environments are 
situated as the problem – an act of responsibilization which implicitly curtails the space for political 
contestation (Rose 1992). I asked another senior official (PLead15) the question of whether foreign 
policy contributes to ‘radicalization’ – and he explicated this topic through an example: 
 
If we’re saying ‘is foreign policy an issue which is discussed by people and causes resentment 
and anger from a lot of people?’, then yes. But the idea that just because [7/7 bomber] 
Mohammed Siddique Khan said, “Well I did this because you the West invaded Iraq” and that 
somehow we then say that “well he then did it because of Iraq, and if we weren’t in Iraq then 
this wouldn’t have happened” – I think it’s far too simplistic. Because he will naturally… want 
to heroize himself. So he’s not gonna say “I'm a person who's not integrated in my local 
community by the way, got huge issues with the political establishment, and I've got some 
broader issues that I'm dealing with” etc. etc. etc. He's not gonna look at it like that. So we've 
gotta look at- we've gotta break down what's actually happened in his life, and look at the 
uncomfortable reality in his life that he might not wanna shine a light on. So it’s all very well 
that he says “well I did this for Iraq” and heroize[s] himself in that way, but it doesn’t mean 
we take that at face value. 
 
No matter how much practitioners are concerned “if the political processes don’t seem to be working” 
(Baldet, in DryCleanerCast 2018), the assumption of individuals as inherently vulnerable means that 
the functionality of Prevent cannot take into account anything outside the individual in its explanation 
of the world. Chandler (2016, 124) writes that rather than vulnerable subjects being produced by 





social and economic problems [are] symptoms or consequences of poor informational choices 
by vulnerable subjects. The problematic of vulnerability thereby becomes a problem of 
subjectivization rather than an external problem of the world. 
So it becomes impossible that Mohammed Siddique Khan was motivated by government policy and 
the war in Iraq – despite his own proclamations. Within terrorism scholarship, violence has always 
been framed as a method of communication (Jenkins 2008), but as these extracts imply, the ability to 
pinpoint an issue of genuine contention outside of the individual is short-circuited. PLead15 said that 
foreign policy 
 
definitely plays a role in leading some people to believe that terrorism is an answer to their 
problem. [People say,] “We don’t need a Prevent strategy, just don’t invade other countries 
and we’ll be fine” – it’s a gross distortion of reality. 
 
I would never have suggested this to them, for fear that I would lose access and destroy any trust, but 
ex-militants would have baulked at the concept that they believed their engagement was an answer 
to their problem. Officials occasionally disrupt the claims made by Prevent, such as when former head 
of MI5 Lord Evans suggested that austerity increases the prevalence of risk (quoted in Dearden 2020). 
Yet, whilst they also make observations that no fundamental difference occurs between those who 
engaged in the Northern Irish conflict and those who commit terrorism offences in contemporary 
Britain (Charles Farr, quoted in House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2012, Q309), and whilst 
practitioners like Will Baldet make the claim that a lack of political alternatives produces violence, the 
psychological roots of Prevent's risk-thinking underpin its operation, according to these numerous 
interview extracts. We are seeing how the claims made by Prevent about how and why ‘terrorism’ 
occurs differs significantly from the accounts of those who have engaged in it – and occasionally from 
those of government officials and Prevent practitioners themselves. 
This individual-centric, psychology-informed solution makes militant and ex-militant 
testimony invisible; it creates a world without consulting its inhabitants. With this in mind, an 
exchange with PC6 is worth recounting. Our discussion saw us exploring how the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland – with which he was familiar – might have been dealt with differently. He mentioned that the 
conflict might have been resolved more effectively through the eyes of Prevent, saying, 
 
They probably woulda been well-served to look at social and economic factors, people’s 
vulnerabilities, people’s friendship groups and grievances and all those sorts of things to try 
and not necessarily tell them “you're wrong, you should never aspire to have a united Ireland” 




This practitioner foregrounded one type of (republican) violence, failing to make visible the significant 
amount of violence that was perpetrated by loyalists. Had he done so, this extract might be reframed, 
 
They probably woulda been well-served to… not necessarily tell them “you’re wrong, you 
should never aspire to have a united Ireland nor to stop republican attacks on your person or 
property” but “here’s why you shouldn’t progress it through violent means.” 
 
This rephrasing is necessary in order to more fully see the unknown, subjugated knowledge that exists 
between Prevent and former ‘terrorist’ narratives: interviewees from both sides of the conflict spoke 
in similarly vigorous terms about having no other, peaceable options. Remembering the importance 
of changing external circumstances to former combatants – and their exasperation that other routes 
had been closed down – it does not need explaining that I would never have been able to make this 
practitioner’s claim to them. Had I suggested in interviews with ex-militants that counter-terrorism 
policy should have investigated their individual vulnerabilities, or suggested their desperation at their 
political surroundings were ‘personal grievances’, not only would this have made little sense to them, 
but they would most likely have been highly offended. Equally, much of the testimony from ex-militant 
interviews would not have been repeatable to Prevent practitioners (as we have continued to see 
throughout the thesis). These moments, when I stumbled across wholly unrepeatable knowledge and 
experience, were the pressure points, where the gap between knowledges became most evident. 
Ultimately, I am making the point here that the functional assumption Prevent is grounded 
upon is that if the ‘potential terrorist’ is sufficiently examined and excavated, then the cause of the 
problem will be found within them, in spite of their environmental conditions. CM1 said that “a lot of 
the time I do come across people that have had negative experiences, and once you start unpacking 
those negative experiences, they go ‘oh shit that’s why I feel like I do!’” The awakening of Channel 
cases to the fact that they are ill-informed, irrational, or otherwise ignorant produces safety for 
society. Aside from the deafening silence of every ex-militant who was able to articulate precisely why 
they involved themselves in violence – where Prevent requires deep excavation of subconscious biases 
– moments like these showed me on a more foundational level how far the problematization of the 
person, rather than the space and time within which the person exists, is present within the 
preemptive rationality. Divesting terrorism risk of considerations of space and time (somebody’s 
environment and history) is only allowable when ex-militant testimony – which constantly refers back 
to the contexts in which they lived – is made absent. Situating terrorism potentiality as a site of non-
space and non-time allows for counter-terrorism interventions in moments unrelated to space or time 
(Massumi 2015; Aradau & van Munster 2008). Spatial relations and contexts don’t matter in this 
modality, only the potential for growth and productivity (as we saw in the previous chapter). 
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This logic enables the state to eschew any responsibility for considering – let alone rearranging 
– the structural composition of society, seeking “only to make up for the shortcomings of society, to 
compensate for the effects of poverty and reduce the effects of oppression. It aims to mitigate society, 
not reorganise it” (Donzelot 1988, 397). Valverde and Mopas (2004, 238) argue that contemporary 
risk-management should be seen within the broader neoliberal framework, and therefore as a venture 
to minimize financial implications for the state, streamlining only the methods of risk-visibilization and 
categorization to allow in turn more effective visibilization and categorization. Policy decisions 
become subsumed in how to organize and reorganize the moment in relation to itself, with social 
inequality and systemic oppression becoming hidden. Conflict resolution organizations in Northern 
Ireland bring in “academics from Queens [University Belfast], Jordanstown, wherever, outside the 
island of Ireland as well. We look at conflict resolution and other examples of conflict and how they’ve 
been resolved” (R47). Yet this traditional conflict and peace studies approach to resolving violence has 
become marginalized (Jackson 2012) by discourse that Prevent constructs and contributes to – that 
the ‘terrorism problem’ is one fundamentally fixed by putting individuals under the microscope. There 
is no admission that violence – or anything that constitutes a potential threat to the neoliberal order 
– could possibly be a product of wider social issues. Instead, everything can be explained by 
psychological dysfunction, and fixed through psychological remaking (Reid 2019). By holding 
subjugated experiences alongside this hegemonic knowledge that closes down the space for wider 
inquiry, we find that the preemptive rationality is coherent only on an internal basis. As soon as 
alternative knowledges are presented – which problematizes not just individuals but structural 
conditions too – we see that its universalizing claims might not be universally experienced or accepted. 
The divergence of subjective experience from claims of objectivity (Jackson 2012) points to the 




Working towards Peace / Safety, through Negotiation / Resilience 
How these respective – political and individual – solutions are achieved is worth exploring, so that we 
can more fully understand the assemblages of knowledge supporting each perspective, and how these 
knowledges relate to each other (or how they don’t). This second part of the chapter examines how 
ex-militant narratives, which focus on negotiation and trust, are silenced by the discourse assumed by 
Prevent, which takes individuals as inherently problematic and in need solely of resilience in the face 







Northern Ireland: Negotiation and Relations of Trust 
As we have seen throughout the thesis, former combatants focused consistently on attempting to 
affect their immediate surroundings and aspiring to achieve political changes. This required, in the 
interviewees’ words, a process of discussion and interaction: R28 said that “nothing… was going to 
change my view that we would have to get the British to negotiate at the table.” Negotiations are 
essentially relational exchanges that allow for (re)configurations of space and time (Massey 2005). 
They were paramount to how former combatants expressed how the conflict could be resolved, and 
were ultimately materialized through the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Former combatants framed 
the three decades of violence as being concluded through this political settlement that involved 
bargains with their paramilitary organizations themselves (also see: O'Brien, B. 1995; McDonagh 2004; 
De Breadun 2008). 
Considering micro-practices of negotiation, many ex-militants (and a couple of interviewees 
who didn’t engage in violence) who now act as peace workers in contemporary Northern Ireland 
articulated a process of dialogue – founded upon trust, with mutual listening and learning – as 
fundamental to contributing to a lack of violence. Outreach and education performed by interviewees 
in Northern Ireland did not manifest through moralizing claims about the absolute illegitimacy of 
violence (claims which are seen in Prevent's operation). On the contrary, peace activist discussions 
with young people about violence were framed merely around its strategic shortcomings in today’s 
context, and also its necessity in certain contexts. R23 mentioned that when speaking to young people 
during work with youths or when giving talks in schools, former combatants would not make absolute 
claims about violence being wrong: “We would explain how the circumstances [during the conflict] 
warranted [violence].” L45, and all others who brought up their role in discouraging young people 
away from a life of criminality and violence, spoke in the same way about not trying to persuade others 
of the moral reasons for not using violence, but instead they highlighted the futility and personal 
consequences of doing so: “If a young person gets up and says, ‘I wanna go out and kill somebody’, I 
say, ‘OK, you’re gonna do that but do you know the consequences? Somebody’s gonna kill one of your 
family.’” R43 and R47 spent much of the conversation explaining how the process of engaging with 
armed dissident groups manifests. R47, who didn’t become engaged in the conflict, explicated the 
process of negotiation his conflict resolution organization utilizes with such groups: 
 
And you say, “Ok, making no judgment about the validity of you saying ‘it’s about continuing 
the armed struggle’, do you think you have the capacity to continue the armed struggle to the 
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extent it’s gonna need to be continued to secure your aims and objectives?” So you get 
feedback about “well it’s about keeping the frame of resistance alive and it’s about making 
sure the state never feels accepted within the six counties.” And you have dialogue about 
“well is there other ways to do that than putting unnecessarily putting your volunteers in 
Maghaberry prison for a long time, or maiming or killing the police officer or prison officer, do 
you think that threatens the British state? Do you think British ministers sit in London and go 
‘Jesus the dissidents have blown up a prison officer from Maghaberry prison’, do you think 
they even talk about it?” 
 
Both R43 and R47 said (in separate interviews), like other peace workers did, that the role of violence 
was not necessarily illegitimate, and could be legitimate in some circumstances. This extract points to 
an open, genuine conversation, a dialogue of finding mutual ground together. If negotiation was a 
functional component of Prevent's operation – which is not the case – it would not be grounded in 
such disregard for the moral high-ground: as the previous chapter demonstrated, it is embedded in 
moralizing to citizens. As we have seen in previous chapters, a functional component of Prevent's 
operation is  moralizing from a point of detachment: this (illusion of) positional distance (Haraway 
1988) stands in stark contrast with the extracts from ex-militants here, for whom negotiation is a 
requirement of moving towards peace. 
Former combatants also spoke of not wanting to discourage others from continued 
involvement in criminality from a position of “we know best”, but instead as bearing some costs 
themselves and showing vulnerability, in order to “create relationships and trust with… armed groups” 
(R43) or those who might be(come) involved in criminality. The peace initiative described by L26 
demonstrates this point well. He mentioned that he had co-founded an organization in the 1990s 
which took 16-25 year-olds from both sides of the conflict away from their localities, to foster their 
disengagement. He said that many were “involved up to their neck in paramilitaries. UVF, UFF, UDA, 
Red Hand Commando… [and] IRA [and] INLA,” or involved in other criminality. They would do activities 
like assault courses together: 
 
So it was practical action but the fact that you were doing these things with them, you weren’t 
telling them to do it, you were doing it with them. You were giving them a sense of belonging 
to something that was positive. You were giving them confidence in you, they could see you 
slipping and getting the mud around you. In my case I broke my leg in three places doing the 
last parachute jump… Unless you were actually doing the things with these people and then 
sitting down they’re not gonna listen to you. 
 
Articulating the breaking of his leg as associated with confidence in his authenticity, an association 
that for him established bonds of trust and ultimately produced demobilization. He later mentioned 
that, as a former combatant-turned peace worker, he would have credence when supporting 
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individuals who were facing prosecution, offering character references and standing up for them in 
court. He said that speaking on their behalf or defending them – and getting stuck into the activities 
designed to foster their demobilization – succeeded in helping them move away from the peripheries 
of or involvement in militant organisations (and other criminality). But he explained that exercising 
vulnerability was essential to gaining their trust and respect, and to demonstrating authenticity, which 
often led to their disengagement. When speaking on their behalf in court, 
 
I [would say to them], “I’m putting my neck on the line for you young man!” “I know [L26] I’ll 
not let you down.” And they didn’t let me down, just because someone had someone had the 
guts to stand up on their behalf and speak for them where nobody else wanted to know them. 
 
In a similar vein, R24, who manages the youth outreach of a major republican former combatant 
organization, equated “the most realistic and genuine projects [that are impactful]” with 
transparency. He said that when going into schools, “We put ourselves up in the firing line, and say, 
‘Listen, go ahead, what're you gonna tell me, what're you gonna say to me, what do you want to ask 
me?’” He described a mutual process of learning from each other and being vulnerable, saying that 
“I've got a pair of balls to face up to… my own weaknesses and [failures].” Peace worker R43 said that 
his conflict resolution organization had fostered the demobilization of an entire dissident group. He 
remarked that his organization “doesn’t condone or condemn attacks, which makes it unpopular with 
government but effective at demobilizing groups.” Paying the price of popularity with the government 
was represented as building trust with those “who are outside mainstream society because they 
believe that what’s happening to them is wrong” (R43). Like the many instances seen in the previous 
chapter, authentic knowledge exchange was not articulated as unidirectional and coming from a 
position of invulnerability, but as constituted through flowing displays of vulnerability and coming 
alongside those who considered violence as appropriate. We will see how differently this logic of 
knowledge-exchange is enacted through Prevent, and how its operatives do not overtly presume a 
position of humility. Instead, rather than engaging in mutual relations of trust, potentially divergent 
individuals are situated as problematic and taught personal resilience in order that they change. 
Before we examine Prevent, however, the logic seen in ex-militant testimony – assuming the 
legitimacy of political aspirations of those who ‘pose risk’, coming alongside dangerous ‘others’, and 
engaging in relations of trust – precludes space opening up for those who present a material danger 
to be seen as separate, or in need of correction. I asked R43 What do you think of the role of 
rehabilitation for people who were involved in political violence? His reply, as a peace activist and as 




Well I certainly wouldn’t use that word. Because rehabilitation in those terms implies that 
they did something wrong and they need fixing. And I don’t see it that way at all. Somebody 
who took up arms believed that what they were doing was right. It was a political decision 
that made them do it, I don’t have any difficulty with that at all. 
Considering this rejection of the framing of rehabilitation, and remembering how ex-militants 
consistently subverted any position of moralizing, shows that ‘potentially-risky’ people are not seen 
as a suspicious or part of a suspect community (something which infuses Prevent's operation). 
Potentially dangerous individuals – even those who have caused harm – are not made other, separate 
objects of study or recalibration, but are called “volunteers” (R47) and are humans to be loved: L26 
said about those he works with through his peace initiative, “I do care, in fact I love you, as a father 
loves a child I love you.” He continued, making the case that this position of genuine friendship, trust, 
and humility disrupts the logic that “because they were excluded, they could exclude everybody else.” 
It should be eminently clear that this perspective outlaid by ex-militants does not impel a desperate 
search for ‘the potential divergent’, which is a foundational component of the preemptive rationality. 
Displays of humility, camaraderie, and vulnerability being framed by ex-militants as important to the 
minimization of potential danger goes some way to unsettling the way in which Prevent would see 
and manage ‘risks’. As we will now see, assumptions of suspicion and the construction of some form 
of suspect community are fundamental to its rationality. 
 
Prevent: Resilience as Solution 
So how does Prevent respond to this knowledge and experience, that situates politics and negotiation 
as foundationally important to mitigating the production of violence, or encouraging the prominence 
of peace? Through the testimony of practitioners, we will see that any consideration of political 
negotiation is subsumed by an obsession with making those with grievances resilient enough to 
withstand their environments. Channel interventions are premised on the inherently risky and 
vulnerable subject being able to be moulded, reshaped, and remade through directed self-efforts, 
towards a point of self-governance (see discussions in: Omand 2010; Elshimi 2015; Reid & Chandler 
2016). Concerns about how to fix broader environments become hidden, in a significant disjuncture 
between the two worlds of understanding. Where ex-militant testimony focuses on negotiation, the 
primacy of politics, and trust, this section on Prevent looks at how discussions of space and time are 
closed down, at how resilience is posited as the solution to injustice, and at the universality of 
suspicion in anticipatory risk-governance. Because the vulnerability of ill-educated citizens is 
problematized in the occurrence of any social or political disequilibrium (Giroux 2004; Reid & Chandler 
2016), the solution is posited as fostering their ability to “bounce back [in order to increase] the[ir] 
self-reliance” (Omand 2010, 60,13). Where Northern Irish testimony pivoted around negotiation and 
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mutuality, one of the bedrocks upon which Prevent is built is the technology of resilience: vulnerable 
subjects are the cause of social problems – fixing them becomes paramount. CM1 made the case that 
“to reduce vulnerability is a successful case” of counter-radicalization. The drawing of vulnerability 
explicitly into risk-consciousness and its reduction into the mitigation of terrorism risk were consistent 
themes of Prevent interviews. 
Discussing trauma with Prevent practitioners revealed how resilience is posited as the solution 
to the risk problem. I asked PLead16 What do you see as the most hazardous vulnerabilities and signs 
of radicalization? Rather than contest as problematic the idea that ‘vulnerabilities’ might be 
considered hazardous, she responded, “I mean there are things that spring to mind, you know mental 
health issues, isolation, people who’ve experienced trauma.” I asked a Channel mentor (CM13) about 
the motivations behind violence, and he replied that in both his post-crime cases and non-criminal 
Channel cases, “It comes back to what I call human factors, it’s trauma. Notional dysfunction, family 
breakup, domestic violence, social exclusion, isolation, fantasy, escapism. All those kinda things.” 
Intervention itself is a technology that makes its subjects invisible (Bachmann, Bell, and Holmqvist 
2015, 9), re-instantiating the locus of the problem as the individual vulnerability and lack of resilience. 
Another mentor (CM8) spent a significant amount of time explaining the “lived experience” of many 
Muslims in England, and how it is infused with discrimination and exclusion from society: 
 
All of this adds to, “You don’t belong, and you're a threat these evil things you and your people 
keep doing.” And no one else has to answer for things of people they share similar ethnic 
grouping with! We don’t… talk about “why did the guy who drove his car into people at the 
mosque” – the average white person isn’t made to answer for that. 
 
Descriptions of trauma similarly saturated ex-militant testimony, some mentioning it explicitly: R37 
said, “I witnessed the eviction of a family from [the] High Street. That again traumatized me I suppose, 
seeing a young family being evicted from their home.” Yet rather than look to the externalities which 
caused the trauma and the conditions that allowed for it (as ex-militants did invariably), the fulcrum 
of the Prevent operation is the trauma itself. Instead of addressing this social or political environment, 
Prevent scans the horizon to spot the individual who might act on the basis of this exclusion and gives 
them “wrap-around care to put them on a safer path before they go down a route towards violence” 
(PC6). Any sense of meaningful environmental concerns disappear behind considerations of how to 
discourage the response to trauma from presenting itself as danger. PC5 said that “we… do our best 
to try and make people not as vulnerable and not engage with groomers.” The variable in the risk-
equation is the citizen – or more accurately their (oblivious) openness to the risk factors that attach 
themselves onto the individuals (explored later). The individual must become sturdier, more rugged, 
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braver: a masculinized and resilient subject in the face of anything outside (Butler 2016). Because 
Prevent cannot look outside the individual, the entire focus is fixated upon encouraging the person to 
be able to withstand any external pressure (Mavelli 2017). 
Risk-management solutions are articulated around education coupled with an ability then to 
self-educate (see: Davies 2009; Already, Taylor, & Karnovsky 2014; Ghosh et al. 2017). The acquisition 
of information, along with the ability to think critically for themselves, was a point of total unity in 
how Channel mentors framed counter-radicalization success. CM3 said that “the only way to get to 
that point [of “minimizing the risk”] is through critical thinking.” CM10 said, “It’s about opening 
minds… [And then] you make up your own mind, it’s your own choice, you are responsible.” After 
being asked what signs he would identify as showing progression away from posing a risk, CM1 
remarked that “if they’ve got an accessibility to like learning – obviously education and awareness are 
often the enemy of prejudice and discrimination… [then] I guess those are markers.” However, (self-) 
education was occasionally described by ex-militants as a distinct provocation towards violence. After 
discussing how his parents’ and his own circumstances had been similar, R37 suggested that the 
difference in why his parents didn’t become involved but he did was simply down to 
 
education. [Me: Really?] Yep. Education. One of the things was the enabling of young 
nationalists to get their own education, free education. And young nationalists began to go to 
university, started to get really well educated, and were able to articulate the needs of the 
nationalist population. That was the big change… I did do a lot of studying about Irish history 
and I decided that the only way we would have any sort of decent life was to end British rule 
in Ireland, and that’s what I set out to achieve. 
 
This chasm between the worlds of ex-militants and Prevent can be explained through how the Prevent 
programme relays the (un)importance of political relations. For the purposes of preemptive 
intervention, the only space is individual vulnerability, and the only time is the present moment. We 
should not educate ourselves about our external environments, but simply about how we can become 
more resilient in spite of them. The terrifying material catastrophe (space) of the future (time) 
becomes concealed underneath concerns about what to do with the individual in front of us, right 
now (Aradau 2004). We can see this more clearly by taking the generative logic of intervention. Butler 
(2009, 47) writes that the state attempts “to define itself as protected permanently against incursion 
and as radically invulnerable to attack.” Yet the state is, like its constituents, inherently vulnerable, 
always seeking to make itself more secure in a never-ending venture, always obsessing with its 
weaknesses (Heath-Kelly 2016b,2018; Reid 2016b). The imposition of knowledge through Prevent – 
of, for instance, the importance of resilience training – is not from those in a position of invulnerability 
down to those who are vulnerable. Discourses of resilience (through education and critical thinking) 
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do work only one way – but it is from those with revelation of their vulnerability and need for 
resilience, to those without this crucial awareness. For those already ‘in the know’ of their vulnerability 
and their need to self-secure, they are impervious to learning from those unaware of their own 
endangered state. The “Gospel of Prevent” (CM8) is that everyone can and should become more 
resilient, because they are ultimately fragile. The Great Commission of Prevent is therefore to inform 
others there is infinite learning to achieve, more resilience and security to move-towards-but-never-
reach. Because those who don’t possess this crucial knowledge are unaware of their condition, and 
might pose a risk, it becomes irrational – and even dangerous – to learn from those questioning the 
premise of this rationality. This became evident when practitioners implied to me that opposing 
Prevent equated to potential support of terrorism (Pettinger 2020b). Indeed, Giroux (2004, xx) 
observes that “politics becomes empty as it reduces citizens to obedient recipients of power… while 
shaming those who make power accountable.” Where former combatants sought to move through 
space (by trusting others) and time (learning from them how to move forward), Prevent must focus 
on the otherized individual in the present moment in order that the horrifying future it imagines does 
not materialize. 
This closure of spatial and temporal relations by preemptive intervention presents a particular 
schizophrenia, and an unquestioning passivity. Had I suggested to practitioners that the state should 
respond to external shocks (like an invasion or imposition of sanctions) through resilience so that it 
could manage itself more effectively, without reverting to spatial and temporal relations (brokering 
peace or trade agreements) they would have been confused, if not flabbergasted (on the political 
deployment of ‘resilience’ in counter-radicalization discourses, see: Stephens & Sieckelinck 2020). The 
disjuncture was picked up in many interviews with ex-militants, who spoke of the hypocrisy of the 
(British) state engaging in violent relations – interning, killing, torturing – whilst moralizing about 
resilience and behaving as a responsible individual. I showed R43, who was familiar with Prevent and 
was one of the Hooded Men (13 men whisked off the streets during the conflict and tortured by British 
special forces for a week), the ‘signs of radicalization’ list of ERG risk factors that undergirds Prevent 
(NOMS 2014). He became visibly frustrated, and remarked: 
 
Everything they [the British state] do[es] is the opposite: “don’t do as I do, do as I say.” It’s just 
silly… They’re talking there about dehumanization, for fuck’s sake! [Laughs] They’ve got- how 
many black sites have they got for taking people away? How many people have they tortured? 
In England. How many people have they handed over to in America, to Abu Ghraib, 
Guantanamo, all those places where they treat people appallingly, and then they say “go on 





Had I drawn Prevent's logic out further in this interview by suggesting that the solution for people like 
him not to pose any risk to society or the state was to become educated through critical thinking, 
ultimately to a point of resilience, I can only imagine that he would have become further enraged and 
possibly terminated the interview. Reid makes the point that, 
 
The resilient subject is a subject that must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the 
world, not a subject that can conceive of changing the world, its structure and conditions of 
possibility, but a subject that accepts the disastrousness of the world it lives in as a condition 
for partaking of that world and which accepts the necessity of the injunction to change itself 
in correspondence with the threats and dangers now presupposed as endemic. Building 
resilient subjects involves the deliberate disabling of the political habits, tendencies, and 
capacities of peoples and replacing them with adaptive ones (2016b, 57; also see: Joseph 
2013). 
 
Because this is a logic acquired by the state and its ever-evangelized citizens (through technologies 
like Prevent), individual vulnerabilities and spaces for more resilience become the only spaces that 
count. ‘Responsibilization’ is not responsibility for their relations with their environments, but is a duty 
for self-care and productivity in spite of them (Bracke 2016). Coping with circumstances rather than 
campaigning for their reformulation becomes the ideal. And the only time that counts is the present - 
the present is reconstructed as good-enough and worth preserving forever (Boukalas 2019; Adam 
2003). This is a counter-revolutionary rationality (Aradau & van Munster 2012) that excludes the 
possibility for protest: regardless of the experiences of injustice, an ideal is constructed of responses 
devoid of genuine responsibility or negotiation (Pendenza and Lamattina 2019). Where arrangements 
like the Good Friday Agreement can be made – are even desirable – through the eyes of ex-militants 
(despite occasional distaste with its terms), the preemptive lens disconnects the relationship between 
human action and material conditions (Luthar & Cicchetti 2000; Stephens, Sieckelinck, & Boutellier 
2019). Anything that is unproductive is ultimately founded upon misunderstandings and insufficient 
information, and so eruptions of violence are a result of uncritical and ill-informed reactions, which 
can be managed if their fragile state becomes properly understood and controlled through enhanced 
resilience. Despite all ex-militants recounting the material suffering they experienced, when asked 
whether Prevent's safeguarding approach – an approach which excludes the potential for 
environmental changes – might have worked to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland, PLead15 
replied, staggeringly, “[It’s] hard to say.” The world in which Prevent’s would-be ideal constituents 
exist, where lived experience and environments were narrated as directly impacting their choices, is 
subjugated below the obsession with the narrative of risk. 
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We can see how space disappears when we think of the centrality of suspicion to Prevent's 
operation. The construction of suspect communities, which are profiles of people positioned as posing 
some threat, is a widely-established product of risk-governance that centres race and space (Hillyard 
1993; Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; Sabir 2017; Wilcox 2017). In the context of preemption, abstracted 
risk factors are visibilized, and so the argument is put forward that Prevent has become “threat 
agnostic” rather than infused with racialized bias (Baldet 2020). Objective risk analysis detached from 
racial profiling is responsible for such targeting; lives deemed unproductive are picked out from an 
objective list for resilience-training. This claim, whilst superficial, is allowable because totalizing 
knowledge of the person is no longer required; observation and big-data analysis of a population’s 
behaviour is operationalized instead (Lyon 2014; McCulloch & Wilson 2016; Heath-Kelly 2017b). As 
we have seen in previous chapters, risk profiles are not (articulated as) intrinsic to the person but are 
detached, abstracted features of a population. PLead15 said that determining risk was achieved by 
asking “what are the risk factors present in those individuals?” The original documentation explaining 
the ERG factors says that “a balanced [assessment] needs to consider how the absence of protective 
influences has allowed risk factors to manifest for each individual” (NOMS 2014, 5, emphasis added). 
This perspective – the apparent detachment of risk factors from the person – means that even those 
having committed offences are “not monsters, they're not wicked” (CM13). They were simply not 
resilient enough. 
So does the suspect community thesis – a thesis founded in suspicion and wholly absent in 
how ex-militants described their outreach that sought to trust dangerous others – hold when the 
embodied person has disappeared? Rather than looking first to colour or creed, detached and 
abstracted susceptibilities are targeted for intervention (Butler 2009, 31). Those who are otherwise 
considered unproductive or insufficiently resilient are drawn in and set before the surgical tools of 
critical thinking sessions and leadership training courses. Yet this gaze still falls on particular groups, 
certain profiles: people who demonstrate they may not conform with this productive norm, those 
unable to wrench their emotional response from their environment. So those who become 
incorporated into the risk-obsessed assemblage include those with mental health issues who might 
not be deemed able to cope with very real injustices (“45-50% of my cases have got [autism spectrum 
disorder]” CM1), those showing anger about social or political issues (“people get cross and that’s why 
people have extreme ideas” PC5), and those who might not feel ‘onside’ because they are excluded 
(“if I [as a Muslim] have to pick a side it’s not gonna be this side, just cos I was born here I'm forever 
hated” CM8). In these examples, and through the focus on abstracted risk factors, we can see that the 
silencing of space and time occurs: the reason people become angry and the lack of intent become 
unimportant knowledge. People's stories – like those of ex-militants – fade away in light of their 
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emotional response and lack of personal resilience. Certain risks are visibilized which are associated 
with subjugated people groups, and so racialized (suspect community) logics remain (Wilcox 2017): 
they momentarily disappear but return through the back door, dressed in “risk agnosticism”. 
Seeing Alternatives: Conditional Disengagement, and De-radicalization 
The final part of the chapter looks at how ‘success’ is framed, with regard to the disparate objectives 
of negotiation and resilience – and how alternatives to violence were narrated. In particular it explores 
the two concepts of conditional disengagement from violence (in ex-militant testimony) and largely 
cognitive ‘de-radicalization’ (in Prevent interviews). It sets them as distinct from each other, in that 
the former stresses the importance of political change, where the latter allows only political 
continuity. The silencing of ontologies concerned with change allows the conditions of the present to 
be sustained as legitimate. 
 
Northern Ireland: Disengagement, Political Activism, and Political Change 
Former combatants spent some time discussing the conditionality of “armed disengagement” to their 
post-conflict life during discussions of how they performed peace outreach and explored alternatives 
to violence with young people. As we have seen in numerous moments during this thesis, ex-militants 
largely took no moral position on the use of violence, but instead spoke of adapting to current political 
relations. R23 said, “Back to the moral argument, [reform is] gonna happen, so why the hell are you 
gonna kill somebody?” This was a stance followed through into how those engaged in peace activism 
performed their work. Many initiatives have sprung up in Northern Ireland seeking to demobilize 
armed groups, to foster ‘greater integration’, or otherwise to contribute to a continuation of the 
peace. Many ex-militants now work as peace activists or conflict resolution mediators, by giving 
assemblies in schools together with those from ‘the other side’ to “deglamourize paramilitarism” for 
young people (L45), settling disputes between youth communities where violence occurs regularly in 
certain areas (especially around Belfast), or helping armed dissident groups to disengage. For instance, 
there are a number of former combatants involved with a scheme that utilizes mobile phone 
networks, for when skirmishes are taking place between young people at particular hotspots. Here, 
respected figures who live nearby – including former combatants themselves (like L39) – are called by 
locals to resolve tensions between groups, before violence escalates too far. Many spoke of their role 
as central to de-escalating tension and low-level conflict, noting that their influence pivoted around 
having “been there, done it, got the t-shirt” (L26), in order that those involved in criminality (or those 
on the peripheries of violence or criminality) might listen. Yet, as we have seen, ex-militants framed 
their aversion to violence in relation to the conditions in which they lived – even those promoting 
180 
 
youth outreach like R23, who said, “I’m not a pacifist. I just will not use weapons cos I’m gonna get 
what I want.” 
This conditionality – of the utility of violence depending on the circumstances – was no more 
patently clear than during an interview with peace activist R43. During this interview I had consciously 
adopted the approach of a Prevent practitioner, with my questions constructed as though I was 
attempting to determine how to minimize the risk of violence erupting. I had probed him on how the 
conflict could have been prevented through localized means, by stopping the formation of armed 
groups. He had already complained at this point that my line was “nonsense” and that “it implies that 
you know nothing about the subject.” He became quite irate, stressing, 
 
[But] if you don’t change the conditions then why wouldn’t we go back to the beginning? [Me: 
What do you think those conditions are?] The sectarianism of the state! [Me: And how could 
that be dismantled?] It can’t be! The state was set up as a sectarian entity! [Me: “A Protestant 
state”?] Yeah. [Me: So it’s inevitable?] Yeah. It really is. It may take another five years, it may 
take another ten years. If you look back in Irish history, every ten years or so, there’s an 
attempt at armed conflict. I just see it as inevitable. Sorry about this! 
 
It was clear from the tone in this moment that he was apologizing because he realized these were not 
responses the Prevent-style framework of the interview had been ‘reaching for’. His world – of 
conditionality and cause and effect, of negotiation and manoeuvring, of the primacy of politics – is so 
distinct from my (Prevent) world of localized preemption that he apologizes for the momentary 
awkwardness. The overriding narrative (from ex-militants and those like R43 working for peace in 
Northern Ireland) was that violence is strictly correlated to political conditions, and that its occurrence 
is “inevitable” given certain environments. This informed how his organization approached armed 
dissident groups, from a point of exploring alternatives to violence. He situated the cessation of 
violence alongside political reform. This is clear in the following extract, as we discussed his frustration 
at Prevent for its hypocrisy and for ignoring material environments. I asked him What would your 
[violence-reduction] programme look like? He replied, 
 
Instead of telling people what they should think, they need to give people information and 
allow them to think for themselves. And society needs to treat people with dignity and 
equality. And there’s none of that in there [in the Prevent documentation]. You treat people 
as a human being then they’re more likely to act as a human being. You treat them like a 
statistic, then they’ll baulk against it… [We tell dissident groups that] violence should be the 
last option as opposed to the first option… [and that] there are alternatives to engaging in 
violence. And the way society needs to run, needs to be run on a human rights basis. And the 




Suggesting that allowing people to think for themselves in this way – genuinely opening up the use of 
violent contestation in certain conditions as potentially legitimate – whilst emphasizing the equity of 
broader political environments, is very different from the desired outcome of Prevent’s resilience 
(cognitive ‘de-radicalization’ and political continuity), as we will soon see. 
During these conversations about the prevention of armed conflict, the continuation of 
political engagement played a primary role. R47 made the case that “part of it is about yes preventing 
conflict, but… it’s not about getting people to give up conflict and then just give up altogether.” Putting 
down the use of violence – in inappropriate moments – whilst emphasizing continued political 
contestation to bring about meaningful social existence, was a common theme of interviews that 
discussed peace outreach (L26,L35,L39,R23,R24,R43). R47 continued, saying that his role in fostering 
armed disengagement is 
 
also about empowering those people to say “look there are things wrong with British politics 
in Ireland” like… Brexit and how it’s gonna affect your way of life. You have a duty to inform 
yourself about how that’s gonna affect you and your family and those around you. Austerity 
measures, welfare reform, all those things are things you should have a voice in and you're 
right to be angry about, but it’s about how you direct that anger and what you do with it. 
 
So ex-militants consistently pointed the subjects of their peace outreach (be it schoolchildren, or those 
involved with or on the peripheries of dissident groups) back towards engagement with political issues 
they were frustrated about, discouraging violence where other peaceful means of achieving material 
change were available. 
 
Prevent: Cognitive ‘De-radicalization’, and Environmental Continuity 
We now turn to the desired response that resilience induces, the ideal direction in which Channel 
cases are ‘mothered’ and shepherded towards (Elshimi 2015). The consequence of diverting citizens 
towards being able to manage their experience of their own relations of space and time more 
effectively is that their environment evades problematization, allowing the continuity of unjust and 
oppressive politics. As Knudsen (2018, 8) writes, this ultimately produces a world “frozen in time”. 
The successful outcome of Channel-induced resilience was represented as cognitive reshaping 
of individuals, and bringing about a change in how they experience their environment. Continuity of 
the existing order played a prominent role, whereas assessment and treatment of grievances as 
genuine – outside of the individual’s personal experience of them – was foreclosed: 
 
Getting someone to a point where they can critically think enough to understand that they’re 
being manipulated by another group, that’s a successful case – getting them back in school, 
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making sure all the protective factors around them, so that he’s no longer deemed a concern 
(PPolice9). 
 
Any discussion about reforming any broader political circumstances was notably absent; the emphasis 
was entirely person-centric. Prevent practitioner Will Baldet said that Prevent has worked when 
somebody “has turned their life around, disengaged from violent extremist group or disengaged from 
legitimizing violence, [to] putting a positive spin on how they're going to change the world” (Talking 
Terror 2019). This was an altogether epitomic view that Prevent practitioners presented: the “spin” 
or perception of Channel cases “changing the world” mattered – but genuine engagement to bring 
about meaningful external reform did not. PLead16 made a similar point after I asked what constituted 
success. She responded, “[It’s] have you done an intervention, have you addressed the alcohol or drug 
misuse, have you sought greater support for mental health issues?” In none of my interviews with 
Prevent officials was it ever implied that directing cases towards effecting material changes to broader 
environments (environments which might have seemed important to the referred individual) should 
be a focus of its interventions. Instead, Prevent's constituents are situated as able to bear the burden 
themselves, and frustrations with systemic abuses can be directed away from engagement with 
democratic processes. Indeed, a would-be Extinction Rebellion activist was visited by Prevent police 
when he informed an NHS trust he wanted to join a protest (Evans 2019), and as we saw earlier, 
Mohammed Siddique Khan’s grievances were ‘actually his own problems’. Precluding any discussion 
around the primacy of politics, this modality not only stands at odds with the testimony of those 
whose ‘risk’ actually becomes materialized, it contravenes the call of the Communities and Local 
Government Committee for Prevent to foster “greater empowerment and civic engagement with 
democratic institutions, to strengthen the interaction and engagement with society not only of 
Muslims, but of other excluded groups” (2010, 3-4). 
Environments do form part of the conversation around Prevent, but they constitute an 
afterthought as the dispositif maintains a focus on the individual’s relationship with herself. Whenever 
the concept of intervening upon environments was discussed, it was in the context of moving an 
individual from one location to another, in order to enhance their personal economic or social stability. 
When reading the following extract, consider how the original problem is navigated: 
 
If you’ve got someone who’s living in an area that doesn’t get on with their neighbours that 
are predominantly black, or predominantly Asian or white or Christian… and that person’s 
having a sense of disconnection or they’re feeling aggressive towards their neighbours in that 
area, the housing representative can […say], “Actually we’ve got a like-for-like property but in 
a different area.” And while that sounds like quite an unusual – you can’t just do that for every 
case – if there’s a situation where there’s someone who has mental health issues, and he’s 
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agitated, anxious, aggressive, or neurotic towards groups of people because of like a factor 
around race or whatever, and they can find somewhere that’s alternative and that’s gonna 
mitigate that problem, it’s gonna stop that problem, then like that can be done at a Channel 
panel. [Snaps fingers.] There you go, the risk has been removed (CM1). 
 
The snapped fingers, followed by the mentor’s revelation that the problem has been instantaneously 
‘fixed’, reminded me of a conjurer performing a trick: the movement of the hand, away from the top 
hat, the sound of the fingers, the instant production of an unexpected and magical solution through 
misdirection (Kuhn et al. 2007). The problem no longer exists, the aggression incited by racial tension 
has disappeared because a house has been provided. Channel interventions attempt to re-direct the 
grievances or the affective impact of grievances: by talking and offering alternative solutions they 
steer vulnerable individuals gradually towards the liberal dream of rationality and economic freedom 
(Coppock & McGovern 2014, 248). It was common to hear the sentiment that “it is not just about 
‘have you bought into some radical ideologies’ but ‘you need a job’” (CM10). 
Prevent practitioners occasionally remarked that they encouraged cases to become involved 
in social projects, leadership training, and so on. Douglas Weeks (2019) similarly found that 
‘preventing extremism’ was interpreted as care for the elderly, sports programmes, and supporting 
the homeless. Stephens, Sieckelinck, and Boutellier (2019) note that these ‘counter-radicalization’ 
projects do not address the reasons referrals occur, and that people's agency to protest against the 
offence is deferred and replaced by agency to engage in alternative activities. Yet Prevent could never 
functionally understand these grievances as legitimate, at least when we consider the divergent 
solutions proffered. A final example to demonstrate how the sleight of hand works: 
 
The person went from holding extreme Islamic beliefs and attacking Christians and their 
religion and being very negative toward non-Muslims he went from that to an apprenticeship 
with the council, college, passing his driving test, University degree (AAha). 
 
Whilst I presumed that the individual being described here had also become less racist and bigoted, 
this is not what the mentor points to. The case was aggressive, and now they have passed their driving 
test. They were narrow-minded, and now they have got work with the local authority. The original 
object of concern becomes hidden, displaced beneath their new normality, their inclusion within the 
mainstream – resilient and productive – strata of society. The grievance doesn’t matter any more, but 
their normalcy does (Elshimi 2015). The examples demonstrate overtly the association of the everyday 
with terrorism risk: citizens’ employment is now relevant to national security. But they also show how 
the banality through which contemporary risk-thinking is operationalized could not be more starkly 
contrasted with former combatants testimony. Set against the determined purpose narrated by 
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former combatants in the telling of their stories, the extracts from Prevent interviews show how 
agency is rescinded in the preemptive rationality. The ability to respond and negotiate with an 
environment becomes delegitimized by the dispositif of risk, because of the repositioning of 
potentially everything – but definitely anything that is potentially unproductive and non-resilient – as 
inherently illogical, irrational, and dangerous. In other words, everything can become, in the moment 
of referral to Prevent, saturated with vulnerability, and devoid of meaningful agency. The natural and 
only response is to rescind the ability of those deemed unable to deal with their environments to 
meaningfully impact those environments. As everybody else is judged to be on this trajectory already, 
environments remain as they were: unaffected by productive citizens content with their 
environments, and unaffected by potentially dangerous citizens whose subjectivities are inscribed 
with irrational risky and threatening imaginaries, citizens who are consistently directed towards a 
passively-complacent – and ultimately an actively-reproductive – inclusion of themselves within their 
circumstances. 
Channel mentoring exposes its cases to new communities they might never have met, or helps 
them acquire jobs, in environments that encourage conformity. It would not, for example, encourage 
somebody referred for ‘animal rights extremism’ to apply for a job organizing Extinction Rebellion 
protests (Evans 2019). Rather than moving its constituents towards attempting to effect changes in 
material circumstances, Prevent produces conformity in the individual by situating them in already-
conformed environments. They are encouraged to apply to university, for instance, or provided with 
housing in an area with fewer problems. The claim made by Prevent, in its obsession with individual 
recalibration, is that structural oppression and injustices no longer need attention; they are an 
inevitable feature of social existence. Resilience, or moving the individual into a safe space until they 
are resilient, is the only reasonable response. As we have seen, the closure of politics produced by 
anticipatory risk-governance occurs by redirecting individuals away from the apparent reason for their 
referral – racist outbursts are stopped by finding the individual a job, concluding the case as ‘safe’. 
Even the original reason behind the initial referral as understood by practitioners is excluded: one 
mentor (CM13) spent time speaking about the culture of ‘might is right’, which for him fostered an 
environment where violence was more likely: 
 
People have unfortunately been programmed to believe that violence is the only way to 
change the world, might is right. That’s it. You know we don’t give people alternatives, in 
terms of how to change the world and how to bring about change. They’ve just been totally 




He had spent some time describing the fact that government (foreign) policy contributed to why 
people engaged in violence – also echoed by CM8. Both mentors complained about the challenges 
faced by Muslims in Britain, most particularly of their relative exclusion within society. Comments 
from ex-militants reminded me of these moments: they overwhelmingly emphasized that living in an 
environment saturated in violence contributed to their involvement in violence (see Thematic Chapter 
1). For example L45 said that “violence breeds violence as far as I’m concerned,” and L26 noted that 
“I was too far ingrained in the culture of might is right, and the weak go to the wall.” Yet, in all 
interviews with Prevent practitioners, no consideration was given to thinking about how Channel 
cases could direct their anger and frustration towards engaging in political activism to redressing 
environmental concerns – like this culture of ‘might is right’, or of racism, or of exclusion. This produces 
the scenario whereby “every single” convicted terrorism offender and every Channel case CM13 had 
dealt with named foreign policy as central to their concerns, but these grievances are roundly silenced 
as irrelevant. As PLead15 said, the claim that policy causes violence is “far too simplistic… [and people 
saying it] doesn’t mean we take that at face value.” So the environments that produce ‘might is right’ 
or frustration with foreign policy are left alone through the operation of Prevent – no matter how 
much critical mentors raise these issues as relevant to why their Channel cases are presenting risk 
factors. 
This final chapter will close by exploring extracts from two interviewees who spoke of the 
problems with the continuity produced by the precautionary logic that only explores individuals as the 
problem. The first is with a Channel mentor, who was speaking about mentoring cases with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder: 
 
So when I go and speak to someone and they say, “What you’re saying makes sense to me, 
your line of analysis and thought blah blah blah,” [then] I feel like I’m making progress. Then I 
go back two weeks later to see this person and they’re like “apples are apples, oranges are 
oranges” and they’re back with the on-off on-off, and it’s like “let’s start again” [laughs]. That’s 
the way it is, in reality, let’s start again, “Why are you feeling like that?” There’s NHS doctors 
as well that’ve said to me like you did, “What are your expectations of what’s successful, what 
looks like success in terms of a case who’s got Autism Spectrum Disorder?... What do you hope 
to achieve with them? We’ve been sending them for treatment for seven years, what do you 
expect to achieve with this individual when we have effected no attitudinal or behavioural 
change whatsoever, in seven years of intensive, weekly appointments? But you come along 
from the Channel project and you want to do what exactly? 
 
He was communicating his surprise that his cases, who process information differently because of 
their ASD, aren’t personally transformed after a few sessions with him, following years of therapy with 
mental health professionals. He left the questions unanswered, moving on to discuss the links 
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between mental health and extremism. I didn’t probe – I was conducting my first interview, was 
under-confident, and was trying to filter the vast amount of information as I learnt how Channel 
functioned. But the implication, from his seemingly rhetorical questions, from the rest of this 
interview, and from all other interviews I subsequently conducted, was that this is an intractable 
problem, and that ‘de-radicalization’ interventions are an unfortunate but necessary part of life in a 
society that wants to be safe from people who aren’t resilient, where mentors just “ha[ve] to de-
programme them” (CM13). This view, of the inevitability of insecurity, was contested by an account 
from B42, a high-profile barrister in Northern Ireland who prosecuted hundreds of terrorism cases 
during the conflict: 
 
There’s a big tranche of [people who] dislike the West, because of [historic injustices and 
hypocrisy like Sykes-Picot]… [So to] ‘de-radicalize’ someone, I think it’s a middle-class myth 
really… When a lot of these atrocities occur like Manchester and so forth, you can’t say what 
I’ve just said, you can’t [talk about] the number of people the West has killed in the Middle 
East, in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and so on, tens of thousands of people, children. In Western 
newspapers that doesn’t exist. So you can’t say [that] when there’s a terrible atrocity in 
Manchester… But we should! We should be saying that! Because maybe that would get 
through to people… It’s rather like in a way in the Republic [of Ireland] people would generally 
be either pro-Treaty [for partition] or anti-Treaty [against partition], and that still exists. The 
two main parties are entirely different mindsets, they are the parties borne of the treaty. And 
I’m sure if you scratched the surface of either of them, they’d tell you about all the atrocities 
the other committed during the civil war. And that was almost 100 years ago. So I’m not sure 
about “de-radicalization”. 
 
B42 spent a significant amount of time exploring why violence had erupted in Northern Ireland, and 
in mainland Britain, ultimately making the case that environments produce violence borne of his 
exposure to those he prosecuted during ‘the Troubles’. The intent of this thesis is not necessarily to 
align itself with this claim, but is simply to highlight how different the words of understanding of 
terrorism between Northern Ireland and Prevent are: post-conflict knowledge is founded upon 
relationships of space and time that allow for political change, whereas Prevent knowledge disappears 
this understanding and sees the present as ‘good-enough’ or inevitable, where individual resilience is 




Whilst Northern Irish ex-militants spoke about the primacy of political engagement alongside a 
military demobilization if alternative routes to peace are available, the preemptive modality focuses 
on cognitive conformity with little recourse to external realities. This is a deeply pessimistic 
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engagement with the world, which situates social existence in an eternal present and with citizens 
powerless to effect political change (Boukalas 2019). The first section explored how interviewees 
respectively described the problematization of environments or individual vulnerabilities. Ex-militants 
emphasized the primary of politics but Prevent officials spoke only of psychological solutions in the 
construction of an emancipated society. We then saw how these units were engaged with through 
negotiation or resilience, and the consequences of these disparate approaches in the opening up or 
closing down of space for contestation. The final section examined what this opening/closing produces 
with regard to change and continuity, with ex-militants suggesting the inevitability of violence given 
the presence of sufficient environmental factors, and Prevent practitioners noting a continuity of the 
present is good-enough, with its state of ineradicable insecurity. Preemptive logics say that society is 
no longer a process nor always (re-)emerging (Massumi 2015b, 87): it is here, it has emerged. The 
desirability of authentic, non-judgemental interactions is subjugated through Prevent's operation by 
connections that are devoid of genuine meaning. With a façade of caring pastoral relationships, the 
constituent element of Prevent interventions is distance from the subject, in order to impartially re-
calibrate the underlying vulnerabilities of referrals (Elshimi 2017, 122). These judgments necessitate 
a separation between subject and object, in order that all ‘risky' spaces can be rationally observed and 
recalibrated as resilient and productive. Where ex-militants described trust and mutuality as 
necessary to produce meaningful exchanges, by definition the preemptive rationality does not listen 
to those unaware of their own dangerously vulnerable state – it would not only be illogical but 
potentially catastrophic. The thesis now moves into its conclusion, where I will provide a brief 
overview of the research, present some reflections from the research, and finally draw the empirical 
material together. Issues of banality and temporality are discussed in the context of the chasmic 
disjunctures between the two discourses. I emphasize the potential for subjugated knowledges to 









This final section draws together the story told throughout the thesis – that Prevent ignores the very 
stories of those people it attempts to make claims about. Throughout the thesis I have been 
attempting to make more intelligible the “nature of the present”, a work of illumination which seeks 
to open up space for “possible transformation” to take place (Foucault 1988, 36). This is an important 
venture; as Massumi (2015b viii) writes, “The task of philosophy [i]s understanding the world as an 
ongoing process in continual transformation.” Seeing politics as a moving, disruptive process, enables 
new imaginaries to be drawn (Massey 2005, 11). It is imperative, in the words of Giroux, for 
(concealed) spaces to be investigated so that the administration of power can be examined, to see 
how modes of “social control [are] organized” (2004, 18). 
Two discourses have been explored across the research: preemptive governance (or the 
testimony of risk-managers), and the subjugated knowledge of its most ideal constituents (ex-
militants, or the ‘materialized risks themselves’). Although the British state recognises Northern Irish 
ex-militant violence as comparable to contemporary terrorism in Britain (Charles Farr, quoted in 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2012, Q309), Prevent makes the testimony of ex-
militants invisible through its operation and refuses to learn from their journeys in and out of 
militancy. I have exposed Prevent’s reliance on a particularist epistemology that separates ‘risk’ on 
mainland Britain from another part of the UK, whereby research participants argued that “extremism 
in Britain is quite unique” (PPolice9). The apparent clash between the opinions of Charles Farr and 
PPolice9 reveals that the British state has not made a studied comparison of Irish and British militants, 
but rather has arrogantly assumed that its contemporary model of radicalization can be 
retrospectively applied to the conflict in Northern Ireland. The regime of truth allows for no 
exceptions, and thus silences or invisibilizes the voices of militants from the most profound local 
conflict of our time. 
This thesis has explored this relationship of invisibilization over four thematically organised 
chapters, comprised of extensive testimony from both eras of British counterterrorism. The first two 
of these explored the way in which ex-militants and Prevent practitioners articulated the journey 
towards engaging in ‘terrorism’; why does violence take place, where does the ‘risk’ lie? We saw how 
motivations were described by those who engaged in violence during the Troubles, and then the 
difference between this testimony and some of the 22+ ERG risk factors. The following chapter 
investigated how the issue of agency was negotiated differently in both sets of interviews: how does 
Prevent’s premise that vulnerable people are drawn without conscious awareness towards violence 
sit with how ex-militants framed their decisions? The next two thematic chapters moved onto 
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discussing the way in which interviewees spoke of the premise of preemption itself through the 
contrasting modes of movement and fixing, nomadology and the State, unknowing and striating 
(Deleuze & Guattari 2010). The final chapter explored the logical conclusions each discourse drives 
towards. 
Again and again throughout the thesis, Northern Irish interviewees framed their involvement 
as intricately related to their relationships with environments, history, and politics. Yet Prevent 
excludes the possibility for historical and spatial explanations from informing its risk-obsessive 
rationality. We have seen how the dispositif of risk produces its worst fears in a distilled form in order 
to direct society in a manageable fashion (Peck 2013, 147; Massumi 2015a), and how it precludes the 
potential for negotiation with systems and structures through its focus on the individual on the basis 
of a psychological framework. Equally, we have seen how former combatants narrated political 
contestation and environmental reformulation as fundamental to their movements toward and away 
from violence. At every turn, these stories have clashed with one another, occasionally appearing so 
foreign that interviewees laughed, became angry, and swore. But the silences were also presented 
through the inability of questions to be posed: I could not ask ex-militants if mental health difficulties 
had incited their involvement or suggested they should have become more resilient to their 
environments. Moreover, I could not have suggested to Prevent practitioners that in order to minimize 
violence, Britain might reconsider its foreign policy agenda, and redeploy public funds towards social 
ends which encourage political activism and protest. Showing a sheet of the official ERG ‘risk factors’ 
to Northern Irish interviewees was about the furthest I felt able to try and push these two worlds 
together, and it was telling that each time I did, responses were that “it’s absolutely astonishing” 
(B42), “it’s fucking nonsense” (R43), and “like in the old Frankenstein movies [if a teacher referred 
somebody then] everyone would be hunting the teacher down” (L27). And when I put the former 
combatant framework to Prevent practitioners, which centred around government (foreign and 
domestic) policy, their responses followed the line that “it’s all very well that [somebody] says ‘well I 
did this for Iraq’… but it doesn’t mean we take that at face value.” The solutions posed by Prevent – 
discussions with mentors, finding somebody a house, and leadership training courses – compounded 
the focus away from anything considered by ex-militants. The two worlds of terrorism knowledge 
were often incommensurable.  
Before we move on to a substantive discussion of the themes of the thesis and what 
implications can be drawn from this research, I will provide some personal reflections on the process 






Undertaking research for and writing this PhD has encouraged me to think and see in a way I have 
never thought or seen before. I appreciate the connectedness of things to a much greater extent than 
before, and think far more deeply about what I see – and my position in relation to it. Reading post-
structuralist, feminist, and post-colonial critique has encouraged this, but just sitting with my 
interview data has also forced me to consider how the chasmic disjunctures between the worlds of 
Prevent and ex-militants might be explained. Seeing such contradictions required that I step back and 
let go of my liberal, probably quite conservative, political-science perspective. This lens, which 
encourages separation and categorization, would have struggled to make sense of the fundamental 
problems explored throughout the thesis. I was motivated by my reading and data to adopt an 
alternative way of seeing, a lens grounded in the critical tradition that encourages the questioning of 
language, assumptions, and my own position (Mies 983; Acker, Barry, & Gsseveld 1991; Denzin 1994). 
I have since spent a lot of time wrestling with this process. It has occasionally been painful deciding 
what to hold onto and what to uproot, and I still feel very much in the middle of working through this. 
But it has helped me empathize with others, and be able to articulate the connectedness of social 
existence, and how deeply embedded our lives are with each other. Being relatively new to critical 
theory, I have struggled with some pitfalls that critical research can be prone to: “guardedness rather 
than openness; aggression rather than submission; superiority rather than reverence; distraction 
rather than attentiveness; exposure rather than tact” (Felski 2012). There are inevitably some 
moments where all of these may be appropriate, but in being newly exposed to some of the power 
and responsibility of the critical approach, I have struggled to maintain humility, grace, and 
forgiveness, which are some of the most important things to me. 
I have also been disillusioned and saddened at points at how entrenched fear-infused logics 
are within the functioning of the world, and the minimal impact I can make to bring about any redress 
or alternative thinking. This has been on occasion particularly depressing – although it has also inspired 
me to agitate for change in this and other areas, like protesting with Extinction Rebellion to help move 
the planet away from global heating, and engaging with politicians on the British tax haven empire 
that fosters corruption around the world. But I see the micro-practices of power relations as much 
more fundamentally important – educating myself on the history of empire, challenging friends (and 
myself) to listen to and empathize with others, and disturbing prejudiced perspectives. I cannot now 
imagine a life where I do not pursue social justice as the primary motivation through which to live. 
The research has been emotional for me in other ways. At points I was utterly staggered by 
what I saw as the inability of some Prevent practitioners to see some of the contradictions in their 
testimony (also see: Pettinger 2020a), and I had to take time away from my work so that I could 
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process my anger and frustration in order to continue sustainably. Questions I would ask myself in 
these moments would be: how can practitioners ignore the perspective that people's environments 
are crucial and shape and constrain how people act, and how do they dissociate this from their own 
lives? Wouldn’t there be instances when they saw the use of material force as necessary, if not 
desirable, to protect themselves and their loved ones, and agitate for what they thought to be right? 
At various points during my research I have had to remind myself that practitioners (and I) exist as 
situated beings – practitioners have lived within a system that encourages divisions and separation 
rather than genuinely critical and deconstructive thought, and their approach (shapes and) is shaped 
by how they have experienced their own environments. This helped me depersonalize my anger away 
from single, specific practitioners and onto broader and historical logics, which I see as more 
fundamentally important to the implementation of preemptive risk-governance – especially as I might 
have seen the world very similarly to these individuals only a couple of years ago. Speaking with ex-
militants in particular has helped me to become more graceful and understanding of others’ 
experiences: these former IRA or UFF members were people who are regularly demonized by the 
media and politicians (especially republicans). But by meeting them face-to-face and listening to their 
stories, I was able to empathize with their position and see why they acted the way they did given 
their circumstances. 
At points I have felt extremely conflicted about my own positionality, and aware of my 
complicity in issues I'm critiquing. I have spent 80,000 words deconstructing a programme whose 
operatives I spent many hours speaking with, whose personability I often appreciated, whose work I 
was genuinely intrigued by. During interviews they were universally kind and helpful – yet my position 
at the time as a non-critical researcher, and being white and male, may have contributed to my 
relatively unobstructed access and personable encounters (see methodology chapter). I did not 
approach most (Prevent) interviewees from an especially critical position; it was only through 
engaging with critical literature afterwards that the significance of what interviewees told me started 
to become clear. So the contents and perspective of this thesis (and associated publications) very 
easily might upset and frustrate my Prevent interviewees, especially as they (and I) were not aware 
that I would be assuming such a critical perspective. I have found this dichotomy difficult to contend 
with. After one of my articles was published (Pettinger 2020b), a prominent practitioner called me to 
convey his emotions, and subsequently withdrew his participation from my research. Although I was 
somewhat sceptical of his intent, this was not easy to hear! How am I qualified to speak about 
emancipation when my research produces anger and frustration from another’s perspective (let alone 
my complicity in walking with ex-militants back through their trauma)? I have processed some of these 
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thoughts and feelings more than others, but they remain regardless. To draw the thesis to a 
conclusion, I now turn to a substantive discussion of the empirical material. 
 
 
Chronology of Thematic Material 
Interviewee testimonies have been unpacked over the course of four substantive chapters. The first 
two chapters were concerned with how ‘the terrorist’ narrated themselves and their socio-political 
environments, and how these stories contrasted with the knowledge of the risk-management 
assemblage of Prevent. In the terminology of Prevent, where is the locus of risk understood to be, and 
how does this inform interventions? These discussions took the form of considering their motivations 
(Thematic Chapter 1) and agency (Thematic Chapter 2). The next two chapters looked at the different 
starting points of the respective logics in order to situate the discussion on why the framings around 
motivations and agency were so different (Thematic Chapter 3), and finally at the logical conclusions 
of these framings (Thematic Chapter 4). After unpacking the progress chronologically, we will look to 
the causes and consequences of the chasmic silences we have identified. 
In Motivations and Risk Factors, we saw that former combatant testimony was saturated with 
accounts of injustices, environmental violence, and oppression. They spoke in no uncertain terms 
about their experiences as inciting their involvement: R30 drew comparisons between his involvement 
because of environments, and violence in contemporary Britain, remarking, “There were a million 
people destroyed in Iraq by Tony Blair. Is it unreasonable to think there’ll be at least one madman 
who’s gonna put a bomb in England! Who would be surprised?” Prevent practitioners, conversely, 
presented a perspective that presences only abstracted risk factors, silencing the explanatory power 
of these personal experiences (of injustices, environmental violence, and oppression). The logic of 
Prevent is eminently disinterested in deducing motivations. The aims spoken about by ex-militants 
become de-materialized in favour of a frenetic pursuit of the potential divergent from within a pool 
of risk-data: as Bigo and Guittet put it: “individuality is reduced to a stock of information” (2011, 488). 
Calculations about associations of potential risk factors are mobilized in place of seeking to 
understand. The testimony of ex-militants – those upon whom Prevent would have wished to 
intervene – which focused on historical and environmental causes, falls away as irrelevant. The ‘risk-
problem’ is instead located only in the present moment, and at the feet of individuals. Prevent situates 
violence as a localized phenomenon, problematizing and making visible the responses to environments 
rather than the environments themselves. Any consideration of structural causes is excluded by the 
assumption of the psychological origins of risk, because preemption is so concerned with “own[ing]” 
the future that it causes space and time to become folded into themselves (Massumi 2015a, 73). 
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The second thematic chapter (Negotiating Agency) explored the disparate narratives around 
agency and commitment. Prevent makes the claim that those who might pose risk possess an inherent 
inability to control themselves, and act as passive (and ill-informed) instruments coerced by others to 
do their bidding. Those who are visibilized for terrorism risk-related intervention are therefore 
children with mental health difficulties and those who demonstrate an explicit lack of intent. Examples 
of those categorized as suitable for intervention included those whose sessions were sanctioned 
because “I felt the young person I've been working with appreciates and values this opportunity” 
(PC6). But as much as this lack of demonstrable intent grounded Prevent interventions, ex-militants 
were equally vehement in their framing of involvement being a considered and purposeful response 
to their surroundings. Even where they accepted they had been influenced (even to a point of being 
‘radicalized’) by others and their environments, they universally narrated their involvement as 
conscious and deliberate, and almost without exception said they would have made similar choices 
again. Moreover, the conversation always moved back to considering the conditions within which they 
lived. Prevent ignores these accounts, making silent the association between serious grievance and 
terrorism potentiality, instead casting vulnerability as inherently problematic and as related to 
terrorism propensity. These two chapters – the first half of the empirical material – were characterized 
by accounts of how banality operates as a fundamental component of anticipatory risk-governance, 
and how this sits in opposition to the serious intent described by ex-militants. Where the intensity of 
circumstances that drew involvement was articulated constantly, Prevent redraws every moment as a 
counter-terrorism moment. 
The second half of the empirical discussion – the final two chapters – then moved to identify 
how disconnected the two accounts are with regard to their epistemological foundations, how the 
respective rationalities are operationalized, and what these logics ultimately produce. The third 
thematic chapter took a Deleuzean approach to reveal how interviewees spoke of the ability to ‘know’, 
‘categorize’, and ‘see’ risk. It showed how Prevent practitioners narrated a fervid obsession with 
striating, ordering, and identifying potential risk sites, yet ex-militants spoke of a contentedness with 
not detecting locations of risk, and a disinterest in hypothesizing about what might have happened if 
‘X’. Building on the intensity of ex-militant testimony from previous chapters, this third chapter 
explored how inevitability was narrated in interviews. These stories were infused with a disdain for 
reconstructions of the past, or speculating about future possibilities, because of the circumstances 
that engulfed them. Ex-militants suggested that to hypothesize in such a way was an “impossible” task 
(R34); they were uninterested in territorializing the space of risk-knowledge. Yet engaging 
hypotheticals and thinking about ‘what if' is the functional methodology of Prevent, according to the 
accounts of its operatives. This endeavour attempts to visibilize and categorize individuals who may 
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exist on the fringes of (un)productivity, those who may pose a potential threat to the neoliberal norm 
by not being resilient and productive enough. Its primary purpose is to remake such divergents into 
singularly constructive beings, shutting down the potential to imagine in non-binary ways. Where ex-
militants spoke of moving from dangerous to peaceability in a moment (territorializing ground and 
immediately ceding their position), Prevent practitioners spoke only in terms of unidirectionality 
(deterritorializing only to reterritorialize another space). Arbitrary, subjective, and confusing fault lines 
were seen in the drawing of the boundary between unitary productivity and potential threat: as PC6 
said, “It doesn’t help that radical sounds so similar to radicalization”. Ex-militants, conversely, avoided 
such disjunctures in stories situated around multiple motivations. They told of a strong desire for 
peace alongside convictions that violence was necessary – occasionally even considering their violence 
as desirable, pronouncing themselves “counter-terrorists” (L26). The potential to hold varied, 
potentially conflicting subjectivities is suppressed through the operation of Prevent, which instead 
imposes a non-negotiable and state-centric vision of society onto its constituents – and positions those 
who don’t (yet) conform as separate and dangerous. 
The final thematic chapter saw how both sets of interviewees articulated the logical 
conclusions of their respective focus and intentions. Ex-militants narrated continual negotiation and 
contestation, and the opening up of political space for trusting relationships with (even dangerous) 
others, as the only option to producing meaningful peace. But Prevent imagines the inverse: its 
practitioners spoke of ensuring the road to relative risk-minimization (in its privileged gaze that 
ignores structural violence) through bolstering individual resilience. The concept of perpetual 
continuity was explored by Prevent's universalized preemptive logic, which was disturbed by ex-
militant focus on change. The emphasis on individual resilience pursued by Prevent curtails discussion 
around environments, and overwhelmingly presumes the sufficiency of the status quo. It imagines 
into existence on behalf of the ‘terrorist other’ a subjectivity always able to be reformed and 
reimagined, ever-reconstituted towards non-contestation. Alternatives to violence, in the eyes of 
Prevent's practitioners, are immersed not in considerations of how to manoeuvre structures or enter 
into political negotiations with those who might think differently (or even be demonstrating material 
threat), but rather through a problematization of individual psychology and a subsequent 
strengthening of cognitive capacities to deal with their environments. People's relationship to their 
environment – rather than the environment itself – requires reconstruction: “the more we recognize 
that behaviour is a reaction then you have the ability to deconstruct and reconstruct [it]” (CM13). The 
dispositif of risk sees only abstracted risk factors attached to aggrieved individuals, where behaviour 
is merely a symptom of an inability to cope. This entire framework ignores the testimony of former 
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combatants, whose aspirations were explicitly and consistently contextualized within an agenda of 
transforming external realities: 
 
You’ll come up with a preventative strategy if you think what needs to be prevented is the 
waywardness of the individual who you want to get back onto the straight and narrow. But if 
his or her involvement in whatever they’re involved in is a direct result of repressive policies, 
then prevention would need to apply to you not them… but you’re not gonna get the Tories 




The thesis has painted a picture of two contrasting structures of knowledge, and showed how the 
assemblage of Prevent operationalizes claims about its hypothetical constituents that bear no relation 
to the testimony of these very constituents, who live in the same country, separated from Prevent’s 
reach by 12 miles of water. Derived from a study of ‘extremist-related offenders’, Prevent supposedly 
makes the most informed claims about convicted terrorist offenders like the Northern Irish 
interviewees from this research. Yet they overwhelmingly do not recognize categories or processes it 
mobilizes in its desperate bid to ‘minimize risk’. What does all of this mean, and what can we learn 
about the chasmic conflict between the two logics? What is produced by the exclusion of ex-militant 
experience from anticipatory risk-governance – what does it do to subjugate such knowledge? 
 One of the most significant conclusions to draw from the thesis is that the implications of 
experiences become silenced by the logic of preemption. Prevent assumes an incapacitated, irrational, 
imperfect individual as the location and cause of the risk. Under this rationality, externalities become 
hidden as a cause of violence. As the individual is imperfect, reforming extenuating circumstances 
makes no sense – it cannot bring about emancipation from the constant struggle to produce resilience. 
This is an intractable state, because it starts with the premise that external problems are merely 
“products of problematic vulnerable subjects, unable or unwilling to communicate and process 
information enabling efficient adaptive choice-making” (Chandler 2016, 142). Prevent practitioners 
realize that 
 
kids wanna change the world man, I think that’s a beautiful thing! Where is the outlets for 
them to engage in legitimate activity somehow? There isn’t, so therefore you almost push 
them… If you haven't got any recourse to [bring about change], violence is your only 
communication tool (CM13). 
 
If we take what we have learnt about Prevent – that it forecloses the ability to contend for meaningful 
external reform – we see this practitioner implying that Prevent (and preemptive governance more 
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broadly) itself makes violence inevitable. Relations of space, time and politics, which former 
combatants narrated as so intricately related to their violence, become dematerialized attributes 
related to a person’s risk profile, of interest only for the purposes of identifying vulnerabilities so that 
an individual’s experiential response can be appropriately managed. Though legitimized by claims that 
it enhances the material provision of national security, preemptive risk-management is characterized 
by a total disregard for whether its functionality produces a reduction in violence: “hopefully we do!” 
(PLead16). Negative experiences of external realities are cast as a psychological frailty, and instead of 
celebrating displays of empathy and vulnerability, these traits become problematized as dangerous 
attributes potentially demonstrative of terrorism risk. 
Projecting vulnerability onto another subject produces the appearance of one’s own 
invulnerability (Butler 2016, 4), but this is a façade which must remain hidden to uphold the 
continuation of such logics. We have seen that the fundamental conception undergirding the 
preemptive apparatus is that everything, everyone, everywhere, is exposed and at-risk. A ‘national 
security’ operation like Prevent is submerged in secrecy not only because its contents might expose 
material vulnerabilities, but also because the very façade of its invulnerability must be protected. 
Vulnerabilities are problematic and must be hidden (goes the logic), but the pretence of invulnerability 
– through which the act of inscribing others with vulnerable identities operates – must also be hidden. 
After all, risk-thinking is a circular logic, and were it to be disrupted or challenged – by suggesting that 
the state itself (or its officials, like Prevent practitioners) could be ‘vulnerable to extremism’ – the 
assemblage would unravel. The ‘invulnerable sovereign’ would suddenly be exposed as potentially 
vulnerable. The façade of invulnerability must therefore be protected to uphold the circularity. If 
experiences could make meaningful claims about material realities, opening up space to negotiate 
over them would disrupt the carefully-constructed doctrine that the state is not amenable to change, 
and is not vulnerable. Yet ex-militants spoke of disengaging from their own violence as a result of 
political negotiations, mutual shows of vulnerability, and openness to reform and de-escalation. 
Rather than being forced out of the use of violence, they articulated through hundreds of thousands 
of words the process of being persuaded that the state might negotiate, putting away their violence 
in response. In building a structure of knowledge that bears no relation to the experience of its most 
ideal subjects (former terrorism offenders), preemptive governance precludes the potential for an 
encounter with an(y) other, foreclosing the possibility for their “infinite subjectivities” to be drawn 
together and learn from one another’s experiences (Badiou 2012, 27). Instead, it sets the lack of 
awareness of the ubiquity of risk as a potential signifier of terrorism propensity, closing down any 
space to learn from anything outside itself. 
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The banality with which Prevent operates, especially in relation to the considerable intensity 
we saw ex-militants narrate throughout the research, functions to compound the hidden pretence of 
the state’s invulnerability, by dispersing responsibility and critical engagement up the bureaucratic 
hierarchy. Because “what might be a very justifiable lifestyle choice [could be] a sign of radicalization” 
(PLead17), teachers and social workers must divest decision-making capacity to those who have eyes 
to see. This visibilizing responsibility is borne by a combination of the “[state] expert and the 
imaginative, [a combination which] is able to negate its violence through its administrative 
appearance” (de Goede 2008, 110; also see: Simon 1988; Aradau & van Munster 2008). The acquisition 
of this power to inscribe by state ‘experts’ ensures the circularity continues and invulnerability remains 
hidden; it would be impossible for ordinary citizens to categorize other citizens as ‘dangerously 
vulnerable’ accurately because the signifiers are so banal. Rather than concede that these signifiers 
might just be banal, everyday, and justifiable, enlightened officials well-versed in risk-thinking are 
recruited to filter these into terrorist risk strata. Mobilizing security-consciousness through meagre 
tasks and ordinary observations like associating “us and them thinking” with terrorism potentiality 
ensures the continuation and extension of risk-awareness. Rather than fostering engagement within 
society – something ex-militants prioritized as central to bringing about meaningful peace – Prevent 
positions everyday encounters as potentially infused with terrorism risk. This banalizing of counter-
terrorism responsibility short-circuits the possibility for empathy; instead of a laudable goal it becomes 
a signifier of potential terrorism risk. Divesting oneself from judgments about whether everyday 
behaviour should be seen as risky, the endeavour to understand others’ relations of space and time is 
excluded from reasonable discourse and practice. 
These issues, of a closure of space and contestation (by associating banality with potential 
terrorism risk), brings us to the heart of the preemptive rationality: that temporality is mobilized as a 
tool of governance through which to direct social and political engagement. Where Northern Irish 
interviewees described the desirability of alternative modes of interaction through armed 
demobilization and peace agreements, Prevent relies on an inability to consider different forms of 
social relations. As the meaning behind material conditions fades, the relationship between cause and 
effect, between political disaffection and political consequence, breaks down. The only reasonable 
outcome is the continued occurrence of the present moment, again, and again, and again. What we 
have now is situated as the culmination of the future: the present is sufficient, and material 
inequalities and injustices are insignificant to the structuring of social reality (Peck 2013; Boukalas 
2019). The future exists merely as an “extended present” (Nowotny quoted in Adam 2003, 73), and, 
without the incentive to agitate for material transformation, “the only way to… actively mobilize 
people, is through fear” (Zizek 2009, 34; also see: Massumi 2015). It is not a norm divested of agency 
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or responsibility; on the contrary, Prevent cases are sent out into the world to spread the “Gospel of 
Prevent” (CM8) with their improved capacity to withstand exogenous shocks and their enlightened 
position of realization that risk can be found everywhere (Reid 2016b). A necessary restlessness is 
accepted by these new recruits: “it’s an ever-changing treadmill that we have to keep up on. It’s very 
difficult” (PC5; also see: Heath-Kelly and Strausz 2018). The continuous future of the present is 
inscribed on targets of Prevent’s operation by practitioners seeking to produce replicates of 
themselves. As Boukalas (2019, 474, emphasis added) writes, “The citizen is both the target and the 
agent of Prevent.” Successful cases are more resilient and now always suspicious (Pettinger 2020b) – 
they have accepted the paradigm that risk is everywhere, and have assumed a responsibility for 
identifying and counteracting it wherever found. 
What does resistance of anticipatory risk-governance look like? Massumi writes that 
“preemption is an effective operative logic”, constructing (a diluted version of) its worst fears as it 
moves so that it can observe and manage the future before the catastrophe emerges in full force 
(2015, 15). Because "’we create it’ [then] ‘we' the preemptors will always be right” (2015, 14). How is 
a self-justifying assemblage that forgets the very people it makes claims about and which needs no 
external validation able to be contested? Resisting a logic that makes the material world disappear 
could not be more important. Prevent closes down space for political relations and in so doing 
suppresses imagination: unless its constituents adopt the risk-obsessed perspective as legitimate and 
necessary (and act accordingly), they will remain ‘seen’ as potentially threatening. Without the ability 
to think critically, democratic debate is impossible (Giroux 2004, xix), and without “material struggle, 
‘another world’ would not be meaningfully thinkable” (Chandler 2016, 169). Opening up space for 
alternative futures, as was so central to ex-militant stories, allows the ideal democratic force to be 
manifested. Some have argued that anticipatory governance should be subject to more stringent 
checks, its worst impulses controlled through democratic means (Steiker  1998; Zedner & Ashworth 
2019). But this dominant ‘ontopower’ (Massumi 2015a) can be seen as a fundamentally anti-
democratic force, especially if we consider democracy to be 
 
not an institution, but essentially an anti-institutional force [that disrupts power structures. It 
is an] anarchic, disruptive element inside the political system. [It is] essentially, a force for 
dissent and change. One can best recognize a democratic society by its constant complaints 
that it is not democratic enough (Bauman 2000, 54-55). 
 
Listening to and learning from all citizens – demonstrated by peace activists in Northern Ireland even 
where it became uncomfortable and bore a cost – is illogical and hazardous under the dispositif of 
risk. But the testimony of ex-militants, which focused on including dangerous others to find a way 
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forward (opening up spatial and temporal relations), provides a substantial challenge to the circular 
claims of the dispositif of risk. Listening to the stories from ex-militants reveals that another way of 
considering ‘risk’ is possible. Another way for social relations to be conducted than an ever-expanding 
(self-)surveillance exists. 
Considering affective politics might move us towards a more sustainable position, especially 
since the anxiety-inducing assemblage of risk-consciousness produces affect by triggering the impulse 
to do something (Aradau & van Munster 2007). Since preemption constitutes its own self-propelling 
force, it does not need alternative causes or virtues or purposes to advance its aims of making ideal 
citizens. The rationalities behind risk-thinking are therefore driven only by “nonconscious affective 
means rather than through persuasive discourse” (Sabsay 2016, 282). As Prevent practitioner William 
Baldet remarked, “It doesn’t feel right to do nothing” (DryCleanerCast 2018, emphasis added). 
Because understanding affect is pivotal to understanding the operation of power (Massumi 2015b, 
32), Hardt and Negri argue that resistance should be drawn from engagement of affective politics 
(2005; also see: Sabsay 2016). What resistance looks like with regard to the dispositif of risk should be 
further considered, but I was struck at its circularity and self-serving logic when I showed the list of 
ERG risk factors to R43. He laughed aloud, commenting that the premise made no sense, and swore 
multiple times. I was drawn to smile, and maybe even laughed along with him in the moment, 
remembering the circularity of Prevent, and how strangely it characterized ‘risky ones’ to a point of 
absurdity in relation to their own stories. Un-subjugating knowledge and experience in this way, by 
talking to (and re-humanizing) those about whom claims of evilness or sheer irrationality are made – 
or those whom repressive measures affect – might produce an affective fulcrum of resistance through 
irony or laughter or sadness, when we realize they have stories too. 
However, the preemptive methodology advances on the premise that action is necessary. In 
the words of many Prevent officials facing criticism, “People should just get on with it, get on board 
with it” (CM3). In order to cope with the incessant and unending demands that the management of 
risk poses, and the associated fear of doing nothing, “You must simply act” (Massumi 2015, 13). The 
call for specific, material solutions is loud. The restlessness to find a solution in the face of 
inexhaustible risks is contrasted with the accounts of ex-militants, who frame violence as simply 
inevitable given certain environmental conditions. Yet practitioners consistently probed well what's 
the alternative to Prevent? It is tempting to engage on this premise, and indeed many academics do, 
often from a point of traditional theory, offering improvements to existing structures without 
“identify[ing] the conditions of possibility under which a domain of objects appears” (Butler 2009, 
109). Such an approach “relinquishes its claim to exercise criticism” (Horkheimer 1972, 178).  The logic 
of ‘doing something’ is not exceptional or restricted to risk-thinking. It pervades even this research – 
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I feel pressure to provide a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem of risk’. But this plays into the neoliberal solution-
obsessed paradigm, the politics of decision, fixating on the what rather than the why (Aradau 2004). 
Critical theory, in its ideal state, is performed through a methodology that intentionally slows down, 
reflects, and raises more questions than solutions (Ruitenberg 2004). Having provided an exposition 
of two fundamentally different worlds of understanding, and spoken of some of the foundational 
consequences of preemptive governance, it is tempting to suggest a step-by-step method of 
dismantling such a system, to offer solutions, to act. Instead, I will pose a few questions that might 
open up more space: 
 
- What does emancipation and resistance look like in the context of circular risk-governance, 
performed as a civic duty? 
- Can anything from the dispositif of risk produce democratic engagement? Does risk-thinking 
encourage anything that can produce emancipation; how can resilience be co-opted from its 
de-spatialized, de-temporalized contemporary deployment? 
- Are mutual relations of humility and vulnerability foundational to enabling a radically inclusive 
politics? 
- How can we further investigate the affective politics of preemptive risk-logics? How do we 
mobilize affective politics to move towards a more desirable future? 
- What language can critical theorists use to expose problematic logics more effectively, 
without as much complicity in their agendas? Should hegemonic identifiers (like 
‘radicalization’, ‘terrorism’, ‘risk’) always be reimagined and deconstructed? 
 
The thesis has demonstrated two worlds of testimony which consistently undermine the other, and 
probed the neoliberal context of the disjuncture which separates them. Prevent mobilizes imagination 
without reference to some of its most obvious constituents. As a result, the preemptive rationality is 
introduced into every crevice: once the purview of soldiers and intelligence operatives, counter-
terrorism is now a universal human duty. It “is no longer punctual, like a battle. It's on low boil all the 
time, it is no longer localized, like an occupation. The heat is everywhere” (Massumi 2015a, 69). 
Separating risk in England, Scotland, and Wales, from the part of the UK that has such a history of 
violence (and maintains a similarly divided culture today), exemplifies the silencing of history in 
operation through Prevent. Prevent explicitly ignores three decades of violent conflict in ‘the 
Troubles’, and the peace agreement which brought this latest episode in Irish history to a conclusion. 
Attempting to produce peace – or a lack of individual-violence – Prevent situates the contemporary 
moment in (British) history as sufficient, foreclosing the possibility of material reform, and negotiation 
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with those who don’t see in the same way. Hopefully throughout the thesis it has become clear why 
peace activist R43 might have made the comment about Prevent that, 
 
I think that the whole Prevent Strategy is a nonsense from start to finish. I don’t know who 
thought the thing up- if you’d have got a bunch of lunatics and said ‘put something together’ 
that’s what they’d have come up with. The people that developed the Prevent programme 
knew nothing about real life, in particular in working class areas. Honestly! 
 
As they are teased out and exposed as undesirable and illogical, practices undergirded by the risk 
dispositif may become displaced (Springer 2012, 102). This is my hope: that new ways of seeing, 
knowing, and being – founded upon radical inclusion, trusting self-scepticism of our own precious 
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